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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MOTIVATION AND THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION
In this dissertation, I provide an interpretation and defense of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of
the primacy of perception, namely, the thesis that all knowledge is founded on perceptual
experience. I take as an interpretative and argumentative key Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological
conception of motivation. Whereas epistemology has traditionally accepted a dichotomy between
reason and natural causality, I show that this dichotomy is not exhaustive of the forms of
epistemic grounding. There is a third type of grounding, the one characteristic of the grounding
relations found in perception: motivation. I argue that introducing motivation as a form of
epistemic grounding allows us to see how Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the primacy of perception
avoids both rationalism and empiricism. Whereas empiricism has argued that all the content of
our knowledge is grounded in causal interactions between the world and our senses, and
rationalism has held that experience does not suffice as a reason for knowledge, thinking of the
relation between experience and knowledge in terms of motivation allows us to see how
knowledge can be grounded in experience while at the same time transcending it.
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INTRODUCTION
Epistemology has long accepted a dichotomy between two sorts of grounds: reasons and
causes. According to this dichotomy, we can understand why we believe what we do in terms
either of reasons that justify our beliefs or in terms of causal interactions between our minds and
the world. This, for example, is this dichotomy that Sellars and McDowell give expression to in
distinguishing between a "logical space of reasons" and a "logical space of nature." In the logical
space of reasons, according to Sellars, we are concerned with the justification of beliefs, i.e., with
the giving and taking of reasons in favor of a belief. In contrast, in the logical space of nature we
are concerned not with justification, but with explanation. In understanding how the interactions
between our senses and the world cause certain sensations in us, for instance, we at most explain
our sensations. We are not responsible for these sensations – we cannot revise them in response to
reasons – and so in answering why we have these sensations and not others we are concerned not
with justification, but with explanation; not with the logical space of reasons, but with the logical
space of nature.
The first thesis of this dissertation is that the dichotomy of reason and causality is a false
one. These two forms of grounding, while genuine forms of grounding with respective and
exclusive domains, are not exhaustive of the forms of epistemic grounding. A central contention
of Maurice Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception is that neither reason nor causality
correctly describe the sort of grounding relations characteristic of perception. To understand
perception, he argues, we need to introduce a new way of thinking about epistemic grounds,
namely, what he – following the phenomenological tradition – calls "motivation" (MerleauPonty, 2012, p. 51). In the following chapters, I take up this thought, arguing that there is a form
of epistemic grounding which does not amount to justification, but also does not merely explain
our beliefs. Instead, it is the primary character of perception to solicit our belief. We find
ourselves existing in the world long before there is any question about the world's existence.
Indeed, perception convinces us so thoroughly of the world it presents to us that when the child
1

first ponders the merely ambiguous and incomplete distinction between wakefulness and
dreaming it is for the child an uncanny event. Primordially, perception does not justify our belief
in the world, but gives us over to this belief, which is why a project of radical doubt, like
Descartes', is always possible. When the question of the world's existence emerges, it will seem
as if perception, not justifying our faith in the world, merely explains it. Or, on the other hand,
perception may be taken as one reason, among many, that factors into our deliberation about the
world's existence. The ease with which perception gives itself to be taken as a reason might tempt
one to think that the primary bond between perception and knowledge is one of reason. And yet
this would be to mistake the initial situation, in which our perception of the world solicits our
belief, rather that counts as a reason in favor of the world or mere explanation of the circumstance
that we believe. Our first epistemic bond with the world is motivation.
And yet, motivation is ambiguous, in the sense that it contains the germ of the distinction
between reason and cause, or we might say reversible, in the sense that any case of motivation
can be taken up as a case of reason or of causality, but not both simultaneously. As we saw above,
one's perception of the world permits itself to be taken as a mere explanation of one's belief in the
world or as a reason in favor of the world's existence. The same ground, which initially instilled
in us belief, is ready to be taken as either explanation or justification. When reflection comes back
over the relation between perception and knowledge with these two terms, it traps itself in an
antinomy: On the one hand, experience must be the ultimate cause of our knowledge. But on the
other, experience does not suffice as a reason for our knowledge, and the empirical circumstances
in which we acquire knowledge concerns merely the explanation of our possession of knowledge
and not the justification of this knowledge. This antinomy describes the opposition of empiricism
and rationalism in brief.
This antinomy, which we will see governing a variety of epistemological questions, can
only be resolved by returning to the element from which both derive: motivation. Only by
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describing the ambiguous mode of grounding provided by motivation do we achieve a solid
understanding of our epistemic situation.
Understanding the grounding relation between perception and knowledge in terms of
motivation leads me to my second thesis: that all our knowledge is founded in perceptual
experience. Perception and knowledge stand in what Husserl would call a Fundierung relation,
i.e., a two way relation in which the latter is inseparable from, or demands supplementation by,
the former, and the former requires clarification and determination by the latter. This thesis does
not, then, dissolve any distinction between the two, nor does it attempt to reduce knowledge to
perception; it only shows how knowledge has its origin within perception. This is the thesis of, as
Merleau-Ponty puts it, the primacy of perception: "The perceived world is the always
presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence. This thesis does not destroy
either rationality or the absolute. It only tries to bring them down to earth" (1964, p. 13). It is
motivation that will allow us to get this thesis into view, for as we will see, once we cease to
approach the relation between experience and knowledge in terms of causality and reason, we are
free to move past the dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism which cuts to the core of modern
philosophy.
A. Method
A couple methodological points need to be made from the beginning. This dissertation is,
first of all, a work of phenomenology. It is oriented toward an accurate and precise description of
the experience of knowledge, of what it is like to come to know. But the phenomenological
framework that I develop will allow me to intervene in epistemological debates. In each chapter, I
resolve an epistemological debate precisely by moving past the phenomenologically inadequate
terms that the debate trades on and attending instead to the primary phenomenon of knowing:
solicitation.
First, there are some principled worries about connecting phenomenology and
epistemology in this way. On the one hand, one might wonder whether phenomenology can be
3

used to answer epistemological questions. For example, as Pietersma has pointed out, the sort of
externalist who thinks that justification has nothing to do with what is phenomenally available to
subjects might think that phenomenology cannot help us with epistemological questions (2006, p.
10). 1 On the other, one might wonder whether phenomenology is properly interested in
epistemological questions. But, as we will see, the debates into which I intervene are stymied by
an inadequate phenomenology of knowledge. Consequently, once the phenomenological
backdrop of these debates is altered, there is room for the debate itself to be reconfigured.
Further, while there may be a sense in which phenomenology is not interested in epistemological
questions – for example, phenomenology is not properly interested in skeptical questions about
the existence of the objects of knowledge, for it is proper to phenomenology to receive the
phenomenon of knowledge as it is given – phenomenology nevertheless interrogates the
phenomenon of knowledge, i.e., it is interested in how knowledge is possible, how it is grounded,
and what it is.
Second, at the heart of the phenomenological method I employ is eidetic analysis. In each
case, I derive the primary support for my conclusions by attending to particular phenomena –
examples – in order to draw out their necessary conditions and essential features. These examples
are drawn from common experience, but also from developmental psychology, the history of
science, and literature. These fields allow us to notice essential features of experience that
common experience is blind to, precisely because common experience aims not at itself, but at
the world. For example, Karl Ove Knausgaard claims that "Writing is drawing the essence of
what we know out of the shadows. That is what writing is about. Not what happens there, not
what actions are played out there, but the there itself" (2013, p. 192). Literature, then, is a means

1

There are, of course, other worries about thinking phenomenologically about epistemology. For example,
Dennett argues that phenomenology is not an admissible method for investigating consciousness (Dennett,
1991). See (Zahavi, 2007) and (Carman, 2007) for replies. I don’t intend to address all such worries in this
introduction, only to forward that epistemological questions at least tacitly rely on descriptions of the
phenomenon of knowledge, and so there is room for phenomenology to intervene in such debates. My hope
is that the merit of this approach will be made apparent in the course of this dissertation.
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of opening up the world by breaking through common experience's understanding of itself.
Similarly, psychology allows us to loosen the bond between the subject and the world so as to
attend to the ligaments of this bond. Of course, literature (as well as the history of science)
describes the particular and not the universal, and psychology treats the subject as mundane, as a
piece of the world. Thus, the former seems to lack the eidetic reduction and the latter the
phenomenological one. But these distinctions cannot be so firmly drawn. Precisely at the heart of
the particular, literature discloses the universal, which explains the paradoxical phenomenon that
the more an author immerses herself in the particularities of a world, the more the reader finds
himself expressed in the author's world. 2
Similarly, psychology illuminates our experience of the world. It is true that psychology
delivers results on the basis of particular, contingent cases. And yet contingency has the power to
illuminate the necessary, which is why Merleau-Ponty can draw conclusions about essential
features of normal experience by analyzing contingent abnormal cases. We see the value of
“attention” in experience, for example, if we turn to cases of “neglect,” e.g., by considering
patients who have a functional visual system but cannot become aware of objects on the left side
of the visual field. There is a sort of empirical eidetic variation at play in these cases: psychology
makes manifest what results for perception if certain factors are altered. On the other hand,
psychology is “mundane.” And yet it does not fail to link up with our experience of the world. If
neuroscience teaches us about the existence of mirror neurons, this gives a new weight to our
lived sense of relating primarily not to private subjectivities, but to other modes of conduct, i.e.,
to the familiar experience of feeling oneself in the other’s action. In other words, phenomenology

2

Of his project of drawing out the essence of “the there,” Knausgaard has said in an interview, “There was
one woman in San Francisco [who asked] ‘How do you manage to write about the Indian American woman
because that is what you have been doing, you know?’ I said ‘No I haven’t. I’ve been writing about the
Scandinavian middle aged man.’ And she said ‘No, it’s the Indian American.’ … [My project was to ask]
How did I become the man I am, you know? How did it happen? What is the identity, what is it to be
someone? And I thought I would just be as private and intimate as I could and be as true as I could to
myself. … So I thought it was too private and too personal and I thought there would be no recognition,
and no identification possible in this book. But it doesn’t work like that” (Knausgaard, 2015).
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learns from each of these fields, because they each make contact with our experience, or in other
words, because each draws out of the shadows the essence of what we know.
Third, the scope of this dissertation is both systematic and historical. My aim is to
provide a phenomenological account of epistemic grounding that can resolve epistemological
debates via an interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. While I will focus primarily on
systematic concerns and secondarily on historical ones, this dissertation is also meant to make
and justify a nontrivial interpretative claim: that Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of
perception ought to be understood in terms of motivation.
Given the historical nature of this dissertation, two notes on my interpretative method
must be made. First, I will treat Merleau-Ponty’s work throughout his career as relatively
continuous, borrowing freely from different eras of his thinking. In the few cases where I find a
potential problem in transposing concepts and terminology between works, I argue on the basis of
those specific cases and not in terms of any general framework about architectonic shifts in
Merleau-Ponty’s thinking. There might be some concern about such liberality, for there is a
question about how continuous Merleau-Ponty’s thinking is. Barbaras, for example, pursues a
developmental hypothesis, according to which Merleau-Ponty’s thinking must make an
ontological turn from a “phenomenology of perception” to a “philosophy of perception,
discovering in perception a mode of being that holds good for every possible being” (2004, p.
xxi). 3 Or, Gardner argues that The Phenomenology of Perception is read along two lines, one
psychological, in conformity with Merleau-Ponty’s early work, and another transcendental, in
conformity with Merleau-Ponty’s later work (Gardner, 2015). 4 All admit that there are changes in
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At the same time, Barbaras takes it that it is the very questions pursued in Merleau-Ponty’s early work
that motivates this ontological turn, and so proposes to treat these early works as an “introduction to
ontology” (Barbaras, 2004, p. xxxiii). Indeed, Barbaras concludes that the ontological turn is not a break
from phenomenology, but its culmination: “We must not see Merleau-Ponty’s ontology as opposed to the
phenomenological enterprise; on the contrary, it is its fulfillment” (Barbaras, 2004, p. 77).
4
Another possible shift has been articulated by Besmer. He holds that there is a transition in MerleauPonty’s middle period from an understanding of the relation between perception and linguistic meaning in
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Merleau-Ponty’s thinking, but I agree with Dillon that there are no reversals from MerleauPonty’s articulation of the primacy of perception in the 40’s to his articulation of perceptual faith
in the 50’s (Dillon, 1988, p. 51). Second, in illustrating or arguing in favor of Merleau-Ponty’s
ideas, I will often draw freely from the phenomenological tradition. Generally speaking, this
move does not seem problematic to me, given that Merleau-Ponty himself draws much of his
thinking relatively freely from the phenomenological tradition. In drawing on this tradition, I do
not mean to assume that Merleau-Ponty’s thinking is in every respect compatible with Husserl’s,
only that Merleau-Ponty relies to a considerable extent on major aspects of Husserl’s thinking and
so it is reasonable to invoke these aspects to understand Merleau-Ponty’s arguments.
Finally, my interest in the thesis of the primacy of perception is narrower than MerleauPonty’s. In this dissertation, I will be concerned with the primacy of perception as an
epistemological thesis. But, for Merleau-Ponty, this thesis is not only epistemological, but also
ontological. 5 I will, in general, avoid the ontological dimension of Merleau-Ponty’s project. I do
not mean to imply that these two dimensions are ultimately separable, but I do suppose that the
epistemological dimension can be treated in isolation from the ontological one. 6

terms of Fundierung to understanding meaning in terms of Stiftung (or institution) (Besmer, 2007, pp. 100102).
5
It seems to me that Dillon is ultimately right to draw a correlation between an epistemological thesis (the
primacy of perception) and an ontological thesis (the primacy of phenomena), and to write that “The thesis
of the primacy of perception is properly phenomenological because … it asserts the ontological primacy of
phenomena as its correlate” (Dillon, 1988, p. 53).
6
Many scholars have pointed out how Merleau-Ponty’s epistemology ultimately depends on an ontology.
Dillon, for example, has argued that it is Merleau-Ponty’s ontological thinking that, by undermining
dualism, makes Merleau-Ponty’s account of knowledge possible, and so claims that “for Merleau-Ponty,
epistemological problems are never treated as only that; rather he tends programmatically to search for
resolution by looking for the ontological presuppositions underlying the standpoints within which such
problems crop up” (Dillon, 1988, p. 4). Pietersma makes a similar claim (though one concerning the
dualism of subject and object, rather than that of mind and matter) (Pietersma, 2006, p. 160). However, as
my project will demonstrate, one does not need to begin from Merleau-Ponty’s ontology to argue for his
epistemology, at least the sorts of epistemological questions I will be asking. Demonstration of MerleauPonty’s ontology, it seems to me, requires an additional kind of consideration, namely a consideration of
the transcendental nature of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. This kind of consideration would supply an
important complement to the present project – for it is implicated in my project – but is not an immediate
necessity.
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B. Overview
I defend these two theses, that motivation is an epistemic ground and the primacy of
perception, over the course of five chapters. In chapter 1, I explain what it means to consider
motivation as an epistemic ground and show that motivation is not reducible to a species of either
causality or reason. I argue that motivation is a form of grounding that is spontaneous, operates in
virtue of implicit meanings, and is normative. This allows me to argue that motivation is not a
species of reason, because whereas reason is active and explicit, motivation is spontaneous and
implicit. Further, motivation is not a species of causality, because causality is passive, does not
operate in virtue of meanings at all, and is not normative. Finally, I argue that motivation is
unique in the way in which the outputs of motivation transcend its inputs, i.e., its outputs are not
definable in terms of, and are not contents of, its inputs.
In chapter 2, I consider the relation between experience and empirical judgments. It is
clear that experience in some sense grounds empirical judgments, but it is far from clear in what
sense exactly it does so. Davidson, for example, holds that experiences, being non-propositional,
are not the kinds of things that can justify judgments, and so experience can at most cause our
judgments. McDowell, in contrast, holds that in virtue of its type of content experience can count
as a reason for judgment. I argue that this debate is rooted in an inadequate phenomenology of the
relation between experience and judgment. In fact, neither reason nor causality properly describe
this relation, for this relation – I argue – is spontaneous (and not active, as it would have to be if it
were relation of reasoning) and normative (and so cannot be merely causal). Motivation, I
conclude, does a better job of describing the type of grounding with which experience provides
empirical judgment than do either reason or causality.
In chapter 3, I turn to the relation between experience and a priori judgments. While it is
obvious that experience in some sense grounds our empirical judgments, it is not at all obvious
that it grounds our a priori judgments. Indeed, rationalists have long held that experience is just
not the sort of thing that can ground a priori judgments, because experience delivers particular
8

and contingent facts, but a priori judgments must hold universally and with necessity.
Empiricists, in contrast, have argued that our a priori knowledge is derived from experience. In
chapter 3, I argue that thinking the relation between experience and the a priori in terms of
motivation provides the best solution to the long-standing debate between rationalism and
empiricism.
I first consider the classical arguments in favor of both rationalism and empiricism. I
argue that empiricism must be wrong that all the content of our a priori knowledge is contained
in experience. On the other hand, I argue that rationalism is wrong to think that experience is not
the sort of thing that can ground a priori knowledge. Further, thinking of the grounding relation
between experience and knowledge in terms of motivation is what allows me to avoid both
alternatives. Because the outputs of motivation transcend the inputs, if knowledge is motivated by
experience then there is no reason to think that the content of knowledge is contained in
experience. Conversely, this same feature of motivation explains how experience, being
contingent and particular, can motivate universal and necessary judgments.
I then consider contemporary debates between rationalism and empiricism. I divide these
debates into two parts. One debate, between empiricism and nativism, concerns the acquisitions
of the meanings employed in non-experiential knowledge. Empiricists hold that all meanings are
definable in terms of sensory primitives. In contrast, nativists hold that some meanings are not
definable in terms of sensory primitives, and so must be innate to the mind. I argue that thinking
the relation between experience and non-experiential knowledge in terms of motivation avoids
both options: some meanings are not definable in terms of sensory primitives, but are not
therefore innate, because they are motivated by experience. A second debate, concerns the
justification of our knowledge. With regard to this question, empiricists hold that knowledge can
only be justified in terms of experience. In contrast, rationalists hold that experience simply
cannot justify some of what we hold to be knowledge, and so there must be some other form of
justification, i.e., rational insight. Once again, motivation avoids both alternatives. Rationalists
9

are right that there are certain kinds of knowledge which experience cannot justify, but this does
not mean that experience cannot ground this knowledge in the mode of motivation. I argue that
on all these fronts motivation provides a better way of thinking about the relation between
experience and knowledge than do either rationalism or empiricism.
However, there is a kind of a priori justification which avoids both rationalism and
empiricism, and which has fundamentally shaped the past two centuries of philosophy: the
method of transcendental justification exercised by Kant. Kant's whole critique of metaphysics
centers around his claim that the ground of a priori synthetic knowledge is experience,
considered with regard to its possibility: transcendental method justifies certain judgments a
priori by showing them to be conditions for the possibility of experience. In chapter 4, I move to
consider this type of a priori justification.
My contention is that, contrary to appearances, the projects of Merleau-Ponty and Kant
are not contradictory but compatible; that, indeed, they require each other. The two projects
operate on different levels: they are concerned with different senses of experience and so
approach experience with different standards. Whereas Merleau-Ponty is concerned with
experience understood as perception, and so approaches experience with the standard of
motivation, Kant is concerned with experience in the sense of empirical judgment, and so
approaches experience with the standard of justification. The many seemingly opposed
conclusions they reach are a consequence of their pursuing investigations on different levels with
different standards. Nevertheless, I argue that transcendental justification ultimately relies upon
an a priori which is not transcendentally justified, but is instead motivated in the course of
experience, in the manner I describe in chapter 3. Transcendental method justifies certain
judgments on the ground that they are conditions for determinate features of experience. But for
this method to work, we must have some knowledge of the determinate features of experience. I
argue that this knowledge is not justified but motivated.

10

In chapter 5, I argue that this line of thinking leaves the door open for a certain kind of
metaphysics. Admittedly, Kant must be right that no synthetic a priori judgments can be justified
through reason alone. However, this does not mean that experience cannot motivate synthetic a
priori judgments. I make this point with regard to a specific metaphysical question discussed by
Kant – that of the Third Paralogism – namely, self-identity. I argue that the structure of
experience suffices to motivate the thought of self-identity. But if we approach this thought with
the standard of justification, everything changes. Kant is right that empirical apperception does
not suffice to justify self-identity, and so something like transcendental apperception will be
required instead. However, these two levels – motivation and justification – are not indifferent to
each other. Indeed, they require each other. For, I will argue, it is only possible to refer
transcendental and empirical apperception to the same subject, to the same I, if we understand
how both arise from the reflective apprehension of the pre-reflective experience of self described
by Merleau-Ponty.
In my conclusion, I turn to consider perhaps the most difficult consequence of this line of
thinking: that the contingent is the ground of the necessary. This leads me to a reflection on the
ambiguity – to use Merleau-Ponty’s term – of knowledge and how this ambiguity can be taken up
authentically.

11

CHAPTER 1. MERLEAU-PONTY’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MOTIVATION
Motivation is the conceptual structure underlying every major argument in this
dissertation. In each of the following chapters, I will reconfigure an existing philosophical
question by introducing motivation as a novel form of epistemic grounding. For this reason, it is
essential, first of all, to establish a clear understanding of what I mean by this term. This is the
purpose of the present chapter. I explain what distinguishes motivation as a form of grounding
from other forms of grounding, namely, reason and causality. And I show that motivation can be
understood as an epistemic ground, not only – as it is generally understood – as a practical
ground.
Two points should be made at the outset. First, while this dissertation will be concerned
with motivation only as an epistemic ground, in the present chapter I will occasionally resort to
cases of practical motivation in order to clarify essential structures of motivation. 7 Further, as I
mentioned in my introduction, my interests in this dissertation are both systematic and historical.
The claims I make about motivation I intend both to defend myself and to attribute to MerleauPonty. 8
I structure this study around 10 theses about motivation:
1)

Motives operate through their meaning

2)

Motives don’t require explicit awareness in order to operate

3)

Motivation is spontaneous

7

In general, I do not think there is any problem in transitioning between cases of epistemic, practical, or
even aesthetic motivation. In each case, it is a question of the constitution of a spontaneous sense: a
meaning we do not create but find. Our existence gears into spontaneous meaning in every domain,
including the practical and epistemic. Epistemically, perception spontaneously reveals a meaning in things.
Practically, situations are spontaneously revealed as having meaning for my conduct. I can then actively
accept or reject these meanings in my judgments or my decisions. Motivation is the form of grounding
characteristic of this spontaneous sense. The essential structures of motivation apply in each domain of
spontaneous sense, though differently in each.
8
Merleau-Ponty himself borrows the term “motivation” from the phenomenological tradition. See
Appendix I for a discussion of Husserl’s and Stein’s treatment of motivation. However, Merleau-Ponty
gives a unique sense to motivation in contrasting it as an epistemic ground not only to causality but also to
reason. See Merleau-Ponty 2012 (pp. 48-51).
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4)

Motivation is an internal relation

5)

Motivation is a reciprocal relation

6)

Motivation tends to equilibrium

7)

Motivation does not ground with necessity

8)

Motivation is normative

9)

The outputs of motivation transcend the inputs

10)

Motives are neither reasons nor causes

In what follows, I defend each of these theses in turn. But first I offer a few examples of
perceptual motivation.
A. The shipwreck example
If I am walking on a beach toward a boat that has run aground, and if the funnel
or the mast merges with the forest that borders the dune, then there will be a
moment in which these details suddenly reunite with the boat and become welded
to it. (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 17).
Merleau-Ponty describes a perceptual gestalt shift: a scene which had appeared as a bank of trees
is reinterpreted as a shipwreck. What is this experience like? Has one begun by noting various
incongruities in the interpretation of the vertical poles as tree trunks – perhaps that they are too
long or too short, not quite the right color, or that they lack branches? While it is certainly
possible that one arrives at the new interpretation in this manner, by noting incongruous details,
one need not. Just as likely, as one approaches the ship, a feeling of tension gradually builds,
without one knowing what causes the tension. One senses a problem in the interpretation, without
being able to adduce evidence as to the problem, perhaps without ever yet paying attention to the
building awareness of a problem. Then, with the arrival of the new interpretation, the tension is
released: a more stable, more complete interpretation achieves dominance. 9

9

This experience of building tension without explicit recognition of incongruities in, or problems with, a
perceptual interpretation, can be illustrated with another example. Suppose I walk into a familiar room and
suddenly sense that something is “wrong,” i.e., something is different: there is a tension between the
perceived room and my familiar sense of the room. Something is wrong, and yet I have no explicit
recognition of what is creating the tension. While in fact several of the pictures on the wall have been

13

B. The bell tower example
… Objects interposed between me and the one I am focusing upon are not
perceived for themselves. But they are, nevertheless, perceived, and we have no
reason to deny this marginal perception a role in the vision of distance since the
apparent distance shrinks the moment a screen hides the interposed objects. The
objects that fill the field do not act on the apparent distance like a cause on its
effect. When the screen is moved aside, we see the distance being born from the
interposed objects. This is the silent language perception speaks to us: the
interposed objects, in this natural text, ‘mean’ a larger distance. It is,
nevertheless, not a question of the logic of constituted truth (one of the
connections that objective logic knows), for there is no reason for the bell tower
to appear to me as smaller and farther away the moment that I can see more
clearly the details of the hills and the fields that separate me from it. There is no
reason, but there is a motive (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 49-50).
The presence of objects interposed between myself and an object to which I am attending
motivates a sense of the size and distance of the object. This is true even if I pay no attention to
the interposed objects, even if they don’t figure in my awareness at all. For example, I see the full
moon on the horizon as large. 10 But if I screen from my vision the horizon above which it hovers,
the moon will suddenly shrink. I do not think (i.e., judge) that it must be smaller than I thought it
was. Rather, I see it as smaller.
C. The portrait example
It took centuries of painting before the reflections upon the eye were seen,
without which the painting remains lifeless and blind, as in the paintings by
primitive peoples. The reflection is not seen for itself, since it was able to go
unnoticed for so long, and yet it has a function in perception, since its mere
absence is enough to remove the life and the expression from objects and from
faces. The reflection is only seen out of the corner of the eye. It is not presented
as the aim of our perception, it is the auxiliary or the mediator of our perception.
It is not itself seen, but makes the rest be seen (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 322-3).
The presence of a reflection in the eye of the subject of a portrait imbues the subject with life.
This simple perceptual cue motivates one to see the subject with a particular quality: that of
liveliness. 11 Further, this perceptual cue serves as a motive whether or not it is explicitly

rearranged, I have only a vague sense that something is different, but can’t quite “put my finger on” what it
is.
10
Cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012 (pp. 270-1).
11
Consider the impression Knausgaard receives from a self-portrait of Rembrandt, how much of it has to
do with the eyes and (if not explicitly) with the reflection they hold: “Old age. All the facial detail is
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recognized by the viewer, for it took centuries to be noticed for itself. There are thus motives at
work in perception to the function of which explicit attention is accidental, attendant at most.
With these examples in mind, I turn to an explication and defense of the 10 theses listed
above.
1. Motives Operate through Their Meaning
One phenomenon triggers another, according to Merleau-Ponty, not through objective
causation, but through “the sense [sens] it offers” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 51). Motives, in other
words, operate through their meanings. For an initial indication of this idea, consider the
reflection in the eye of the portrait subject. What should we say is the motive here? Is it the white
paint on this particular sector of the canvas that motivates us? Is it the light waves striking our
eyes? Or would it be more accurate to say that it is the reflection in the eye that motivates us? The
physical factors, the matter and the light waves it emits, are causes of sensations. But these
sensations alone do not suffice for seeing life, because these sensations can be had without one’s
seeing life: a patch of white light does not make one see life. One could respond that it is my eyes
being struck by light of this wavelength in conjunction with light of a particular other wavelength,
the dark of a pupil, that causes me to see life. But these colors will often go together without one
seeing life. What is right in this response is that the stroke of white only motivates by entering
into the whole of its surroundings. But the whole that makes the reflection motivate is not this
complex of white and black light, but the eye to which it belongs. It is by entering into a whole of

visible; all the traces life has left there are to be seen. The face is furrowed, wrinkled, sagging, ravaged by
time. But the eyes are bright and, if not young, then somehow transcend the time that otherwise marks the
face. It is as though someone else is looking at us, from somewhere inside the face, where everything is
different. One can hardly be closer to another person. … What is depicted here, what Rembrandt painted, is
this person’s very being, that which he woke to every morning, that which immersed itself in thought, but
which itself was not thought, that which immediately immersed itself in feelings, but which itself was not
feeling, and that which he went to sleep to, in the end for good. That which, in a human, time does not
touch and whence the light in the eyes springs. The difference between this painting and the other the late
Rembrandt painted is the difference between seeing and being seen” (2013, pp. 26-7). See Rembrandt’s
“Self Portrait at the Age of 63” at the National Gallery. To reword this impression: it is the eyes which
deliver Rembrandt not as a mass of historical details, but as a subject, a power of seeing which transcends
its predicates (e.g., thoughts, feelings).
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meaning, “the eye” and not the bare color, that the white becomes not just bare color but a
meaning, “the reflection in the eye,” and so invokes the perception of life.
But is this an essential feature of perceptual relations? We need a more precise
understanding of what Merleau-Ponty means by “sens,” what I am calling “meaning,” and why
perceptual phenomena are grounded in virtue of meanings. To this end, I first offer a criterion for
distinguishing meaning-ful from non-meaningful relations, and then offer a brief account of
Merleau-Ponty’s notion of “sens.”
A. A Criterion
By “meaning” I intend something like that as which an object or event is intended.
Meaning, in other words, is characterized by something like Heidegger’s hermeneutical “as
structure.” The phrases “The 15th state incorporated into the Union” and “The Bluegrass State”
have the same referent but different meanings (nothing in the meaning of a “Bluegrass State”
necessarily implies that it be 15th state incorporated into the union). I can think of Kentucky as
either of these things, but this does not imply that the two meanings are the same. A similar idea
would be expressed in saying that meaning is intensional rather than extensional, though these
terms refer to linguistic meanings, whereas sens is pre-linguistic.
With this basic understanding of meaning, we can supply a criterion for distinguishing
grounds that operate in virtue of their meaning from those that don’t. A ground that operates in
virtue of its meaning will operate in virtue of that as which it is a ground. Put otherwise, a ground
can be said to operate in virtue of its meaning if the terms used to describe that ground determine
the truth value of statements about the grounding relationship. Imagine that upon the death of a
close friend I undertake a journey in order to pay my respects or comfort the grieving family.
There are all sorts of features of my friend that could be used accurately to describe her: suppose
besides being my friend she used to reside at 71 east 5th Street and on Saturdays volunteered at
the local animal shelter. She could be intended in any of these meanings. If someone approached
me and asked why I was travelling, I could truly respond “Because my friend has died.”
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However, I would respond falsely were I to say, “Because of the death of the Saturday animal
shelter volunteer,” or “Because of the death of the resident of 71 east 5th street.” These descriptors
of my friend are not incorrect, but it is incorrect to frame them as motives of my journey. If I
were traveling because of the death of the Saturday volunteer, I would be motivated to undertake
my journey every time the holder of this office passed away, which I am not. It is only as my
friend that the loss touches me, only as my friend’s, that the death summons. No bare event or
state of affairs is a motive: only as something, i.e., in virtue of its meaning, can an event, thing, or
state of affairs become a motive.
In contrast, because causal relations hold not between meanings but between objects,
events, or states of affairs, it is a matter of indifference what terms are used to describe the relata:
if asked why a pool ball is in motion, one can answer as truly “Because it was struck by the 9
ball” as “Because it was struck by the yellow-striped ball” as “Because it was struck by a
collection of matter with the requisite momentum.”
B. Merleau-Ponty’s Account of Sens
First, a word about translation. I have chosen to translate Merleau-Ponty’s term “sens” as
“meaning,” because I think this term can be used to make Merleau-Ponty’s point about
motivation most clearly. However, the alternate translation, “sense,” may capture more of the
nuance of the term. Whereas “meaning” might seem to imply some sort of explicit semantic
content, “sense” does not. One can get the sense (or “make sense”) of a scene, or a mood, or a
melody without being able to formulate this sense in words. When I use the term “meaning” as a
translation of Merleau-Ponty’s “sens,” I don’t mean to exclude non-semantic contents.
Merleau-Ponty tends to talk about meaning in terms of part-whole relations. 12 Thus, in
the introduction to the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty writes,

12

Donald Landes writes, for example, that “in [Merleau-Ponty’s] earliest works, the notion of sense
emerges through Gestalt psychology as a way of describing the sense of the whole that is irreducible to its
parts, and hence the emergence of meaning in experience without any thetic intervention by consciousness”
(Landes, 2013, p. 205).
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Consider a white patch against a homogenous background. All points on the
patch have a certain common ‘function’ that makes them into a ‘figure.’ The
figure’s color is denser and somehow more resistant than the background’s color.
The borders of the white patch ‘belong’ to the patch and, despite being
contiguous with it, do not join with the background. The patch seems to be
placed upon the background and does not interrupt it. Each part announces more
than it contains, and thus this elementary perception is already charged with a
sense [sens] (2012, p. 4).
Perception is meaningful, according to Merleau-Ponty, because it is primordially composed of a
figure on a background, i.e., there is no perception more original than a figure on a background,
on the basis of which a figure on a background could be composed. Perception does not yield, in
other words, as its basis mutually indifferent atomic sensations which must be combined into the
perception of a whole, a figure. Rather, the perception of the figure or the whole is primordial,
and consequently each part is not isolated from the others, but “announces more than it contains.”
This “announcing” beyond itself, i.e., the intrinsic relation to the whole, implies that the part has a
sense. Sense, then, for Merleau-Ponty, fundamentally names the way in which experience is prepredicatively composed of organized wholes or structures. 13 To make sense of a situation is to
resolve the givens of a situation into a coherent (though not necessarily explicit) structure.
Further, it’s because meaning has to do with the way in which we organize a situation that it can
be described in terms of an “as structure”: the way in which we organize a situation is that as
which we intend a situation (e.g., that I perceive a figure with the structure of a table implies that
“table” is that as which I perceive the object). Let this suffice for a cursory account of MerleauPonty’s understanding of meaning.

13

What do I mean by “structure” here? This can be indicated by a brief recourse to the Structure of
Behavior. Merleau-Ponty introduces the category of “form” in Structure of Behavior in order to account for
certain phenomena of the nervous system, such as reflexes. He writes there, “We will say there is form
whenever the properties of a system are modified by every change brought about in a single one of its parts
and, on the contrary, are conserved when they all change while maintaining the same relationship among
themselves” (Merleau-Ponty, 1963, p. 47). Form or structure is thus something like the concept of similar
figures in geometry: a change in one of the parts makes the whole dissimilar, but if all parts are changed to
maintain the same relationship, the whole is similar.
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Even if it is implicit and indeterminate, a motive has its effect through the way in which it
as a situation is organized into a structure. Thus, in the shipwreck example, the perceptual
situation motivates an interpretation, not qua a set of mutually indifferent atomic sensation, but
qua a perceptual field in which the various aspects of the situation shape each other and are in
tension until such a time as a coherent structure or interpretation can be negotiated. Similarly, the
interposed hill is a motive for seeing the bell tower as far away only as an interposed hill (if I
were surveying the scene from above, the hill would have no value in the perception of the bell
tower), i.e., as part of the perceived structuring of distances I have in view.
2. Motives Don’t Require Explicit Awareness to Operate
Merleau-Ponty writes that no “explicit positing” need occur for a motive to have its
effect. In other words, one doesn’t need to notice or be aware of the motive for it to motivate.
While motives operate through their meaning, then, they do not need to operate through any
meaning of which I am consciously aware. This is easy enough to see in the above examples:
1. I do not first note various perceptual incongruities and then decide that what I thought
were tree trunks are in fact the ship’s masts. These incongruities, which afterwards can in some
cases be enumerated and will appear as obvious clues, needn’t themselves gain my attention in
order to shape my perception.
2. Attending to the hill that stands between me and the bell tower is not a necessary
condition for my perception of the hill to shape my perception of the distance to the bell tower.
Similarly, I may be so captivated by the moon that I don’t notice any of the objects on the horizon
– yet they will encourage me to see the moon as a certain size.
3. The reflection in the eye of the portrayed subject affects how I see the subject. According
to Merleau-Ponty, the reflection could only go so long unnoticed by artists because it is not
normally seen for itself: it belonged only to the background of perception, not to the foreground.
However, nothing here forbids explicit positing. My stopping to note the hill and its
position between the tower and myself will not affect my perception of the distance between here
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and the tower. While at least some motives can be raised to explicit awareness, doing so need not
affect the process of motivation. Thus, even if I stop and note the hill between myself and the
tower, and take it as an index of distance, once a screen is placed between myself and the tower
the perceived distance of the tower decreases. This occurs even though I now know about the hill,
and take it as an index of distance. Motivation thus continues to operate independently of explicit
awareness. This consideration allows us to see the following:
3. Motivation is Spontaneous
Motives present a subject with a curious quasi-responsibility. If asked why one is
motivated to do or think in a particular manner, one may be unable to respond. Motivation is thus
not entirely within the realm of responsibility, as reasons must be. On the other hand, one can
through reflection set about describing one’s motives, making them explicit and thus possible
features of responses. Such description can be more or less astute. Moreover, it need not alter the
process of motivation. 14 Thus, motivation is neither entirely within nor entirely without the space
of responsibility.
This point can be put more finely by distinguishing between passivity, spontaneity, and
activity. I mean spontaneity in the sense that Merleau-Ponty intends when he claims that the
meaning we find in the world is the product of a “spontaneous valuation” (2012, p. 465). For
example, the following series:
..

..

..

..

..

..

is always perceived as a collection six groups of dots two millimeters apart (the dots are grouped
with the near dots, rather than the far dots). This gestalt is spontaneously attributed to the series; it
is not the product of decision of deliberation, and if asked I can give no reason as to why they
should be grouped that way rather than another. More accurately, I can attempt to explain why I
grouped them that way, e.g., “It makes sense to group dots that are closer together.” But such

14

Though it seems very likely to me that it often does alter this process – a proposition to which
psychoanalysis and the phenomenon of cognitive penetration attest.
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explanations are speculative and at best rationalizations, as can be seen by the fact that if I did
have good contravening reasons, I would not be able to revise this perception. For example, in the
case of the Müller-Lyer illusion, my “spontaneous valuation” of the lines as of different lengths
conflicts with the reasons I have for thinking they are the same length (e.g., that I have measured
the two lines). 15 While I am free actively to affirm or deny the spontaneous sense that I perceive,
I am not free to change the perception itself: despite my knowledge to the contrary, the lines still
appear different in length. Thus, I am not active with respect to this spontaneous sense. But
neither am I simply passive. The world does not cause this perception in us, and conversely, we
do not simply receive it. Instead, the body spontaneously produces it. 16
In the bell tower example, there is a sense in which the removal of the screen should not
cause my perception of distance to change. Once I know the distance, the presence of the screen
should be indifferent to me. And yet whenever the screen is placed back in front of me, the
perceived distance shrinks to what it was before. The motivation of this perception thus occurs
spontaneously.
4. Motivation is an Internal Relation
What does Merleau-Ponty mean when he writes that motivation is an internal relation
(2012, p. 51)? One option is that Merleau-Ponty means the term in the sense defined by G. E.
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In the Müller-Lyer illusion, two lines of equal length appear unequal due to the addition of arrows
attached to the ends of the lines, in the one line the arrows pointing away from the line, and in the other
toward it. See Figure 1.1.
16
It would be more exact to say that I am at most partially active with respect to this spontaneous sense.
For often our redescriptions of the world do in fact change our perceptions of it. If a friend sees a different
gestalt before us than I do, I will ask myself “Could it be like he says?” Then somehow the perceptual field
changes, and the gestalt perceived by my friend pops into view; if I seek, I find. Similarly, as soon as I
measure the lines in the Müller-Lyer illusion it is not exactly true that the lines remain different in length.
Instead, they are thrown into confusion, neither quite equal nor quite different. Nevertheless, the decisive
fact remains that I cannot make myself see what I in fact know. The same is true in regard to practical
motivation. The spontaneous sense of a situation often conflicts with my reasoned stance toward it. But it is
also true that in reasoning through a situation, in drawing distinctions and applying general maxims, I
reconfigure the motivational field that produces the spontaneous valuation, and this valuation may itself be
transformed thereby. Nevertheless, in both cases it remains true that I am at most partially active with
respect to the spontaneous sense: as with sleep I can gather all the circumstances of sleep around myself in
petition for its arrival, but it is useless unless sleep comes to me, so here my reasoning is like a petition for
spontaneous insight that may or may not come.
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Moore, i.e., that an internal relation is a necessary one, such that if the relata exist, then they
necessarily stand in the specified relation to one another. This is more or less the sense that
O’Conaill, following Morriston, has attributed to Merleau-Ponty. O’Conaill writes that MerleauPonty understands an internal relation to be one in which “the relata are logically interdependent;
that is, they cannot be defined independently of each other” (2012, p. 582). That this
interdependence is logical is important, for on O’Conaill’s interpretation, Merleau-Ponty thinks a
relation is internal only if the relata are inconceivable without one another, and therefore cannot
exist without one another. But, as Morriston points out, if Merleau-Ponty understands internal
relationship in this strong sense of logical existential interdependence (that the relata cannot exist
without one another), then it seems like paradigmatic instances of motivation will not qualify as
internal relations. I invoked Merleau-Ponty’s example of being motivated to undertake a journey
by the death of a friend, but the death can certainly occur without one’s undertaking the journey,
and the journey can occur without the death (Morriston, 1979). O’Conaill accepts Morriston’s
criticism only in part: while Morriston is right that the motivated is only prefigured in the motive
(but can be conceived without it), he does not recognize that the state of being motivated is
logically dependent on what one is motivated to do (we cannot think of being motivated to do X,
without thinking of X). O’Conaill’s qualification, however, does not succeed in restoring
Merleau-Ponty’s claim that motivation is an internal relation, on O’Conaill’s account of what
Merleau-Ponty means by an internal relation (O'Conaill, 2012, p. 583). If we accept this account,
it seems we will also have to accept that Merleau-Ponty was wrong to think that motivation is an
internal relation.
A second option presents itself in Husserl’s distinction between independent and nonindependent parts. According to Husserl, non-independent parts or moments can exist (by
essence) only as parts of more inclusive wholes (2001, p. 12). Such non-independent parts can be
said to be founded upon, i.e., necessarily supplemented by, some other moment (Husserl, 2001, p.
25). For example, the white color of a piece of paper is a non-independent part of the paper,
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insofar as it cannot exist without the extension of the paper. The color can thus be said to be
founded upon the extension. Further, some foundational relationships are reciprocal (Husserl,
2001, p. 27).
A reciprocal foundational relationship between parts of a whole seems like a plausible
candidate for what Merleau-Ponty means by “internal relation.” Consider how Merleau-Ponty
articulates the relationship between apparent size and apparent distance:
The phenomenon ‘apparent size’ and the phenomenon of distance are two
moments of the overall organization of the field, … the former is related to the
latter neither in the relation of sign to signification, nor in the relation of cause to
effect, and … like the motivating and the motivated, they communicate through
their sense. … Apparent size, then, cannot be defined independently of distance:
apparent size is implied by distance just as much as it implies distance (2012, pp.
271-3).
But while Husserl’s conception of foundational relationships is certainly in the
background of Merleau-Ponty’s conception of internal relationships, and is helpful insofar as it
restructures dialogue about internal relations in terms of parts and wholes, as an interpretations of
what Merleau-Ponty means by “internal relationship” it runs afoul of same problem Morriston
pointed out for the more analytic definition of internal relation: the motivated is not a nonindependent part of the motivation relation, insofar as it can exist without the motivating.
How then should we approach Merleau-Ponty’s concept of internal relations? I propose
that, for Merleau-Ponty, the relata in an internal relation are logically interdependent, not in terms
of their existence (this is the error made on both the analytic and my suggested Husserlian
approach), but in terms of their meaning. Morriston is, of course, right that the journey can occur
without the death, and the death without the journey. The existence of the one is not logically
dependent on the existence of the other. However, the meaning of the one is logically dependent
on the meaning of the other. The journey means something very different without my friend’s
death (it is perhaps a vacation, and not a final visitation). Conversely, Morriston is correct that the
death occurs whether or not I undertake the journey – and yet, is it not clear, all things being
equal and assuming the journey is well within my means, that the death meant something
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different to me if I chose not to undertake the journey than if I had chosen to undertake it? In my
choice, the death reveals the meaning it has for me, it reveals whether it stands more toward the
core or the periphery of my existence.
Let’s briefly look at a few examples of what Merleau-Ponty considers to be internal
relations. First, consider the notes of a melody. With the first note of a melody, we already have a
vague horizon of meaning that will shape the meaning of every subsequent note. The sixth note
will only mean what it does relative to the previous five: it conveys something it could not
possibly convey were it played in isolation. Conversely, the first note is by itself indeterminate. It
could be the beginning of any number of melodies, joyful, ironic, or somber. If we look back on
this indeterminate first note from the vantage of the sixth, the first will no longer mean what it
did: it will have been given meaning as the inception of this particular playful tune. Of course,
these notes could exist without the others. But they could not mean what they do without the
others. Second, according to Merleau-Ponty, the parts of a perceived form or structure bear an
internal relation to each other. Merleau-Ponty writes,
The parts of a thing are not linked together by a simple external association … .
There are no indifferent givens that together set about forming a thing because
some factual contiguities or resemblances associate them. Rather, because we
first perceive a whole as a thing, the analytic attitude can later discern
resemblances or contiguities there (2012, p. 16).
Perceptions are not composed of elemental givens with independent meanings, which can be
indifferently synthesized into a whole. Rather, the meanings of the parts of perceptions depend on
each other and on the whole. 17 Third, Merleau-Ponty describes the perception of color and of
lighting as standing in a reciprocal relationship (2012, pp. 320-1). On the one hand, the
perception of color is determined by the perception of lighting: a blue piece of paper under a

17
This is most obvious in cases of Gestalt reversibility, such as “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law” (see
Figure 1.2). When one suddenly sees what was at first the young girl now as an old woman, all the parts
will be concordantly re-determined: what was a chin is now a nose, an ear now an eye. The parts are not
atoms of meaning, which subsequent to their interpretation can be associated into a whole. Rather, they
draw their meaning from the whole.
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yellow light emits wavelengths that would appear brown under daylight, and yet the paper is
perceived as blue. The perception of the paper is adjusted to, and dependent upon, the perception
of the lighting as yellow. Thus, what I perceive is not an immediate, isolated sense given, but a
part dependent in its meaning on the other parts of perception. In this sense, the perception of
color reveals its dependence on the perception of lighting, precisely where it seems to be
independent. Conversely, if one strongly illuminates the interior of a black box, and weakly
illuminates the interior of a white box, the two will appear an identical gray. If one then places a
piece of white paper in the first and black paper in the second, the first will be perceived as a
strongly illumined black box, and the second as a weakly illumined white box. The perception of
lighting is thus dependent on the perception of color.
Notice how different this sort of internal relation is from a causal relation. While in both
cases, the relation is the ground of a relatum being as it is, the causal relation can be merely the
occasion for the relatum being as it is, whereas the internal relation sustains the relatum being as
it is. Of course, in the example of the melody, the successive notes fall out of existence, yet their
meanings sustain each other note in its meaning. Were the meaning of the others to be truly and
totally forgotten, the final note would lose its meaning. In contrast, one billiard ball driven to
motion by another is subsequently entirely indifferent to the existence of the other. Thus,
Merleau-Ponty considers causal relations to be external relations (and conversely, relations
between reasons as internal, insofar for example as a conclusion is dependent for its evident truth
on the truth of its premises).
I have argued that for Merleau-Ponty motivation is an internal relation, and an internal
relation is one in which the meanings of the relata are interdependent. This means that the
meanings of a motive and a motivatum are interdependent. How does this play out in our
examples? In the shipwreck example, the meaning of what I am seeing – tree trunks or ship’s
masts – is dependent upon the perceptual givens preceding the interpretation, and they conversely
are dependent upon the interpretation: the various parts and qualities I am perceiving will be
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differently determined on the basis of what I am seeing. Or again, the sense or meaning of the
portrait’s face – its life or absence of life – is dependent in part on the reflection in the eye.
5. Motivation is a Reciprocal Relation
One of the more novel aspects of Merleau-Ponty’s thinking about motivation is his claim
that it is a reciprocal relation. Whereas Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological predecessors, Husserl
and Stein, clearly describe the motivated as internally related to the motivating, they do little to
suggest that the motivating is logically dependent on the motivated. Merleau-Ponty argues that
the internal relation, the relation of logical dependency, between the motivating and the motivated
is reciprocal. In other words, precisely through the meaning it motivates, the meaning of the
motivating factor is itself transformed. I will call “proactive” the influence that the motivating
factor has on the motivated, and “retroactive” the influence of the motivated on the motivating.
It is easy enough to see a retroactive effect in some cases of motivation. The example of
the melody, given above, demonstrated this effect: the meaning of the first note is indeterminate
until it is given a particular shape, mood, and force by the notes that follow. From out of the range
of possible meanings established by the first note, the ensuing notes will select one and thereby
determine the meaning of the first note in a particular manner. Retroactive effects are also
frequently operative in our processing of sentences. Imagine someone asks you, “Is the mouse
working?” The meaning of the parts of the sentence stand in a reciprocal relationship: they
determine each other. The word “mouse” establishes an indeterminate horizon, a vaguely defined
range, of possible meaning such that when the word “working” arrives, one is already disposed to
understand it in a certain manner: working here means something like “functioning properly,” not
something like “has steady employment.” Thus, the meaning of “working” is motivated by what
is here doing the working: the mouse. Conversely, what is meant by “mouse” is here determined
by what is meant by “working.” Prior to the “working,” I do not know whether I am being asked
about the computer interface device or the rodent. But as soon as I have “working,” a meaning
coalesces and the sentence falls into a particular place: the question is whether this device is
26

functioning properly. The tension between competing interpretations of “mouse,” a tension which
perhaps had never even come to my attention, is now resolved. Thus, what was the motivated
factor serves conversely to determine the motivating factor. Whereas “mouse” puts forward a
vague sense that makes “working” mean “functioning properly,” and thus operates proactively, in
the same breath “working” fixes “mouse” as this electronic device, determining after its initial
occurrence the “mouse” that put forward a vague sense, and thus operates retroactively. In this
case, each relies on the other for its meaning: alone, their meanings would be indeterminate.
Motivation can thus name this reciprocal process, by which the components of a whole fix each
other and the whole to which they belong.
Thus at least some relations of motivation are reciprocal, i.e., contain a retroactive effect.
But should we think that all are? To answer this question, we need to do clarify what sort of
things Merleau-Ponty thinks the retroactive effect can do.
A. The Retroactive Effect
Merleau-Ponty describes the retroactive effect as explication or validation. He writes, for
example,
To the extent that the motivated phenomenon is brought about, its internal
relation with the motivating phenomenon appears, and rather than merely
succeeding it, the motivated phenomenon makes the motivating one explicit and
clarifies it, such that the motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive
(2012, p. 51).
That the retroactive effect is one of explication is easy to see in the above examples. While the
sixth note doesn’t explicate the first in the sense of making it explicit (of bringing it to the
forefront of consciousness), it does give a particular shape to what was its indeterminate meaning:
out of an amorphous block of possibility, the sixth note does the work of carving a refined shape.
The motivated clarifies the motive. Validation is one mode of such clarification or explication.
Discussing a practical motivation, in which the death of a friend motivates one to decide to
undertake a journey, Merleau-Ponty writes,
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The motive is an antecedent that only acts though its sense, and it must even be
added that it is the decision that confirms this sense as valid and that gives it its
force and its efficacy. Motive and decision are two elements of a situation: the
first is the situation as a fact; the second is the situation taken up. … By deciding
to undertake this journey, I validate this motive that is proposed and I take up this
situation. The relation between motivating and motivated is thus reciprocal
(2012, p. 270).
Such validation is a kind of explication or clarification, because by itself the actual force of the
motive is ambiguous. What does the death of my friend mean to me? Is it the sort of event that
will motivate my journey, or does it sadden me but not compel the journey? As I argued above, it
is not until we know the motivated that we will know the actual force of the motive. The decision
validates the motive. Thus, validation is a means by which the motivated determines the
indeterminate meaning of the motive.
Note that, according to Merleau-Ponty, through this retroactive component, motivation
tends to obscure itself. Because the meaning of the motive is reinterpreted in light of the
motivated, the original situation of the motive is forgotten or concealed. One of the remarkable
features of motivation is how silently this forgetting occurs. By the time one gets to the end of the
sentence “Is the mouse working?” one will no longer remember that “mouse” ever could have
meant anything other than this electronic device; the ambiguity with which the word was fraught
will have been all but erased. Once one has seen these elongated shapes as the masts of a ship, it
will be impossible to see them otherwise: one cannot see tree trunks there any longer; especially,
one cannot see the indeterminacy and the tension they once bore. The perceptual situation may
disclose ships masts so obviously at this point that one must ask “How could I not have seen it
before?” Or, take the case in which one is faced with a difficult question, and is given the answer.
The answer fits the givens of the question together so seamlessly that one will be unable to work
oneself back into the difficulty and the aporia one faced, such that one will be frustrated at having
been unable to glimpse the means of obtaining the answer before. Why does this happen?
Because the answer has, unbeknownst to us, transformed the givens of the question into a new
constellation of meaning that cannot any longer admit the difficulty of the question because it has
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resolved it. The question is reorganized by the answer. Thus, one can no longer see in the ship
anything but the parts of a ship: one cannot see those indeterminate situations that posed to us
questions and negotiated with us an answer. The process of motivation conceals itself, in other
words, because it is so successful. When motivation works, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “the
motivated seems to have preexisted its own motive” (2012, p. 51).
We should now be able to see why every motivational relationship is reciprocal. At a
minimum, every motivatum will validate or invalidate its motive, i.e., will retroactively determine
the motive’s force. But, as we have seen, such validation is only an instance of a more general
phenomenon: every motivatum determines its motive, which motive by itself would be
indeterminate.
6. Motivation Tends to Equilibrium
Any motivational situation is likely composed of a variety of implicit motives, weighing
on the sense of that situation in different directions. Motivational situations in which motives
conflict but none achieve dominance are, perceptually and theoretically, situations of uncertainty,
and practically, situations of indecision. The experience of such situations is marked by the
tension of conflicting motives, a tension the grounds of which we may not even be able to make
explicit to ourselves. Such tension is resolved when a determination of the situation incorporates
or reconciles a sufficient range of motives into a coherent whole, such that the tension is released,
and a stable equilibrium of motives is reached. It is a property of our experience of motivation
that, generally speaking, determinations which more successfully resolve this tension, i.e., which
incorporate as many motives as possible as coherently as possible, have more weight for us.
For example, walking down a street, I notice a person staring out from behind a store
window. The person’s form and pensive stance suggest humanity. Yet as I approach, I begin to
grow uncertain. Something in the person’s appearance is not quite right: though I needn’t note it
explicitly, I sense the person’s bearing is outlandish, their body inert and closed off, their figure
not fully shaped. My sense of tension grows: the person grows more uncanny. It suddenly occurs
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to me that what I see is not a person but a mannequin. With this determination, the tension is
resolved. The interpretation “mannequin” reconciles the humanity of the form with the
lifelessness of its bearing. My perceptual situation has achieved harmony through a determination
which transforms the conflict of motives into an equilibrium. Due to this equilibrium, the
interpretation at which I have arrived is stable. Of course, all this can occur without my ever
having to stop and fix the sense of a single motive explicitly.
Motives rarely exist alone. Rather, they belong to complex motivational situations, within
which various motives weigh on us in various ways and negotiate a determination of the
situation. 18 In general, the process of motivation tends away from disharmony and tension toward
equilibrium and stability, toward a “poise” between weights and counterweights. Note that a
situation of indeterminacy tends to have less equilibrium and stability than a well determined
situation. Situations of indeterminacy, for example perceptual indeterminacy, are shot through
with the possibility of collapsing into instability. In the mannequin example above, the lack of
initial determinacy allows the interpretation to dissolve into uncertainty. From a distance, I was
able to see the figure as a person due to the lack of distinct perceptual information. But as I
approach the situation becomes more determinate, and I am forced to abandon my previous
interpretation, which in its collapse is revealed as having possessed only illusory stability.
Motivation thus tends to equilibrium, stability, and determinacy. In the shipwreck example, the
process of motivation concludes with a more stable interpretation of the scene: the interpretation
which can most coherently accommodate the various perceptual motives as they continue to gain
clarity upon approach. Or, the perception of the bell tower’s distance alters in response to the

18

This description is somewhat misleading, as if perception furnished us with a set of independent motives,
which then are integrated into some cohesive interpretation. In fact, each motive of our interpretation takes
on its shape – its meaning and what it motivates – in virtue of the environment of motives to which it
belongs. The reflection in the eye only has the meaning of “reflection in the eye,” and can so operate as a
motive, in virtue of the totality of the perceptual scene (if it were a disconnected white patch, it wouldn’t
take on this meaning).
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perception of the hill, so as to accommodate this new motive into a harmonious perception of the
whole scene.
Intermission: On Solicitation
The following three theses about motivation (that motivation does not ground with
necessity, that motives are normative, and that the outputs of motivation transcend its inputs)
must be grasped together, and so must be gotten into view by another strategy. For this reason, I
now take a brief intermission in order to consider a particular way of speaking about motivation:
solicitation. By solicitation, I mean the way in which a situation calls for a particular action or
judgment. This consideration will allow us to see a number of structures essential to motivation,
which afterwards I will formalize in theses 7-9.
Solicitation is a mode of grounding because it allows us to answer questions about our
actions and decisions. Take as straightforward a case of solicitation as an invitation to dinner. If I
am pulled over on the way to dinner and asked why I am driving, I can truthfully respond that I
am driving because I was invited to dinner. As a mode of grounding, solicitation has a
characteristic structure that differentiates it from other modes of grounding (namely, causality and
reason). We need to do a little phenomenology to get this structure in view.
We can begin to clarify the idea of solicitation by contrasting it with compulsion. First,
compulsion is a sufficient ground of acting in a particular manner, whereas solicitation is not. If
some friends invite me over for dinner, I may decline. But if they compel my presence by, for
example, tying me to the back seat of their car, I will (barring unforeseen circumstances) be in
attendance for dinner. But why isn’t solicitation, by itself, sufficient grounds of action? Because,
solicitation requires as a supplementary ground the response of the solicited. Solicitation grounds
by soliciting a response. A call for help, for example, doesn’t by itself produce help: it produces
help by suggesting and obtaining an appropriate response. Thus, Fichte defines a summons as
“being-determined to be self-determining” (Fichte, 2000, p. 31).
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Further, solicitation involves intention. A response is solicited by awakening an intention:
the cry for help obtains my response by awakening in me the intention of helping. If I am in a
dark room and a point of light moves across the wall, my eyes will be solicited to follow it. It
would be phenomenologically clumsy to claim that the light compels my eyes. My eyes are not
drawn by the light as one draws a heavy weight by rope. At a particular moment (T1), one gives
the rope a tug, and the weight slides toward one, in the direction of the pull as T1. Similarly, at a
particular moment (T1), the light solicits my attention, drawing my eyes. But unlike the weight,
my eyes are not drawn in whatever direction they are pulled at T1; my eyes are not pulled in the
direction of the light’s location at T1, but to wherever the light may be when they can catch it
(T2). Certainly, my eyes are solicited at T1. But they are unlike the weight, which is compelled by
the event at T1, because they are solicited to an event at T2. In other words, the light does not drag
me along behind it, but awakens within me an intention. My eyes seek the light itself (they intend
the light). They do not aim at any particular time or any particular location, they will pursue the
light wherever it goes, because what animates them exceeds any particular time or location,
namely, the light itself. Thus solicitation, unlike compulsion, operates by awakening an intention.
As such, it is not just the relation of a cause to an effect. 19
In establishing a direction of response, solicitation is a three-place relation: in our
example, the light at T1 solicits my eyes to the light at T2. But in a certain manner, one might say
that it is the light at T2 (the light which does not yet exist) which solicits one. It is this which
beckons us from out of the present light, which makes one realize one’s distance from one’s goal.
Thus, what Heidegger said of the call of conscience – that it comes from me, but beyond me – is a
species of a more general truth about solicitation: it comes from the present, but from beyond it.

19

To be clear, responses to solicitation don’t require an explicit intention on the part of consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty writes, “When I am overcome with grief and wholly absorbed in my sorrow, my gaze
already wanders out before me, it quietly takes interest in some bright object, it resumes its autonomous
existence” (PoP 86). Here some aspect the world (“some bright object”) has solicited me beneath my
personal existence or my intentionality, and I have responded without any explicit intention of doing so.
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This analysis allows us to point to a difference in the temporality of compulsion and
solicitation. Solicitation, in awakening an intention, opens a future. In terms of practical
motivation, an intention is an intention to do or to achieve something: the object of practical
intentionality lies in the future. This is why the light moving across the wall orients me not to
itself at T1, but to the possible future in which my attention catches up to it, to the light at T2.
If this point about the temporality of solicitation is correct, it requires us to rethink the
structure of grounding characteristic of solicitation. When asked on the train to attend my friend’s
funeral why I undertake my journey, it will not be enough to respond, “Because my friend has
died.” Such a response would be correct but only partial and insufficient. A complete response
might go something like: “Because my friend has died and I intend to attend her funeral.” The
first response lacked any formulation of what I intend the trip to accomplish, that for the sake of
which I am travelling, i.e., the “final cause” of my action. We have already seen that solicitation
has a two-fold structure of grounding: soliciting situation and responding subject. But the
preceding analysis of intentionality has shown that this two-fold grounding structure is itself
incomplete. Solicitation operates by awakening an intention. Thus, we need to introduce that
which is intended as a partial ground of solicited action. Solicitation has a three-fold grounding
structure, involving solicitor, responder, and the intended. We can now see that what makes the
grounding structure of solicitation unique is the temporality of its grounding. In the kind of
grounding characteristic of compulsion or causality, a past event or circumstance is an adequate
ground of a present event or circumstance. Not so in solicitation. In solicitation, one partial
ground of action, that which is intended, does not yet exist.
Of course, this last point doesn’t mean that solicited action isn’t adequately grounded,
just that its ground isn’t reducible to the present. Yet, in another sense, solicitation is never an
adequate ground. We need to do a little more phenomenology to get this point in view. Take the
example of the cry for help. How does it actually operate? The cry reaches us beneath the level of
activity, forcing itself upon us, not as mere sensation, but as carrying a meaning: a summons to
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some course of action. What forces itself upon us is the suggestion of a particular course of
action. In suggesting, the cry awakens a vague intention. This intention remains at the level of
spontaneity. The cry has put the intention within me, and while I can choose to accept or reject it,
I cannot remove it from myself, which is why if I reject the cry it acquires an unforeseen weight
that colors my day, now in the mode of guilt, shame, etc. But the possibility that the cry suggests
is indeterminate. One acquires the intention to provide aid. Yet, how will one help? What does it
mean in this situation to help? The cry suggests a possible action only in the mode of delineating
a horizon of possible actions. In other words, any number of actions might constitute an adequate
response to the summons. Yet there are general contours of what will and what will not constitute
an adequate response: the cry for help allows that I rush to the source of the cry or that I call in
authorities, but it does not allow that I proceed indifferently or flee the scene. Thus, the cry
delineates, sets the bounds or limits of, a horizon of possible responses. Moreover, the cry norms
this horizon, establishing some responses as more fitting than others: if the sufferer is in imminent
danger and I have the power to help, both rushing to the source and calling the authorities might
constitute adequate responses, but the former will be more fitting. The cry for help is
indeterminate because its primary function is to solicit action by pointing out a problem, a lack, or
need. This situation is analogous to what Merleau-Ponty says of that of the Russian peasants in
1917: their predicament likely did not yield an explicit representation of the revolution as a
solution, and the revolution is at most “at the end of the paths they have taken and is in their
projects in the form of a ‘things-must-change’” (2012, p. 470).
That to which solicitation solicits is thus indeterminate. Nothing in the situation that
solicits one necessarily requires one course of action over or another. Thus, solicitation does not
explain one’s action in the manner that gravity explains the motion of the planets or that premises
combined according to the laws of logic explain a conclusion. Both reason and causality involve
necessity. One can explain with necessity why the mass of one’s body is attracted to that of the
earth, or why from certain premises one must reach a certain conclusion. But when one is asked
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why one called in authorities rather than rushed to the aid of the sufferer, one cannot simply point
to the situation. One can give reasons why one chose as one did, yet these will not constitute a
necessary ground of one’s action. Thus, solicitation is not an adequate ground, in the sense that it
doesn’t ground one’s action with necessity. Consequently, one’s response to solicitation involves
an element of risk and is open to doubt: it may turn out that one’s response was not the most
fitting, and if this happens one will be responsible and not simply excused by features of the
situation. 20
The other result of this analysis is that, while the to-which of solicitation is indeterminate,
solicitation is nevertheless normative. Though the cry for help doesn’t mandate any particular
response, it establishes the parameters for better and worse responses: it norms a field of possible
responses. That solicitation is normative is probably already a result of its difference from
compulsion: the intention awakened in solicitation has normative force. Skill mastery is a good
example of the normativity of solicitation. To master a skill is to be awake to the normative
dimension of a situation. For example, a skilled soccer player is awake to normative differences
in the possibilities available: some befit the shape the field is taking and some do not.
I have argued that solicitation opens and norms a field of possible responses, and because
it opens a field rather than picking out a single response, that to which one is solicited is
indeterminate. Consequently, even if one responds to a solicitation, the solicitation won’t
determine one’s response, and from the solicitation alone one won’t be able to deduce the

20
We might think here of Kierkegaard’s Abraham, who in elevating himself above the universal takes
leave of rational grounding or in other words undertakes a leap, such that Kierkegaard asks, “How then
does the individual assure himself that he is justified?” We never feel certain that Abraham has not merely
succumbed to temptation. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s essay “Cezanne’s Doubt,” which analyzes Cezanne’s
doubt about the success of his work, is centrally concerned with this very experience of risk. What Cezanne
doubts is whether his works achieve a meaning that is universal and necessary – a meaning open to all
because it expresses the world as it had to be expressed – or whether they remain contingent upon
particular and accidental features of his life (“trouble with his eyes” or his “nervous temperament”).
Cezanne could only experience this doubt as he did because his works and his style were original. If he had
painted in a classical or impressionist style, he could have doubted his skill as a painter, but not the
universality of his style. His style did not simply take its ground in its predecessors, and thus its legitimacy
could become a question for Cezanne and his contemporaries: if its ground is not tradition, is it the
particular accidents of Cezanne’s body or temperament, in which case it will never really speak to others?
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response. But moreover, one’s response to a solicitation is in no sense contained in or immanent
to the solicitation. One could not, in other words, discover one’s response simply by analyzing the
solicitation more adequately. The process of solicitation is ampliative: the response exceeds, or
contains more than is present in, the solicitation. Say, for example, that I am observing a sculpture
in a museum. My fascination draws me into the work, solicits my approach. I walk around the
piece in order to get a fuller appreciation. But the draw itself does not contain this series of steps:
I will not find a prescribed course of motion by attending more carefully to the draw. The draw is
like a true question, one which does not contain its response, and my steps are like an answer.
Finally, solicitation grounds in a uniquely original or creative manner. That which
emerges through the process of solicitation contains more than is present in the solicitation. That
is, it involves something new and is not merely a reconfiguration or manipulation of the old. Isn’t
this also true of causes and certain kinds of reasons? A valid conclusion amplifies its premises,
and a kinetic interaction produces a novel momentum. But unlike causes and reasons, solicitation
grounds indeterminately, and as we saw, that means without necessity. Thus, solicitation is
original in a specific sense: it is not sufficiently grounded by anything that came before it, or in
other words, the one solicited can’t point to anything in the situation that fully or adequately
justifies her response in the manner that one executing a geometrical proof can point to reasons
that fully justify her conclusion. Solicitation is original in the sense, then, that it must ground or
take responsibility for itself: it requires, in other words, a creative or original act – a “leap.” Is
solicitation a paradox, since it at once grounds one’s response and leaves it ungrounded? One
would have to respond that solicitation is no more paradoxical than a question – which grounds
its answer in the sense that it establishes the parameters of an appropriate response, but leaves it
ungrounded insofar as it does not contain or determine the answer – or than existence itself,
which takes up its past precisely in exceeding it.
There are three main takeaways from this analysis of solicitiation. First, solicitation does
not ground with necessity. Second, solicitation is normative. Third, the to-which of solicitation
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transcends (is not contained in) the solicitor itself. I would now like to suggest that each of these
is an essential feature of motivation.
7. Motivation does not Ground with Necessity
Motives do not compel; they solicit. This is part of what it means to say that motivation
grounds spontaneously, rather than merely passively. If a perception is grounded spontaneously,
then the perceiving subject must be in the appropriate disposition to have that perception; the
perception is not simply produced in the subject by the external world. In the shipwreck example,
the subject must have some perceptual schema for “ship” in order to regroup the perceptual
givens as a ship. Or in the portrait example, the subject must be familiar with the seeing that can
be seen in the eye that contains a reflection. In short, the subject must be able to hear the call of
the givens, so to speak, in order to respond appropriately. The subject is the supplemental ground
of motivation, and thus motivation does not ground with necessity. Further, motivation does not
necessarily ground any particular response. The perception of a bank of trees and the perception
of the shipwreck are two ways of responding to the perceptual givens, and the fact that the same
givens can motivate both perceptions demonstrates that the givens don’t necessarily ground any
particular interpretation. The givens give rise only to the tension of the scene and an intention,
and correlatively the final interpretation is merely the most satisfying response to the problems
posed by the scene. It always remains possible that the gradual enriching of the givens will
require yet another interpretation.
8. Motivation is Normative
On the other hand, motivation is normative. The subject is not indifferent to which
perception she has. While, in the shipwreck example, the givens don’t ground with necessity, it is
still true that both before and after the gestalt shift the subject thinks she is right to perceive as
she does and would be wrong to perceive otherwise (indeed, after the shift she thinks her previous
interpretation was wrong). Thus, while motives do not ground any particular response with
necessity, they still determine and norm a field of possible responses.
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9. The Output of Motivation Transcends its Input
In writing that output of motivation transcends its motives or inputs, I mean that the
output is not in any sense contained in its motives; the meanings produced by motivation are not
definable in terms of the motivating meanings. The interpretation “shipwreck” is not somehow
hidden within the perceptual field which motivates it. Instead, it is a spontaneous and creative
resolution to the tensions within the perceptual field that broke apart the previous interpretation.
“Shipwreck” cannot be defined simply in terms of this perceptual field, because the schema
“shipwreck” must be brought to the field; if the subject lacks this schema, the givens may fail to
reorganize themselves and may remain in tension. In part, this is a consequence of the claim that
motivation does not ground with necessity. If motives did contain all the resources for their
outputs, then they might plausibly ground their outputs with necessity. As it is, motives lack the
resources to determine their outputs. In this sense, the outputs of motivation transcend the
inputs. 21 Or, we could also say that motivation is a creative process and its outputs are original
with respect to its inputs. 22

21

While I won’t go into further detail, every one of the features disclosed in the analysis of solicitation can
be applied to motivation generally. Aside from the characteristics I already delineated, we can note that
motivation operates by establishing a finality or direction in the one motivated. There is here only a vague
intention, a sense that one’s interpretation of the scene is about to change (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 18).
Certainly, we couldn’t say that one intends to interpret the givens as a ship’s mast, because this
interpretation can’t even figure as a determinate possibility until it has arisen. The intention here is only
that of a resolution of the tension within the givens and need not be explicitly represented by the subject of
motivation. In awakening this vague intention or expectation of transformation, motivation is oriented
toward the future: toward an interpretation to come. Further, this finality figures as a partial ground of
motivation: the tension of the scene is oriented toward a new interpretation. If there were not an
anticipation of a truer interpretation, one which would give sense to the entire scene and resolve its
tensions, the tensions themselves would not arise, for the insufficiencies of the previous interpretation only
have the value of tensions when they are animated by a commitment to perceiving the scene rightly.
22
We can think here again of “Cezanne’s Doubt.” Certainly, Cezanne’s style has its motives. The style of
his predecessors, Cezanne’s personal characteristics, and the subjects of his paintings are all partial grounds
of his works. Cezanne’s works do not emerge from nowhere and without history. And yet Cezanne can
only doubt the legitimacy of his work because none of these motives are necessary grounds of his work.
The experience of doubt is the experience of lacking adequate ground, of not having anything to point to
which would explain one’s actions with necessity. The motives of Cezanne’s works are thus not necessary
grounds. Merleau-Ponty writes that “the artist launches his work just as a man once launched the first word,
not knowing whether it will be anything more than a shout, whether it can detach itself from the flow of
individual life in which it originates and give the independent existence of an identifiable meaning … ”
(1992, p. 19). The artwork doesn’t prove itself, except with time. It cannot resort to preexistent standards of
measure in order to demonstrate its value, as a new theory in physics demonstrates itself with results
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10. Motives are neither Reasons nor Causes
We are now in a position to see why Merleau-Ponty claims that the phenomenological
concept of motivation subverts the dichotomy of reasons and causes. In distinguishing between
reason and causality (as mentioned in my introduction), I intend something like McDowell’s
distinction, in Mind and World, between what he calls “the logical space of reasons” and “the
logical space of nature.” Sellars articulated the former as follows:
In characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an
empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical
space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says (1997, p.
76).
Relationships within the logical space of reasons are normative: it is right to conclude by reason
of Socrates’ death that he is mortal, and it would be wrong to conclude otherwise. Justification is
thus a kind of normative relation. McDowell defines the latter, the logical space of nature, as the
logical space within which the natural sciences operate. Natural sciences explain rather than
justify; knowing a cause helps to explain an effect, but it would be a category mistake to take a
cause as a warrant or justification for an effect. Socrates is not justified in sitting in the Athenian
prison on his final day by his bones and sinews, but by a conception of the good and how to
realize it. The logical space of nature is, in other words, lawful but not normative.

interpreted through preexistent measures, or as a mathematical theorem is demonstrated with necessity on
the basis of certain preexistent premises. A novel style creates its own standards and awakens them in its
audience. In other words, the artist’s motives cannot contain the full content of what the artist creates.
Merleau-Ponty writes, “The meaning of what the artist is going to say does not exist anywhere – not in
things, which as yet have no meaning, nor in the artist himself, in his unformulated life. It summons one
away from the already constituted reason in which ‘cultured men’ are content to shut themselves, toward a
reason which contains its own origins” (1992, p. 19). What makes an artwork original is that it “contains its
own origins.” What can this mean? First, that nothing before it grounds it adequately, with necessity, i.e.,
can prove its value. Second, it grounds itself, demonstrating its value by teaching its own standards. A
novel artist may be rejected by her contemporaries, because they evaluate it on the basis of preexisting
standards. Yet if her work is truly original, it will cultivate new standards, and in time demonstrate its
worth.
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In this section, I argue that motives are not causes because they operate through their
meanings and are normative, and they are not reasons because they are spontaneous and need not
be explicit. 23
A) Motives Are Not Causes
As I have argued in this chapter, motivational relationships operate through their meaning
and are normative. But neither of these features pertain to causality. Motives have their effect in
virtue of that as which they are, i.e., in virtue of their meaning and not just as things or events.
Consequently, it makes a difference what terms one uses to describe a motive. Because causal
relationships hold between objects and events, and not between meanings, they are indifferent to
that as which they are described. As I said above, if asked why a pool ball is in motion, one can
answer as truly “Because it was struck by the 9 ball” as “Because it was struck by the yellowstriped ball” as “Because it was struck by a collection of matter with the requisite momentum.”
Further, causal relations cannot establish normativity; they can make it such that
something is the case, but not that something ought to be the case. This is why causality explains
rather than justifies. In terms of causality, I can explain why I have the sensations that I do, but
this does nothing to establish those sensations as right or wrong. In contrast, motivational
relations do establish normativity: I think, for example, that I am perceiving rightly and that if
someone were to perceive otherwise they would be mistaken. Therefore, motivational relations
are not causal. 24 This doesn’t mean that there is no causal story to be told about goings on in the
brain that underpin processes of motivation. But this is as true of reasoning as it is of motivation,
and so if one admits a distinction between reason and causality one then one can do so in the case
of motivation as well.

23

See also Wrathall (2005) for a strong defense of Merleau-Ponty’s distinction of motives from reasons and
causes.
24
Donnchadh O’Conaill has also made this point: “the intentional content of a state of being motivated is
normative in that it presents an object as making a demand, and a certain course of action as an appropriate
response” (O'Conaill, 2012, p. 584). See also (O'Conaill, 2014, p. 445). While O’Conaill raises this point
specifically with regard to practical motivation, it applies equally well to perceptual motivation.
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B) Motives Are Not Reasons
I have claimed that motives can’t be identified with reasons because motives can be
implicit and are spontaneous. I start with the first of these. For example, we can’t think of the
reflection in the portrait subject’s eye as a reason, because it doesn’t figure explicitly in the
thought process that leads to the perception of the portrait as lively. But this argument depends on
the further claims that a) motives can be implicit, and b) reasons cannot. I have argued the first of
these claims above. But why should we think that reasons cannot be implicit? Could we think of
the process that leads from the reflection to the perception of liveliness as a sort of latent reason?
Certainly, we likely will not find in consciousness an explicit synthesis of the form:
i) There is reflection in the eye of the portrait.
ii) Anything with a reflection in its eye should be perceived as lively.
iii) The portrait should be perceived as lively.
And yet, does this consideration – that there need not be an explicit synthesis – suffice to
conclude that the perception of liveliness isn’t a judgment, an operation of reason?
One of my assumptions has been that reasoning, or the exercise of rational grounding, of
using reasons as grounds, is done at the level of explicit thinking. Properly speaking, the
assumption goes, there is no such thing as implicit reasoning: if I am reasoning, then I have
explicit mental objects standing in explicit relations of grounding with each other. Logical
syllogism is thus a paradigm case of reasoning, for here we have three distinct propositions
standing explicitly before consciousness, explicitly in a relation of logical grounding. Obviously,
at least some instances of reasoning are explicit – but why should we think that all instances of
reasoning are explicit?
My initial response to this question depends on pointing out that reasoning is reflective.
When we reason, we go back over our assumptions and the relationships in which we have
assumed that they stand, in order to test them by a higher standard. Reasoning allows us to say:
“While at first it might have seemed that …, upon closer examination it must be the case that …
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.” This doesn’t mean that reason doesn’t depend on an indeterminate background of assumptions
upon which one hasn’t yet reflected when one begins reasoning, but it does mean that to the
extent that we are reasoning, we are making our thoughts explicit. When we reflect on our
thinking, we are no longer simply moved along by it toward a conclusion, but stop and make the
thinking itself explicit, an object of attention. Thus, reasoning is done at the level of explicit
thinking. In other words, one cannot properly be said to have a reason for thinking as one does,
unless one has this reason at one’s disposal, i.e., has it explicitly. In contrast, one can well have a
motive for thinking as one does without yet recognizing this motive. 25
But McDowell and others have consistently maintained that reasons for belief or action
can be implicit. Proponents of this position tend to support it by pointing out that, while in the
normal course of experience we do not make our reasons explicit to ourselves, yet when we turn
to reflection, we find our reasons readily available. Thus, McDowell has claimed, for example,
that while a chess master playing blitz chess isn’t giving reasons for her moves while playing, she
yet would be able to give rational explanation of her moves as soon as she is questioned about
them. McDowell writes: “What matters is that the agent can answer the ‘Why?’ question straight
off, without any need for reflection or investigation” (2013, p. 47). This phenomenon of the
seamless (“straight off”) transition to reflection might lead one to believe that unreflective action
is already chock-full of justifications: how else could the chess master respond so readily?

25

One might object: But isn’t it the case that implicit thought processes can be more or less rational? For
example, it seems perfectly rational to see a painted figure as less alive when its eye holds no reflection of
light, but it certainly is irrational to see someone as less competent on the basis of their race or gender. I
think it is certainly correct that implicit thought processes can be more or less rational, but wrong to think
that this means that implicit thought processes are ever instances of reasoning. To call an implicit thought
process rational or irrational makes reference to a standard that transcends implicit thought processes,
namely reason. For how does one decide whether an implicit thought process is rational or irrational? One
makes this decision by making the implicit thought process explicit, so as to as see whether it holds up “in
the light of day,” under the standard of reason. The decision thus entails translation to another order.
Further, rational, explicit thought processes can seep down into one’s tendencies of implicit thinking, as in
habituation: the racist by repeatedly recognizing the irrationality of their implicit tendencies, may gradually
replace these irrational implicit tendencies with more rational ones. But here too, the implicit tendency is
only termed rational or irrational by reference to an order outside itself: the explicit.
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O’Conaill is similarly not impressed with the claim that reasons emerge only in making the
grounds of action explicit. He writes,
A process of explicit justification will involve giving reasons, but usually this
process does not create reasons; rather the agent makes apparent reasons of
which they were already aware. So from the fact that explicit reasons … do not
feature in unreflective action, it does not follow that such action is not rational
(2014, p. 448).
And there is truth in this claim: if the subject is asked why she perceived the portrait as lively –
and is able to recognize the influence of the reflection in the eye on her perception – and so
answers the question in these terms, she will not have created this reason, as if out of thin air; she
will have given her reason.
But this way of putting things is misleading. The choice is not really between giving
reasons already present in perception and creating reasons out of thin air. This choice presupposes
that the act of attention, of explicit justification, is neutral, and introduces no transformation in
that to which attention attends. Yet this presupposition is belied by the fact that often the
transition to reflection is not seamless, and instead the content of unreflective action apparently
resists being taken reflectively, as justification. 26 For example, why did I respond coldly to my
friend's warm gesture the other day? Had she committed a legitimate grievance? Was there
instead a matter of jealousy on my part? Was I merely tired, hungry, and feeling short? There is
no answer readily available here, because these answers are so many ways of crystallizing, or
giving determinate form to, the indeterminate field of grounds of my action. Sometimes the
process of justification unfolds smoothly: a chess master may know readily enough why she
unreflectively made the move she did. But all I need is to demonstrate that it doesn't always.
Often there is a legitimate resistance in transforming an unreflective ground of action into a
reason. Then my explication will be searching and tentative: it can still be better or worse (more
or less true to my actual grounds), but it won't be obvious or final. In such cases, the reasons I

26

Merleau-Ponty argues that attention is transformative in his chapter “Attention and Judgment,” from
Phenomenology of Perception.
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give to explain my judgment might be perfectly good reasons, but as descriptions of the reasons I
had, they are at best expressions of my motives and at worst rationalizations of my judgment or
action. 27
It would help, at this point, to be more precise about this phenomenon of resistance.
Merleau-Ponty writes that when I express my reasons, I “crystallize a collection of indefinite
motives in an act of consciousness” (2012, p. 309). Wrathall understands this claim to mean that
when one treats a motive as a reason, one “ends up focusing on some narrow subset of a rich and
complex set of motives,” thereby treating the motive as more “determinate and prominent” than it
was (2005, p. 119). My reason-giving is thus not only poor relative to my motives (focusing on a
relatively narrow subset), but also more determinate than my motives. When I give a reason, I
introduce a precise ground of belief or action. But the grounds of our beliefs or actions are often
diffuse and indeterminate. For example, one may have a vague sense of unease about a
conversation, leading one to judge that the conversation is not going well, without formulating or
being in a position immediately to formulate judgments about why one thinks it is not going
well. 28 Or, to reformulate my previous example in terms of judgment, I tell my friend that our
mutual acquaintance has acted coldly toward us the other night. She disagrees, and asks why I say
this. Suddenly, I am put in the position of justifying my belief, and now I begin examining my
feelings about the matter. I can reply “Did he not seem distracted all night?” or “Well, he didn’t
laugh at that joke,” or “Was there not an expression on his face as I explained my work?” What
am I doing in this process of justification? Here, as is often the case, giving reasons is not simply

27

In response to arguments like this, McDowell has at time responded that such motives fall outside scope
of my action as a rational agent. See, e.g., (McDowell, 2013, p. 51 & 55). But if we take this line, I think
we will be left with precious few instances of rational agency. We can hardly give expression to the
ultimate grounds of our lives. If I reason back far enough into the grounds for my actions, will I arrive
finally at the ground: happiness? Duty? Care? Articulating such ultimate grounds is difficult, and yet surely
pertains to our rational agency.
28
I borrow this example from Taylor Carman, who concludes from it that “The content of skillful social
intelligence resists abstraction and incorporation into purely rational configurations of inference,
deliberation, and decision” (2013, p. 175).
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a matter of verbalizing, or calling to attention, “straight off,” unambiguous grounds, but a matter
expression. In such cases, I attempt to give determinate form to a vague sense of the situation. It
is against this vague sense that the reasons I give are measured: the reasons are formulations
which are more or less true to the sense I had. Here, the justifications I give are expressions. Such
expressions may leave much of the content of the grounds for my belief or action out of the
picture. They may not get these grounds in the picture at all, as when I am unable to express the
influence that the reflection in the portrait’s eye has on my perception. This being so, the grounds
of my judgment are at most partially within the space of reasons.
If the preceding is true, then while motives can be implicit, reasons cannot, and thus
motives cannot be considered as reasons. This conclusion can also be reached by noting that
motivation is spontaneous. When we reason, we are concerned actively to give and take reasons.
In response to these reasons, we can actively revise previously held positions. For example, if I
hold X, and I hold that if X, then Y, then I will conclude that Y. But if I later find very compelling
reasons to reject Y, and have very strong reasons to think that if X, then Y, then I will be forced to
reject X. This revisability is, I think, crucial to our idea of activity: I am free to accept or reject
conclusions in response to reasons. But the same is not true of motivation. Cases of motives
conflicting with reasons, e.g., optical illusions, make this clear. In the Müller-Lyer illusion, I have
compelling reasons to think that the lines are equal. I can thus revise the conclusion I drew from
perception, namely that the lines differ in length, on the basis of new reasons. 29 But I cannot so
revise my perception. Motivation is closed (or rather, at most partially open) to the giving and

29

Note that I am not specifying whether or not one’s reasons are correct. One might colloquially call a
reason which is in error “irrational.” However, here, I treat anything as a reason which operates according
to the norms and practices of reason. Thus, even reasons which are “irrational,” i.e., mistaken, I will call
reasons, because they are properly governed by the laws of reason, i.e., are meant to be judged correct or
erroneous by the norms of reason and these norms are not external to their space of operation (as I claim
the norms of reason are to motives).
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taking of reasons. Thus, whereas reasons are active, motives are spontaneous. Motives are not
reasons. 30
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explained what it means to take motivation as an epistemic ground
by defending 10 theses about motivation. I have shown how motivation can serve as an epistemic
ground and, in my final thesis, I showed that motivation cannot be reduced to a species of
causality or reason. Whereas causes do not operate in virtue of their meanings, and reasons
operate in virtue of explicit meanings, motives operate in virtue of implicit meanings; whereas
causes ground non-normatively and passively, and reasons ground normatively but actively,
motives ground normatively but spontaneously. Finally, both reason and causality ground with
necessity, whereas motives do not. In this way, motivation provides a way to understand how
grounding can be a process of transcendence. In the following chapters, I will show how
introducing motivation as an epistemic ground can solve long-standing epistemological problems.

30

One might object that the above example can be accommodated by the view that motives are implicit
reasons, by treating the conflict as one between two kinds of reasons. Certainly, we at times have
conflicting reasons, so there is no prima facie reason to conclude from the conflict of motivation and reason
that motives aren’t a kind of reason. But notice that in the case of the Müller-Lyer lines, not only are
motivation and reason in conflict, but it is not at all clear how one would even go about describing one’s
motives in terms of reasons. In other words, not only is one’s motive for seeing one line as longer than the
other as a contingent matter of fact implicit, it is not even clear how one could go about making one’s
motive explicit. Thus, psychologists can speculate about the “reasons” one has for seeing one line as longer
than the other: perhaps the arrows make one line look like a protruding edge and the other like a recessed
edge, such that the length of the line is interpreted differently. But this is really speculation, rather than an
explication of an as yet implicit reasoning, and moreover this “reason” dissolves the moment it is actually
treated as a reason (we can’t take it seriously as a consideration in favor of).
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Figure 1.1. The Müller-Lyer Lines. Reprinted from Müller-Lyer Illusion, In Wikipedia.
Retrieved August 9, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M%C3%BCllerLyer_illusion. 2007 by Fibonacci. Reprinted with permission.
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Figure 1.2. “My Wife and My Mother-in-Law.” Reprinted from My Wife and My Mother in
Law, In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 9, 2017 from
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/My_Wife_and_My_Mother-in-Law. 1915 by William Hill.
Reprinted with permission.

48

CHAPTER 2. EXPERIENCE AND JUDGEMENT
In the previous chapter, we saw that perceptual experience presents us with a spontaneous
sense that is not well accounted for in terms of reason or causality. Instead, we need to employ a
novel form of epistemic grounding, namely motivation, in order to understand the genesis of
perception. My broader thesis is that motivation is the form of grounding pertinent to the relation
between perception and knowledge. I now begin arguing for this position. My analysis will have
two parts. In this chapter, I ask how experiences can ground judgments at all. Then, in chapter 3, I
will turn to more general considerations about the relation of experience to judgments that are not
directly of experience: universal judgments and, ultimately, a priori judgments.
There is no doubt that our judgments about experience are grounded in experience. If you
were to ask me why I think that the sky above is cloudy or the pavement wet, I could
appropriately reply, “Because that’s how it looks to me.” In other words: “Because I experience it
so.” With this response, I would indicate that my judgment is grounded in my experience, or in
other words that experience answers questions about why I judge as I do. And yet it is not so
obvious how this grounding should be understood: philosophically, there is no agreement about
how to characterize the relationship between experience and the judgments to which it gives rise.
Evidently there is some manner in which experience grounds judgment and yet articulating this
manner of grounding presents a challenge.
Two ways of thinking about this relation have been given expression in the work of
Davidson and McDowell. Davidson has argued that experiences cause beliefs. He claims that
“nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief,” and because
experiences aren’t beliefs, or any other sort of propositional attitude, they can’t stand in a logical
relation to beliefs (Davidson, 1986, p. 310). This leaves Davidson with the thought that
experiences stand in a merely causal relationship to beliefs, and consequently, that experiences
can’t justify beliefs. McDowell, in contrast, has argued that experiences can justify beliefs. In
Mind and World, McDowell claims that experiences have conceptual content, and that because
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conceptually articulated contents can stand in a logical relation with judgments, experiences can
count as reasons for judgments. These two ways of thinking about the relationship between
experience and judgment continue to shape contemporary epistemological literature, and the
debate between them has not been decisively settled.
In this chapter, I argue that this impasse is due to an insufficient phenomenology of the
kind of grounding pertinent to the relation between experience and judgment. In fact, neither
reason nor causality correctly describes this relation. What stymies the debate between McDowell
and Davidson is that both accept the dichotomy of reason and causality. But we have seen that
this dichotomy is a false one: motivation is a third kind of epistemic ground. Here, I show that
motivation provides a new and better means of describing the relation between experience and
judgment. 31 Doing so will open a new avenue for thinking about knowledge, which avoids both
Davidson’s “coherentism” and McDowell’s unique form of “minimal empiricism.” 32
1. Davidson and McDowell
Davidson, in his “A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge,” lays out a puzzle for
empiricist accounts of knowledge. Empiricists think that our knowledge is justified by our
experience. But, argues Davidson, experiences are not the kinds of things that can justify
knowledge. Knowledge is propositional (i.e., its object is the referent of a that-clause). 33 For
example, I know that the tree is shedding its leaves. But experiences are not propositional. For
example, I perceive a tree shedding its leaves. And here lies the problem: surely only a belief (i.e.,
something with propositional content) can serve as a reason for holding another belief. According
to Davidson, we can only justify our beliefs in virtue of other beliefs. For example, if you ask me

31

This thought is suggested by Mark Wrathall at the end of his essay “Motives, Reasons, and Causes,” but
not fully worked out there (not being the central point of his essay) nor sufficiently argued (as I will explain
later).
32
See McDowell 1996 (p. xii) for this designation.
33
There are certainly different ways of specifying what this means, and I don’t want to get bogged down in
discussions about the nature of propositional content. For the sake of simplicity, I accept something like:
Contents are propositional if they are referents of that-clauses.
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why I think it has rained, I will respond: “Because I think that the street is wet,” i.e., in virtue of
some propositional content. But experiences are not beliefs, and so it seems that they cannot
serves as reasons for – they cannot justify – knowledge. But since our experiences do evidently
ground our judgments, but cannot do so in the mode of reason, they must instead cause our
judgments. This leads Davidson to a coherentist position, according to which experiences cause
beliefs and our beliefs are justified with respect to their degree of coherence with the full body of
our beliefs.
McDowell’s Mind and World aims, in part, to solve this puzzle. 34 McDowell has his own
way of formulating the puzzle: in terms of two conflicting philosophical pressures, which Mind
and World aims to reconcile. On the one hand, knowledge seems to entail answerability to the
empirical world (McDowell, 1996, p. xii). The ultimate verdict on our judgments and beliefs,
according this minimal sort of empiricism, comes from the “tribunal of experience.” Without this
responsibility to the world of experience, our judgments ultimately fail to gain traction. The threat
is that we have perfect freedom in judgments, in a way which leaves them ungrounded in
anything outside of our freedom. Thus, if we are really to have knowledge at all, our judgments
must be justified by experience.
On the other hand, a necessary condition of knowledge is justification: a belief which
isn’t supported by good reasons can’t count as knowledge. As Sellars puts it, in his attack on
“The Myth of the Given,” “In characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not
giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of
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McDowell’s question, then, is really: How is knowledge possible? Because this is McDowell’s guiding
question, his interest in experience extends only to its ability to ground knowledge. Rouse has formulated
this insight by arguing that McDowell’s interest in experience is normative rather than descriptive, i.e., in
whether experience can be assessed in certain ways rather than whether it actually is certain ways (Rouse,
2013). Rouse thus thinks McDowell’s interests are orthogonal to those of phenomenology, such that it’s not
quite right to put them in dialogue. I think this formulation is too strong: McDowell really is interested in
claiming that experience is, e.g., conceptually articulated. His interest in experience is just transcendental
rather than phenomenological (i.e., in what experience must be like in order for knowledge to be possible,
rather than in what experience is actually like), but both interests require giving an account of experience.
Thus, there is room for genuine dialogue between the two approaches.
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reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (1997, p. 76). McDowell, following
Sellars, contrasts the “logical space of reasons” (what I have simply called “reason”) with the
“logical space of nature” (what I have called “causality”) the space in which the natural sciences
function. Natural sciences explain rather than justify; knowing a cause helps to explain an effect,
but it would be a category mistake to take a cause as a warrant or justification for an effect. As I
put it in chapter 1, the presence of Socrates’ body in the prison is the material condition for his
being there, but it is not the reason for his being there. The logical space of nature is, in other
words, lawful but not normative. But experience is customarily thought to belong to the logical
space of nature: sensations or “impingements” are lawfully caused according to natural processes.
And if our experience is caused, it can’t figure as a justification for knowledge, because it doesn’t
belong to the kind of logical space that involves justifications, i.e., the logical space of reasons. If
our experiences belong only to the logical space of nature, they can serve at best as exculpations
of our beliefs, but not as justifications (McDowell, 1996, p. 8). Conventional empiricism (the
“Myth of the Given”) depends on a conflation of the two logical spaces, such that experiences can
seem to be both caused and to serve as justifications for beliefs.
McDowell thus claims that for knowledge to be possible, both a) our judgments must be
responsible to experience, and b) experience must be the kind of thing that can justify our
judgments. McDowell’s question is how we must conceive experience in order to accommodate
both of these demands. In other words, what kind of thing must experience be, if knowledge is to
be possible?
According to McDowell, as long as we conceive experience as purely receptive, as
belonging squarely to the logical space of nature, it will be impossible to accommodate these two
pressures. Instead, we must understand experience as belonging within the logical space of
reasons, i.e., as constitutively shaped by our activity, or more specifically, by the capacities
exercised in judgments. Further, McDowell understands this active shaping of experience in
terms of conceptual capacities. In this chapter, I won’t be interested in this aspect of McDowell’s
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thinking (his attribution of conceptuality to experience), but only in his claim that the bond
between experience and belief must fall within the space of reason if we are to have justified
knowledge. In these terms, the Myth of the Given is that experience can be outside the boundary
of activity and yet serve to justify judgments. McDowell’s point is that experience can justify
judgments, i.e., belong to the space of reasons, only if it is constitutively shaped by our rationality
(specifically if it is organized by concepts).
Davidson lays out a genuine puzzle: How can non-propositional experiences justify
propositional judgments? But I don’t buy Davidson’s conclusion, namely, that experiences cause
judgments and so what we need is a coherence theory of knowledge. On the other hand,
McDowell’s instinct is right: experiences must ground judgments in some more-than-causal
fashion. But McDowell’s solution won’t work. Experiences, as I will argue, cannot serve as
reasons for judgments. What is needed here is a third form of grounding: motivation. In the
following two sections, I will explain how I understand the difference between experience and
judgment, and how motivation can be used to think about the relation between them. 35
Subsequently, I will argue that neither causality nor reason adequately describe this relation.
2. Experience and Judgment
Noting a couple features of experience and judgment will help us understand the relation
between the two. First, we are active in judgment to an extent that we are not in perceptual
experience. As I have already said, perceptual experience draws on our spontaneity, whereas
judgment responds to our active thinking. Merleau-Ponty notes this distinction, for example, in
writing that
Between sensing and judging, ordinary experience draws a very clear distinction.
It understands judgment to be a position-taking … . It takes sensing, on the
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For Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the relation between experience and judgment in
terms of motivation, see, e.g., Husserl (1973, p. §§68 and 71) and (1989, p. §56); Merleau-Ponty (2012, pp.
33-7, 210, 395).

53

contrary, to be the giving of oneself over to the appearance without seeking to
possess it or know its truth (2012, p. 36). 36
Judgment is subject to the norms of reason in way that experience is not: I can revise my
judgments under pressure from conflicting reasons, but I cannot so revise my experiences.
Second, in experience contents are given to us, whereas no content is directly given in
judgment. As Husserl writes, “Experience in the first and most pregnant sense is accordingly
defined as a direct relation to the individual” (1973, p. 27). In contrast, one can easily make
judgments for which no content is given, e.g., if I experience the sky as blue but arbitrarily form
the judgment, “The sky is green today.”
Finally, I take it that whereas judgment is propositional, experience is not. Or, in the
terms of the phenomenological tradition, judgments are predicatively structured, whereas
experiences are pre-predicative. As Husserl puts it, experience is “single-rayed”: it is simply
directed toward its object. In contrast, judgments synthesize two “rays of attention”: it is directed
toward both the subject and the predicate. While this claim about propositional structure is
accepted by all parties to the present debate, it is not universally accepted. 37 I’ll briefly explain
my reasons for holding it.
A. Propositional Content
Like McDowell and Davidson, Merleau-Ponty maintains that the content of perception is
non-propositional. The language of “propositional contents” is not Merleau-Ponty’s, but I think
that terminology does name something that Merleau-Ponty is genuinely interested in. Following
Husserl, Merleau-Ponty describes perceptual experience as pre-predicative, i.e., as possessing a
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McDowell too notes this difference, writing that while in judgment one is free to make up one’s mind, in
experience “one finds oneself saddled with content” (1996, p. 10).
37
See Davidson 1986 (p. 310). While McDowell did claim in Mind and World that experience has a sort of
propositional content, namely that “things are thus and so,” (1996, p. 9) he has since retracted this claim
(2008). Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception describes experience as “pre-predicative”
throughout.
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structure different from and prior to that of predicative propositions. 38 Merleau-Ponty writes, for
example, that “the being of the perceived is the pre-predicative being toward which our total
existence is polarized” (2012, p. 336).
I think it is right to distinguish propositional from experiential content, first, because our
propositional knowledge is poor relative to our experience. Attend to your current perceptual
state. Now attempt to express it, completely, in propositional form. 39 The task is an immense one
– in fact, it isn’t clear that it has any precise limits. How many propositions would one need to
complete the job? The question cannot be answered. Or, what is my experience like, e.g., as I
cross the floor of the coffee shop? I maneuver between tables, chairs, customers and I mind these
things and many others. It would be absurd to suggest that therefore the stream of my experience
takes the form: "Now there is the table … And now there is the chair … And now there is the
customer heading my way." What makes this suggestion ridiculous is that my experience is rich
and my propositional knowledge is poor. The latter is not poor, however, in its quality, for in
quality it achieves a determinacy and permanence that my experience does not. It is poor, instead,
in what it manages to portray. The propositional expression (even if only internal) of my
experience crystallizes some definite content out of the indefinite array of my experience,
isolating only the most salient chunks of experience.
A propositionalist about experience will object that I have mistaken their position: I have
understood “propositional content” in terms of explicitly formulated propositions – whether
expressed or remaining internal – whereas in fact we should think of experience as propositional
all the way down, including the implicit dimensions of experience.
My response to this objection is basically the same I gave to the objection that reasons
can be implicit in chapter 1: the objection misses the transformative nature of attention. If this
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The idea that the structure of experience is not that of predicative judgments is a central idea of Husserl’s
Experience and Judgment, which turns around an analysis of the difference between predication and prepredicative experience. See Husserl 1973 (p. 27).
39
I borrow this sort of experiment from Heck (2000, pp. 489-90).
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propositionalist objection were correct, how could formulating a proposition clarify anything in
experience, as it does when, for example, I begin to describe my experience of a taste, of a song,
or of a scene? Equally, how could we experience difficulty in raising our experience to
propositional expression, in giving a formulation to the ambiguous contours of experience, as I
surely do when I am made to describe a novel experience? 40
Finally, there are structural differences between experience and propositions. Whereas a
proposition is singular and determinate, experiential content lacks such precise contours. In a
working note for The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty writes,
Yet there is a world of silence, the perceived world, at least, is an order where
there are non-language significations – yes, non-language significations, but they
are not accordingly positive. There is for example no absolute flux of singular
Erlebnisse; there are fields and a field of fields, with a style and a typicality
(1968, p. 171).
Our experiences, then, do not have the definite boundaries that our propositional descriptions of
them do. 41 This is why the task of giving experiential content propositional form is so
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Of course, some propositional content can always be summoned for experience. A novice wine drinker
sampling for the first time a Barbaresco, when asked to describe the experience can always state vacuously,
"This tastes like Barbaresco." But this expression is a mere tautology and so leaves out any meaningful
content of my experience. As an expression, it is undoubtedly poor. Thus, while it is evident that any
experience can be given propositional form, this does not prove that experience is propositional.
41
This is, for example, Roquentin’s point in Sartre’s Nausea about telling the story of one’s life: “You have
to choose: live or tell. … Nothing happens while you live. The scenery changes, people come in and go out,
that’s all. There are no beginnings. Days are tacked on to days without rhyme or reason, and interminable,
monotonous addition. … Neither is there any end: you never leave a woman, a friend, a city in one go. And
everything looks alike …. . There are moments – rarely – when you make a landmark, you realize you are
going with a woman, in some messy business. The time of a flash. After that, the procession starts again …
. That’s living. But everything changes when you tell about life; it’s a change no one notices … . You seem
to start at the beginning: ‘It was a fine autumn evening in 1922. I was a notary’s clerk in Marommes.’ And
in reality you have started at the end. It was there, invisible and present, it is the one which gives to words
the pomp and value of a beginning. … The end is there, transforming everything. For us, the man is already
the hero of the story. His moroseness, his money troubles are much more precious than ours, they are all
gilded by the light of future passions. And the story goes on in the reverse: instants have stopped piling
themselves in a lighthearted way one on top of the other, they are snapped up by the end of the story which
draws them and each one of them in turns, draws out the preceding instant … . We forget that the future
was not yet there; the man was walking in a night without forethought …” (2007, pp. 39-40). The ordinary
flow of experience, then, is without stark boundaries: without beginnings or ends, or at least, when
experience makes beginnings and ends, these are not definitive, for they engage generalities that persists
beneath the boundaries. But when we set about telling of our experience we necessarily demarcate a before
and after, i.e., we determine a beginning. Ronquentin goes on to point out that this marks a rupture in the
temporality of an event: in isolating an experience, we define a whole, within which the parts define each
other, such that the beginning is already defined by the end. But for my current purposes, all I wish to point
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interminable: there are myriad ways in which one can carve up this content into precise form.
This is also what makes the task difficult: it’s often unclear what is the right way to put
experience into propositional form. I will return to this point and make it more thoroughly in
section 6 of this chapter. For now, I only mean to note that while experience is open to being put
in propositional form, it also resists this transformation, and this resistance suffices to show that
experiential content is different in form from propositional content.
B. Conclusion
In this section, I’ve sketched the contours of the distinction between experience and
judgment. The view I have adopted is Merleau-Ponty’s, which in large part agrees with views
adopted by McDowell and Davidson. All three agree, for example, that experience is nonpropositional, whereas judgment is propositional. It’s worth noting that there are significant
regards in which they disagree. For example, they disagree about whether the content of
perception is conceptual, McDowell holding that it is and Merleau-Ponty and Davidson holding
that it is not. 42 However, Merleau-Ponty is quite far from landing in Davidson’s camp here.
Davidson views experience in terms of causality, and thus leaves spontaneity out of his picture of
experience. Like McDowell, Merleau-Ponty thinks experience is organized by a kind of
“spontaneity” in receptivity, but differs from McDowell in his description of this spontaneity: for
McDowell, spontaneity signifies the deployment of conceptual capacities, while for MerleauPonty, spontaneity signifies that experience is meaningful. Thus, McDowell’s paradigm of
spontaneity is active thinking (judgment), and passive experience is spontaneous only to the

out is that putting experience into language, into propositional form, entails determining the boundaries of
an experience that in itself was indeterminate.
42
There is some question about whether Merleau-Ponty is as strongly opposed to McDowell on this issue
as he seems to be. Dreyfus, Kelly, and Alweiss, for example, take Merleau-Ponty to think that the content
of experience is non-conceptual (see Dreyfus (2007) & (2013), Kelly (2001), and Alweiss (2000)).
However, Berendzen has contested this claim (2009) & (2010). It seems to me that while the nonconceptuality of perceptual content in Merleau-Ponty is at times overstated in the literature, a careful
reading of Merleau-Ponty cannot ignore his description of certain kinds of non-conceptual content. He
writes, e.g., that “Living thought … does not consists in the act of subsuming under a category” (2012, p.
130). While I think that experience has non-conceptual content, my argument in this section does not rely
on this position and so should be acceptable even to a conceptualist.
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extent that it involves the capacities exercised in active thinking (conceptual capacities). In
contrast, for Merleau-Ponty, experience is organized by a spontaneity that is sui generis, i.e., isn’t
defined by discursivity.
3. Motivation
In the previous section, I distinguished between perceptual experience, in which one
spontaneously grasps meaning, and judgment, in which one actively takes a propositional stance
with respect to that meaning. A similar distinction between experience and judgment is drawn by
McDowell and Davidson, though different parties construe the boundaries of this distinction
differently. Now that I have clarified what Merleau-Ponty means by experience, and how his
position stands with respect to McDowell’s and Davidson’s, I can turn to the question of how we
should conceive the relation between experience and judgment. Whereas Davidson conceives this
relation in terms of causality, and McDowell conceives it in terms of reason, Merleau-Ponty
conceives it in terms of motivation. In this section, I explain what it means to claim that
perception motivates judgments.
I think we can describe the motivational relationship between experience and judgment
basically as follows. If judgment is propositional, and experience is nonpropositional, judgment is
obviously not reducible to, or in any sense contained in, experience. Instead, judgment responds
to nonpropositional experience by determining it propositionally. On the other hand, judgment
isn't autonomous with respect to experience: experience demarcates and norms a field of possible
judgments (propositions), establishing some propositions as better or worse responses to itself.
Propositions are normed by experience in terms of how well they express the content of
experience. In this sense, propositions are responsible to experience.
This account of the relation between perception and judgment allows us to acknowledge
Davidson’s puzzle without giving up the normativity of experience. Because the outputs of
motivation transcend their inputs, it is possible for non-propositional content to motivate
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propositional content. And because motivation is normative, this non-propositional content norms
the propositions that can be made of it.
Further, we can specify the notions of norming and responsibility here in terms of the
phenomenological concept of evidence. Husserl uses the term ‘evidence’ to describe ‘the giving
of something itself’ (1969, pp. 157-8). 43 A judgment has evidence when it is intuitively fulfilled,
e.g., in experience. While I am in the hallway, I can judge for myself that the room I will enter is
full of people, but the judgment is empty (unfulfilled) until I walk into the room and see and hear
for myself. In entering the room, my judgment becomes evident. Experiences norm judgments in
the sense that they evidentiate them: seated across from my friend, I can judge ‘My friend here is
a human’ or I can judge ‘My friend here is a heron.’ But only one of these judgments will be
evidentiated by experience.
I will thus understand the claim that experience motivates judgments to mean that
experience evidentiates judgments. The notion of evidence allows us to see how experience
grounds judgments, without itself containing propositions. 44
Importantly, we are not active with respect to evidence. I can actively form judgments at
will, e.g., I am free to form the judgment "This room is full of people" in the hallway, and even if
as I walk in I find no one there. But I cannot actively make a judgment evident. Alone in the
room, I know too well that no amount of willpower can fulfill my judgment. At most I can put
myself in the right circumstance for a judgment to be evidentiated (e.g., I cannot will my
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Naturally, Husserl is not suggesting that evidence in this sense is a sort of sense-datum or ‘Given’ (in the
mythical sense), minimally because (in the same passage) Husserl is clear that the giving of evidence draws
on our spontaneity (in Husserl’s terms, on an ‘intentionale Leistung’).
44
Walsh (2013) has pointed out that Husserl’s notions motivation and evidence in the Logical
Investigations are distinct. For example, the sight of smoke can motivate the thought of fire, even though it
in no sense makes the fire evident to me. But, while it seems plausible to me that not all motivational
relationships are evidential, this does not entail that no motivational relationships are evidential, nor that
evidential relationships are not motivational. For example, in an Appendix II to Experience and Judgment,
Husserl describes the way in which the evidence of a judgment of probability (and not just the judgment of
probability itself) is motivated (1973, 394). Consequently, at least on Husserl’s terms, nothing speaks
against allowing that there are motivational relationships that are not evidentiating while at the same time
holding that the evidential relationship connecting experience and knowledge is a motivational relationship.
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judgment "It is hot outside" into fulfillment, but I can walk outside into the heat). Thus, just as I
am not active with respect to experience itself, neither am I active with respect to evidentiation by
experience.
4. Reason
What makes my account of the relation between experience and judgment preferable to
Davidson’s causal account or McDowell’s rational account? In this section, I argue that the
relation between experience and judgment cannot be understood in terms of reason. In the next
section, I will explain why causality won’t work either. In short, my argument here is that
McDowell cannot describe the grounding relation between experience and judgment in terms of
reason, because to do so would entail that this relation is at the disposal of our active thinking,
which it is not.
First, let me explain McDowell’s position in a little more depth. McDowell thinks that the
conceptual capacities engaged in experience put us in a position to be justified in knowledge. The
idea is that our judgments are ultimately justified by appeals to experience, by claims like: “It
seems this way to me,” or “It looks like …,” or “It appears that … .” 45 For example, on a walk
along the coast, I say to my companion, “Look! There’s that osprey!” If she then asks me why I
say that that is the osprey – thinking herself that it is an eagle – it would be natural for me to say:
“Well, because it looks that way to me.” In this way, experiences are our ultimate reasons for
holding certain beliefs, because they immediately put us in a position to know certain
propositions to be true or false. McDowell’s view is thus that the nonpropositional content of
experience justifies propositions, i.e., judgments: the former is a reason for holding the latter. But,
according to McDowell, experience is a noninferential reason. In other words, we shouldn’t think
of experience as providing a premise for a conclusion (i.e., a judgment). Instead, experience
immediately puts us in a position to know things, to know that certain propositions are true or
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See, e.g., McDowell (1996, p. 165) & (2008, pp. 3-4).
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false (McDowell, 2008, pp. 12-13). When I reply to my friend that “It seems that way to me,” I
am not using this appearance as a premise, for which “That’s an osprey” is the conclusion; I am
pointing out that my experience puts me in a position to know noninferentially that that is an
osprey. 46
I want to be clear about what justifications like “it seems that way to me” actually mean.
If experience were propositional, then we might understand such claims as follows: “I experience
that ‘That is an osprey’,” or, “The content of my experience is that ‘That is an osprey’.” And then
it might seem to be an obvious and reasonable step from the experience that “That is an osprey”
to the judgment “That is an osprey.” But if experiences are non-propositional, as I and McDowell
think, then phrases like “It seems to me that ‘That is an osprey’,” or “It looks that way [as if ‘That
is an osprey’]” are misleading, for taken literally they suggest that what one sees in experience
are propositions, thereby saddling experience with propositional content that it doesn’t possess.
Instead, according to McDowell, such phrases are best understood as meaning that one’s
experience “inclines” one to say that, e.g., “That is an osprey.” McDowell writes that “Such
locutions … accept, in their ‘that’ clauses, specifications of things one’s experience puts one in a
position to know noninferentially” (2008, pp. 3-4). It seems to me that to say that experience
“inclines” one to make a judgment or that experience “puts one in a position to know” are other
ways of referring to what I have called evidentiation; I think justifications like “It looks that way
to me” mean that experience evidentiates my proposition or judgment, in the sense that I don’t
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Wrathall has argued against McDowell on the grounds that the motives of our experiences are often
unavailable for use as reasons for judgment: “An experience is able to provide rational grounding to the
extent that it is available for use in inference and justification. Thus, we can conclude that if the experience
that gives rise to the thought is not available for use in inference and justification, then the thought is not
rationally grounded. … It is often the case that we are motivated by some features of our perceptual
experience that are not available for use in thought but that nevertheless dispose us (rather than cause us) to
have the thoughts that we do. Thus, motives stand to the thoughts they motivate not in a way that justifies
or supports them, but rather in that they impel us toward having them” (2005, pp. 122-3). But I think this
mistakes McDowell’s case. For McDowell does not claim that every feature of experience that influences
the way we see things is a rational ground for our judgments. Rather, McDowell claims that how we see
things, our experience (however it is grounded in the various features of experience), is available for
thought, and so can rationally ground a judgment. While the reflection in the eye may not be available for
use in judging that the portrait is lively, the experience of the portrait as lively is.
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utter the proposition emptily (as I would if, e.g., I had said “That is an osprey” while walking
down an empty, enclosed corridor, that appeared to me as such). 47 Thus, if I reply that “it looks
that way to me,” I don’t mean that I literally see the proposition, but that my experience makes
that proposition evident. Again, if experience is nonpropositional (as I think it is), then we should
think of experience as norming a field of possible propositions one could make in response to
experience, such that no propositions are given in my experience, but my experience yet makes
some propositions better than others.
This way of construing the bond between experience and judgment as rational, I now
argue, will not do. Justifications like “Because it seems that way,” the kind McDowell uses to
describe the justification of judgment by experience, are not really satisfactory as rational
grounds for judgment. And the reason for this is that we cannot fully take responsibility for them,
or in other words, the relation between experience and judgment isn’t active in the sense
McDowell requires to count it as justification (McDowell, 1996, p. 53). 48
What would it take for the relation between experience and judgment to be rational?
McDowell has provided an – I think good – answer to this question in his criticism of Evans.
Evans claimed that experiences can have nonconceptual content and yet stand in a rational
relation to judgments. McDowell criticizes this position on the grounds that any account that puts
experience and judgment on opposing sides of a "conceptual boundary" (a boundary between
conceptual and non-conceptual content), leaves experience outside the sphere of our spontaneity,
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I am putting McDowell’s ideas in terms of the phenomenological concept of evidence in order to
facilitate a conversation. However, if someone in McDowell’s position had good reason to reject my
assimilation of experience’s “inclining” one so to judge in terms evidence, then I don’t think my argument
in what follows will be damaged. My argument depends on the fact that we can’t freely revise how our
experience evidentiates, but this is just as true of how experience inclines one to think.
48
What I am arguing is that the relation itself doesn’t come under the self-scrutiny of active thinking, and
thus can’t be considered as rational. Notice how I equally disagree with Evans and his defenders here (see,
e.g., Heck (2000) or Lerman (2010), for a defense of Evans’s position on this exact issue). I agree with
McDowell, against Evans, that if experience is outside the boundary of spontaneity (in McDowell’s sense,
i.e., “the space of reasons”), then it cannot stand in a rational relation to judgment. But I disagree with
McDowell that we should think of the relation between experience and judgment as rational, as being able
to “come under the self-scrutiny of active thinking.”
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and any account that leaves experience outside the sphere of spontaneity cannot treat the relation
between experience and judgment as susceptible to active thinking. But, McDowell claims, only
relations susceptible to active thinking can be considered as rational. As McDowell puts it,
If these relations [between experience and judgment] are to be genuinely
recognizable as reason-constituting, we cannot confine spontaneity within a
boundary across which the relations are supposed to hold. The relations
themselves must be able to come under the self-scrutiny of active thinking.
Further, McDowell understands “falling under the self-scrutiny of active thinking” in terms of
being “liable to revision, if that were to be what the self-scrutiny of active thinking recommends"
(McDowell, 1996, p. 52). Thus, McDowell takes it that for a relation to be rational, it must be
liable to revision by active thinking.
But the relation between experience and judgment does not meet this criterion. I have
claimed that not only are we not active with respect to our experience, we are not active with
respect to the evidentiation of our judgments by experience (i.e., these are grounded
spontaneously, in the sense I articulated above). In other words, we are not free to revise or alter
this relation under the recommendation of active thinking. Take again the case of my
ornithological dispute. Suppose I am inclined to trust my friend’s eyesight over my own, and so
judge that what appears to me as an osprey is in fact an eagle. While I am free to form this
judgment, I am not free to revise the way in which experience evidentiates my judgments: my
experience continues to fulfill the judgment that the bird before us is an osprey, and not to fulfill
the judgment that it is an eagle. Thus, we ought to say that while we are active with respect to our
judgments, the relation between experience and judgment is spontaneous. But if this is so, then on
the criterion McDowell has given, the relation is not rational.
Let me be more precise. It is true that our empirical judgments are revisable. In fact, they
are revised in one of two ways: either a) experience evidentiates a new, different judgment, or b)
one has reasons independently of experience for revising one’s judgment. But neither of these
two modes of revision can give McDowell what he needs in order to count the relation as rational.
63

In the first case, the revision is not by the recommendation of active thinking. It is, in fact, totally
spontaneous: the new evidentiation either falls into view, or it does not. In the second case, the
relation between experience and judgment is not revised – it is simply ignored. The relation
between experience and judgment is thus revisable only in the sense that one can always withhold
affirmation from the evidentiation provided by experience. Even if experience fulfills a judgment,
I need not affirm that judgment. I may have other reasons for doubting the testimony of
experience (e.g., my friend's superior eyesight). I may even be embarking on a Cartesian project
of radical doubt. Whatever the case, whereas the evidentiation provided by experience is
spontaneous (and not actively revisable), I am active with respect to judgments, for I have the
capacity to affirm or deny any judgment. In this sense, my judgments do genuinely fall under the
“self-scrutiny of active thinking.” But the bond between experience and judgment is not thereby
revised, but severed. The important point is that this power only tells us about judgment, and not
about the relation between experience and judgment, which is what McDowell needs it to do.
Illusions make this distinction between activity and spontaneity particularly clear. For
example, in Zöllner’s illusion, parallel lines appear convergent (see Figure 2.1). Despite the fact
that one knows that the lines are parallel, one cannot help but see them as convergent. Not only
does one lack active control over one’s experience here, but one lacks active control over what
experience evidentiates: experience fulfills the proposition that the lines are convergent, but not
the proposition that the lines are parallel. 49 But my judgment is different, for I am free to deny the
evidence of experience. Perhaps I have measured the distance between the lines at various points,
and found these distances equal. So, I have good reason to deny the proposition that the lines are
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In reference to Zöllner’s illusion, Merleau-Ponty writes, “We must recognize that in taking on the
auxiliary lines, the principle lines have ceased to be parallel, that they have lost this sense in order to
acquire another, and that the auxiliary lines import into the figure a new signification that henceforth clings
to it and that henceforth can no longer be detached from it. This signification adhering to the figure, this
transformation of the phenomenon motivates and is, so to speak, behind the false judgment” (2012, p. 37).
Notice that neither can the bond here be understood simply in terms of passivity (causality), because
sensory impacts upon the eye obviously do not give the lines as convergent: this signification is
spontaneously produced in our perception.
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convergent. But whereas my denial is active, the bond itself is spontaneous: experience
stubbornly fulfills the judgment that the lines are convergent, despite my knowledge to the
contrary. No argument, no host of reasons, will alter this testimony of perception; though reason
may well sever or bracket the bond between experience and judgment, it persists beneath my
active refusal of it. Consequently, the fact that reason can grant or withhold approval from this
bond does not make the bond itself rational.
I have argued that the bond between experience and judgment shouldn’t be understood as
rational, because it doesn’t meet the criteria McDowell rightly sets for rational relations: that they
belong within the scope of active thinking. Before concluding this section, I will address one
important objection to my position.
I have argued that the primary bond between experience and judgment is motivation,
rather than reason. But one can take the motivational bond between experience and judgment as a
reason. Active thinking can survey the motivational bond between experience and judgment, and
affirm it as a reason for judgment. 50 I can take, for example, the proposition “I experience that the
lines are convergent” as a reason for the judgment “The lines are convergent,” a reason which in
this case is simply overruled by other reasons. This is not exactly the relation McDowell claimed
to hold between experience and judgment (insofar as it is inferential), but it does seem like a
legitimate sense in which experience serves as a reason for judgment. Thus, there seems to be a
perfectly good reason for saying that there is a bond between experience and judgment which is
rational. However, this move won’t secure the kind of relation that McDowell wants.
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Notice that such acts of reason taking would be completely dependent upon the motivational bond.
Husserl makes this point (in a slightly different context) in Experience and Judgment: “… Acts of positiontaking are completely dependent insofar as they have their motivational foundation in what takes place in
the perception itself, in its proper and perhaps purely passive course. Perception has its own intentionality,
which as yet involves nothing of the spontaneous activity of the ego and its constitutive function, since this
intentionality is, on the contrary, presupposed if the ego is to have something for or against which it can
decide” (p. 289).
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This strategy relies on a subtle ambiguity. Ginsborg has distinguished two senses of
reason (Ginsborg, 2006). In one sense, we take facts as reasons, and it seems wrong-headed to
even consider psychological states, like beliefs or judgments, as reasons. As Dennis Stampe puts
it,
If I believe it has rained because the streets are wet, it is the fact that the streets
are wet, not the fact that I believe them to be, that comprises my reason for
believing that the streets are wet (1987, p. 343).
I take the fact that the streets are wet, not my belief that they are wet, as my reason for believing
that it has rained. But in another sense, it is natural to take psychological states, like beliefs or
judgments, as reasons. For example, someone attempting to reconstruct my reasons for judgment
will cite my other judgments or beliefs as reasons: "His judgment that it had rained followed from
his judgment that the streets were wet." This is the sense in which Davidson has claimed that
experiences can’t count as reasons for belief. Reason in the first sense names "the fact which
presents itself to the subject as favoring the belief" (Ginsborg, 2006, pp. 289-90). Reason in the
second sense names the psychological state justifying the judgment. More generally, we can
distinguish between grounds in the first sense and grounds in the second sense.
In considering the relation between experience and judgment, we have been considering
reason in the second sense. McDowell's claim is that the kind of psychological state justifying
one's judgments of experience is experience. But I have argued that reason does not describe the
manner in which experiences ground (in the second sense) judgments, because of our passivity to
this grounding. If one now takes the tack, in response, of claiming that we do take experiences as
grounds of judgments (and thus this grounding is not merely passive), one has subtly shifted
focus from the second form of grounding to the first. This response takes one's experience as a
fact which serves as a reason, in the first sense, for one's judgment. But in the second sense, it is
no longer the experience itself, but a judgment about experience (i.e., "I experience that …"), that
grounds one's judgment. And this merely pushes back the question about the relation between
experience and judgment, because one must now explain how one arrives at the judgment about
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experience, the "I experience that …", in the first place. Thus, this response does not make
experience the ground of judgment in the sense that is relevant to McDowell, though it does
describe a perfectly legitimate sense in which experience can be taken as a reason for judgment.
This distinction allows me to preserve Davidson’s insight that only a proposition can count as a
reason for a belief, without denying experience a kind of justificatory role in our judgments of
experience, though a very different one from that McDowell claimed to exist.
5. Causality
In the last section, I argued that the relation between experience and judgment isn’t
rational. In this section, I claim that neither is it causal.
There are two main reasons that I think this, namely that the bond between experience
and judgment is meaningful in a way that causality simply can’t describe. First, it is the
meaningful features of experience that evidentiate judgments. I am inclined to think that the bird
before us is an osprey because I am familiar with the white patches on the chests of osprey – the
coloration has a meaning for me, even without my pausing to reflect on it. Likewise, the
reflection in the portrait’s eye means liveliness to me: it isn’t that the white patch causes me to
judge the painting as lively, but the white patch in its meaning of “the reflection in the eye”
makes the judgment of liveliness evident to me. Second, experiential judgments are normative: I
find myself right to judge so, and others wrong not to judge so. But it is not clear how a causal
relationship could instigate this kind of normativity. One is not right or wrong to have been
caused such as one has, ultimately because one cannot take responsibility for this causation. In
other words, I think McDowell is right that relations that are purely receptive cannot be normative
and agree with him that nonpropositional experience and the grounding of judgment by
experience cannot be understood simply in terms of receptivity. I just disagree with McDowell
about how to understand this more-than-receptive type of grounding.
Thus, I think that a description of the bond between perception and judgment in terms of
motivation is truer to the phenomena than either alternative. Understanding the bond in terms of
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reason fails to capture its passivity, and understanding it in terms of causality fails to capture its
normativity. 51
6. Expression and Motivation
One, especially if one is a trained philosopher, may not struggle to understand the relation
between experience and judgment in terms either of reason or causality. In contrast, one may
have little intuitive sense for what it means to think of this relation in terms of motivation. This
lack of familiarity makes my account difficult to adopt. In this section, I will challenge these
familiar modes of thinking about experience and judgment by analyzing the phenomenon of
original expression. By expression I mean the act in which an experience is articulated in
propositional form. In particular, I want to draw attention to original acts of expression, cases in
which an experience cannot be expressed in a familiar or cliché manner and so requires a novel
judgment. 52 Original expression is a species of the relation between experience and judgment
(and one of which every familiar expression is ultimately derivative), but it has not yet been used
to analyze this relation. This is a shame, I think, because this species of the relation has the
potential to reframe our ways of thinking about its genus.
Take, for example, a novice wine drinker sampling a novel wine. She will be hard
pressed to find the right means to express her experience. Of course, she can form some
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An additional consideration clarifies the relation between the three modes of grounding. One way to see
that motives aren’t causes is to notice that motives are in principle open to being taken as justifications by
rational reflection. Because motives operate in virtue of their meaning, they are the kind of thing that can
be taken as justifications. The reflection in the portrait’s eye really is a consideration in favor of the
painting’s quality of liveliness, and it justifies a judgment of liveliness, but only in the register of reflection.
Prior to reflection, the light in the eye moves us by tacitly drawing on our recognition of its significance.
The coloration on the bird’s chest really is a consideration in favor of believing it to be an osprey. But prior
to reflection, it is only part of my tacit familiarity with osprey; not taken up by me for itself, it is not taken
up as a consideration in favor of my judgment. Yet, it would be a mistake to assimilate motives to
rationality merely because the motives of our experience are open to being treated as reasons for judgment.
As we saw in chapter 1, motives resist being treated as reasons, and we must say that motives are only
relatively open to being treated as reasons.
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By original expression I mean something much like what Merleau-Ponty calls “speaking speech” as
opposed to “spoken speech” (2012, pp. 202-3), where the latter names the already constituted system of
familiar “means of expression,” and the latter names a “meaningful intention in a nascent state” that must
create a means to express itself by taking up and transforming already existing language.
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judgments, e.g., "This tastes like wine," and maybe even, "The wine is sweet." But she wants to
do better, to articulate beyond these commonplaces the nuance of her experience. So, she
searches for the right words. She tries on various options for size, but can’t quite find anything
that fits. Likely, she can’t find any definite contour in the taste onto which she can hold. It isn’t
that she has some definite idea of the taste for which she just can’t find the word. Instead, she
isn’t even totally sure what the taste is or if there is a word for it: the taste is vague or ambiguous.
She runs through the experience trying to fix just what she has experienced, until suddenly she
strikes upon a proposition which suits the taste: "The wine is acidic."
If we think through the novice wine drinker’s act of expression closely, there is
something puzzling about what has happened in it. On the one hand, her gustatory experience of
the wine grounds her judgment: she only recognizes the judgment as true because it has been
evidentiated by experience. The experience, as I said previously, norms the field of possible
propositions, making this particular judgment a good one. On the other hand, the experience did
not itself contain the proposition. If it had, this budding oenophile would not have had to search
for the right words to fix her experience; she would only have been struggling to remember the
words. Instead, the experience was vague and indeterminate, and if we remember her first taste
we recall that it did not contain the acidity or exclude other qualities, e.g., tannin. It was too
vague for this. But the judgment determines the experience, fixing it as acidic and not tannic.
What is puzzling is that the experience did not contain the proposition “The wine is acidic,” and
yet when the proposition is suggested she recognizes her experience in it immediately. More, the
experience itself is determined through the judgment. The content of the experience is actually
enriched by the judgment, and when she returns to the wine the taste will mean something more
to her than it did before. After all, this is how one becomes skilled or discerning in one's tastes: by
enriching one's capacity for experience through articulation and expression. Or to use other terms,
what is puzzling here is that the experience grounds the judgment, while itself being transformed
by the judgment.
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This phenomenon only becomes more apparent when we look at less purely sensory
experiences. Say that I am struggling to find the right words to describe our friend's behavior at
the dinner table the other night. How would one describe him, exactly? Sure, he was acting oddly
– but how exactly? Would you say he was despondent? Distracted? Joyless? None of these words
quite do his behavior justice. Yet they are so many ways of getting at the same experiential
content. In this case, I am trying to find the appropriate judgment to express the content of
experience. But at the same time that my judgments are responsible to the experience they
express, they give the experience a definite sense: in discerning between "despondent" and
"joyless" we are deciding about the character of experience, and thereby determining it.
I am trying to gesture here toward what Elena Ferrante has called “literary truth.” In
speaking of sincerity in literature, she claims,
The most urgent question for a writer may seem to be, What experiences do I
have as my material, what experiences do I feel able to narrate? But that’s not
right. The more pressing question is, What is the word, what is the rhythm of the
sentence, what tone best suits the things I know? Without the right words,
without long practice in putting them together, nothing comes out alive and true.
It’s not enough to say, as we increasingly do, These events truly happened, it’s
my real life, the names are the real ones, I’m describing the real places where the
events occurred. If the writing is inadequate, it can falsify the most honest
biographical truths. Literary truth is not the truth of the biographer or the
reporter, it’s not a pole report or a sentence handed down by a court. It’s not even
the plausibility of a well-constructed narrative. Literary truth is entirely a matter
of wording and is directly proportional to the energy that one is able to impress
on the sentence. And when it works, there is no stereotype or cliché of popular
literature that resists it. It reanimates, revives, subjects everything to its needs
(Ferrante, 2015).
Ferrante distinguishes the writer’s material, the experience, from the form of the expression, the
words, rhythm, and tone. This distinction allows us to see that what makes the writer’s
expressions “alive and true” is neither the experience to be expressed (the “material”), without
which the expression is empty, nor the expression, without which the experience remains cliché.
It is rather the intimate bond of the two. If we are to understand the form of grounding which
occurs in expression, we must then appreciate the complexity of this grounding: the experience
motivates the expression, but the expression opens up the experience.
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Once we appreciate the complex manner in which expressions are grounded, the
dichotomy of reason and causality is far less tempting. In the case of the wine drinker, the
experience cannot have been a reason for the judgment, because the experience is only
determined through the judgment. Of course, if after making the judgment the wine drinker is
asked why she thinks the wine is acidic, she will reference her experience, saying "Because its
tastes acidic." The problem with this response is that she could not have said it prior to judging
the wine acidic, because her experience is only determined as acidic through the judgment. The
response "Because it tastes acidic" is thus a reconstruction of the actual ground of her judgment,
one only possible in light of the judgment. In taking the experience to be the reason for the
judgment, one has thus understood the process of expression in terms of its result. Neither can the
grounding here be understood as causality. If the expression were simply caused by the
experience, it would not require the labor of expression, nor could it introduce new content into
the experience – there would be no normativity here, and so the wine drinker wouldn’t need to
struggle. Just like reason, causality mistakes the process of expression in terms of its result: the
experience only has the sort of content that could cause the judgment as a result of the process of
expression.
These conclusions are also found in the case of literary expression. Ferrante distinguishes
the form of an expression (the proposition) from its material (the experience). In seeking to
achieve truth in her statements, the author is concerned primarily with the former. But if this is
true, then there is no good way to make sense of the idea that the author’s judgment is grounded
either causally or rationally by her experience. On the one hand, this grounding cannot be
understood in terms of causality. If the grounding was causal, the writer would passively receive
the expression. But understanding literary expression in terms of passivity overlooks both the
writer’s craft and the normativity inherent in her task – the whole negotiation between her
capacities and the demands placed upon her by the experience if she is to be true to it. On the
other hand, neither can the author’s expression be grounded in terms of reason. On McDowell’s
71

model, when the writer is asked why she formed this particular judgment, she will answer,
“Because I experienced it thus.” But, no less than causality, this answer overlooks the author’s
craft, because it assimilates the expression to the experience. If Ferrante is right that the form of
the expression cannot be reduced to its matter, then the writer can only say “Because I
experienced it thus” after having formed the expression. Expression is not formed by reason of
experience; instead, it creates experience as its reason. 53 Neither reason nor causality can allow
for the originality introduced by the form of the expression. Thus, we must say that the
experience (as the theme or motif of expression) motivates the expression, norming the field of
possible expressions without itself containing them.
What makes it so easy to think of the relation between experience and judicative
expression in terms of reason and causality is that we tend to think in terms of experiences and
judgments with which we are entirely familiar. In this section, I have tried to reorient our habitual
ways of thinking about the relation between experience and judgment by calling attention to a
unique form of this relation, namely, original expression. Of course, not all expressions are
original (though all familiar expressions were at some point original, and so familiar judgment is
a derivative mode of expression). But, as I have showed, an analysis of the phenomenon of
original expression does require a reorientation in our habitual modes of thinking about the
relation between experience and judgment.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that motivation, and not reason or causality, describes the
relationship between perceptual experience and judgment. First, I described the specifically
phenomenological concept of motivation, as a form of grounding distinct from reason and
causality. I explained what it means to say that experience motivates judgment, in terms of the
phenomenological concept of evidence. Experience, I then argued, cannot be understood as either
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Cf. Merleau-Ponty claims about original perception that it “cannot yet know its reasons, since it creates
them” (2012, p. 46).
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a reason or cause for judgment, because the former would miss the passivity of the bond between
experience and judgment and the latter would miss its normativity. Finally, I attempted to shift
the parameters of this debate by considering the phenomenon of original expression. Now, in
concluding this chapter, I’d like to consider the consequences of introducing motivation as a form
of epistemological grounding. Ultimately, I suggest, it requires us to provide an account of
knowledge that challenges the dichotomy between the unique form of empiricist foundationalism
found in McDowell and Davidson’s coherentism.
Within the domain of reason, we are concerned to justify our beliefs. But, as McDowell
points out, if our beliefs are caused, then we can’t speak of them as justified. Causes function as
exculpations, rather than justifications (McDowell, 1996, p. 8). What about motives? One might
think that if motives aren’t reasons for belief, then they are at most exculpations for our beliefs.
But I will show that motives, not belonging to the dichotomy of reasons and causes, can’t be
understood in terms either of exculpations or justifications.
Motives don’t justify: as we have seen, motives ground our expressions without offering
the intermediary of a reason. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to think that, because
motives aren’t justifications, they ought to be lumped in with exculpations. Motives, unlike
causes, which force us into outcomes, draw on and solicit our spontaneity. As I argued in the first
section of this chapter, perceptual experience is shaped spontaneously (not actively or passively)
and only motivation is in a position to describe this kind of spontaneous grounding. But if
motivation is a form of grounding which draws on our spontaneity, then it cannot count as mere
exculpation; our acts of expressions may not be justified, but neither may we be excused for
them.
We might see the distinction here more clearly by considering it in analogy to Aristotle’s
distinction between voluntary action, involuntary action, and decision. Voluntary and involuntary
action differ essentially in the locus of the principle of motion: within the agent or outside of the
agent, respectively. Voluntary action differs from decision in that the latter is a product of
73

deliberation, the difference clearly seen in that children and animals are capable of voluntary
action, but not decision. 54 We are certainly excused for our involuntary actions: that someone else
pushed my hand onto the button that instigated the crime excuses me from guilt – it is an
exculpation. But we are guilty (or responsible) with respect to our voluntary actions, for our
voluntary actions manifest our character as virtuous or vicious, though according to Aristotle not
as clearly as does decision, in which we are concerned to justify our actions. Motivated actions
draw on our spontaneity, and so are importantly voluntary, insofar as the principle of motion is
within the agent; because motivated actions aren’t involuntary, motives don’t count as
exculpations. On the other hand, motivation needn’t be the result of deliberation, and so
motivated actions do not belong with decision. Consequently, motives don’t count as
justification. 55
But this alternative between exculpation and justification is at the heart of Davidson’s
coherentism and McDowell’s brand of empiricism. McDowell is right to point out that it is
because Davidson can see experiences as no more than exculpations for belief, such that beliefs
can only be justified by other beliefs, that he adopts a coherentist stance. On the other hand,
McDowell’s sort of minimal empiricism is grounded in his belief that experiences justify
judgments. A careful phenomenology of the bond between experience and judgment makes either
of these alternatives unacceptable. But if neither exculpation nor justification adequately describe
the relation between experience and judgment, a new way of thinking about knowledge will be
needed. Phenomenology can supply this account of knowledge by beginning from the experience
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See Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, Book III, chapters 1 & 2.
On the other hand, McDowell doesn’t think that all justified action is deliberate, or the product of
decision. McDowell’s claim would thus be that the sphere of voluntary actions belongs within the sphere of
reasons, insofar as an agent is always prepared to justify her spontaneous actions with reasons (or at least is
rightly expected to be so prepared). And if this were true, motivation would either describe the sphere of
involuntary actions, or would be a species of reason-giving. But by now it should be clear that from the fact
that an agent can give reasons for her spontaneous actions or judgments, it doesn’t follow that her actions
or judgments were grounded in reasons. I have argued that the space of motivations is partially open to the
space of reasons, but conflating the two ignores the transformation that our grounding undergoes when we
give an account of our actions and beliefs.
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of evidence, in which our experiences motivate our judgments. This is much the sense in which
Husserl has defined knowledge as
The consciousness of the ‘agreement’ between an empty anticipatory belief, in
particular a predicative belief (empty, or not genuinely given), and the
corresponding experience which gives at first hand the object of this belief – the
object judged in the predication – as the experience of its self-givenness … .
From another perspective: there is agreement between the mere judgment,
between what is posited in the predicative sense, and the experience of this sense
in the mode of ‘it itself’ (1973, p. 283).
In this way, phenomenology will allow us to understand knowledge (as Ferrante puts it) in its
“life and truth.”
This, in brief, will be the aim of chapter 3. Whereas in the present chapter I have
described the relation between experience and empirical judgment in terms of motivation, in the
following chapter I will consider how experience grounds knowledge generally, i.e., how it
grounds universal and ultimately a priori judgments. Again, I will argue that motivation provides
the best description of this grounding relation.
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Figure 2.1. Zöllner Illusion. Reprinted from Zöllner Illusion, In Wikipedia. Retrieved August 9,
2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Z%C3%B6llner_illusion. 2007 by Fibonacci. Reprinted
with Permission.
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CHAPTER 3. THE PRIMACY OF PERCEPTION
From the moment we reflect on the relation between experience and knowledge we are
caught in an antinomy – the antinomy which gives life to both rationalism and empiricism. On the
one hand, it seems that our knowledge must be grounded in experience. If it were not, how would
we distinguish the real from the imaginary? The law of non-contradiction shows some
propositions to be false independently of experience, but it does not yet give us knowledge of the
real; independently of experience, our beliefs are at best consistent, but not yet true. On the other
hand, it seems that experience cannot ground our knowledge. Experience teaches us particular
facts about the world: experience can teach us that “This swan is white,” but not that “All swans
are white.” Moreover, experience is contingent. Even if experience could teach us “All swans are
white,” there would be nothing necessary about this judgment. Consequently, experience cannot
teach us a priori truths, e.g., “All shape has extension.” But we know (among other things) truths
which are universal and necessary, for example, that all shape has extension. What experience,
delivering a contingent particular, could teach us such a truth?
There is, consequently, an antinomy about experience and a priori knowledge. Universal,
and especially a priori, knowledge – that is, universal knowledge that holds with necessity, e.g.,
“All shape has extension,” but not “All swans are white” – cannot be founded on experience. On
the other hand, a priori knowledge must be founded on experience. Broadly speaking, the former
is a rationalist point and the latter an empiricist point. If there is truth in this antinomy, then we
cannot see how we have a priori knowledge at all.
In this chapter, I seek to resolve this antinomy by describing the relation between
experience and knowledge in terms of motivation. I argue, following Merleau-Ponty, that
experience grounds knowledge in the mode of motivation. To reach the conclusion that
experience grounds knowledge, I will have to meet two key challenges. First, the contingent is
supposedly insufficient to ground the necessary. Second, to the extent that knowledge exceeds
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experience, knowledge of the real supposedly cannot be distinguished from the imaginary. I show
how motivation can meet both challenges.
While my account is aimed at what I see as the basic historical motives of rationalism and
empiricism, in the final sections of this chapter I will address how motivation can be used to
resolve contemporary rationalist and empiricist debates in philosophy and cognitive science.
1. Rationalism and Empiricism
First, I need to clarify what the rationalist and empiricist positions are. The debate
between the two centers around two terms, which correspond to what Husserl would call
meaning-intention and meaning-fulfillment, or what I have been calling meaning and evidence.
The empiricist holds the propositions:
E1) All knowledge is definable in terms of experiential content.
E2) The evidence for all knowledge is ultimately (immediately or mediately) experiential.
In contrast, the rationalist holds that experience is insufficient to license these propositions, and
holds instead:
R1) There is some knowledge that could not have gotten its meaning from experience
(i.e., not all knowledge is definable in terms of experiential content).
R2) There is some knowledge that, because it cannot be evidenced by experience, must
be self-evident.
E1) is perhaps the core tenet of empiricism, already espoused by Locke in his Essay Concerning
Human Understanding. There, Locke argues that there are no such things as innate ideas. All our
ideas, instead, are received through experience, or more specifically, through sensation
(experience of external objects) and reflection (inner sense). These two sources directly give us
all our simple ideas (e.g. color, extension, succession). With respect to such simple ideas, we are
passive; we do not choose whether and when we will receive them. On the basis of such simple
ideas, we can construct complex ideas (e.g. duration, power, substance). Complex ideas are
actively (voluntarily) made. They are produced, claims Locke, according to three operations
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which the mind can perform: combination, comparison, and abstraction. Such acts are performed
on the simple ideas that the mind passively receives from experience. Simple ideas, then, are the
material out of which all our ideas are constructed. Importantly, the operations of which the mind
is capable cannot introduce any new content into our minds. Instead, they only combine,
compare, or abstract from given contents. As Locke puts it, the mind cannot “have any idea
which does not wholly consist of [simple ideas]” (2009, p. 340). When I say that the mind cannot
introduce any new content, I mean just this: all our ideas wholly consist of simple ideas.
Hume formulated a version of the second empiricist proposition – that all evidence is
ultimately experiential – when he claimed that we can hold no idea valid to which no impression
corresponds. It emerges in another way in the verificationist attitude prevalent in early 20th
century analytic philosophy, namely that only empirically verifiable statements are cognitively
meaningful. 56 The common thread is the thought that experience is the ultimate touchstone of our
propositions, establishing some as knowledge and others as false. Without experience, we would
have no means of distinguishing between the real and the imaginary, and so no means of
distinguishing between true and fictitious propositions. It is experience, then, that establishes the
truth-value of our propositions, in the sense that it is a condition of statements having veridical
import at all. In defining the second empiricist proposition in terms of evidence, I am admittedly
giving the sense of “truth” here a phenomenological spin. In phenomenological terms, the
empiricist position would be that all meaning-fulfillment is composed out of experiential
meaning-fulfillments; what the first empiricist proposition said of meaning-intention, the second
says of meaning-fulfillment.
The rationalist position denies both empiricist propositions. The first rationalist
proposition denies that all knowledge can be defined in terms of experiential content. The
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Note that few empiricists, prior to Quine, are as rigorous about evidence as the principle E2 would
demand. Most hold that there is some form of a priori justification, e.g., even Hume holds that we know
“relations of ideas” independently of experience.
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rationalist holds that there is an incommensurability between our experience and our knowledge,
such that our knowledge cannot simply be composed out of our experience. It is unclear, for
example, how terms as diverse as “quark,” “chiliagon,” “modus ponens” could be defined in
perceptual terms. One way to see this is in terms of the sorts of propositions experience is able to
provide with intuitive content: I cannot perceive a chiliagon (all I see is “a many-sided figure”)
nor a universal law. Experiential content might figure in the definitions of such intellectual items,
but one cannot define the latter solely by operating on the former. The rationalist concludes that
such meanings must be innate.
The second rationalist proposition denies that experience is the sort of thing that could
serve as evidence for certain kinds of knowledge, in particular, a priori knowledge. A priori
knowledge is universal and necessary, while experience is particular and contingent. As Leibniz
puts it,
Although the senses are necessary for all our actual knowledge, they are not
sufficient to provide it all, since they never give us anything but instances, that is
particular or singular truths. But however many instances confirm a general truth,
they do not suffice to establish its universal necessity; for it does not follow that
what has happened will always happen in the same way. … From this it appears
that necessary truths, such as we find in pure mathematics and particularly in
arithmetic and geometry, must have principles whose proof does not depend on
instances, nor consequently on the testimony of the senses, even though without
the senses it would never occur to us to think of them… (2000, p. xlviii).
At least some of our knowledge cannot be “established” by experience, because experience gives
only instances, and instances do not suffice as reasons to hold any truth with necessity. Since
some of our knowledge is necessary, it cannot be established by experience. Hume, of course,
makes a similar point about our causal propositions. But whereas Hume concludes that
propositions that cannot be licensed by experience are fictitious – the product of habit or
sentiment – the rationalist concludes that a priori knowledge must be self-evident. Descartes, for
example, holds that certain propositions are indubitable because they appear clearly by the natural
light.
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2. Arguments against Rationalism and Empiricism
In this section, I argue against the rationalist and empiricist positions.
First, I endorse the rationalist argument against empiricism: perception and the intellect
are incommensurable. Indeed, many intellectual structures are not transposable into perception,
and conversely, there are many intellectual contents which are not definable in terms of
perceptual contents. Take, for example, number. I cannot imagine a chiliagon, nor will I perceive
a pile of 1,000 toothpicks as numbering 1,000. Yet, “1,000” has a meaning for me in virtue of the
intellectual structure of natural number: its place in the count sequence relative to the other
numbers, which distinguishes it from 999. Perception can distinguish between 800 and 1,000, but
not between 999 and 1,000; the intellect can draw both distinctions, and to draw the latter, it relies
on a sophisticated concept of number that perception does not possess. As I will argue later, it
would be a profound underestimation of the difficulty of acquiring the concept “1,000” to think it
could be defined simply in terms of operations on perceptual content. Again, perception does not
yield the scientific description of time; perception presents us with distant simultaneity (gives us
spatially separate events as occurring simultaneously), whereas on the scientific conception the
simultaneity of distant events is relative to frames of reference. Thus, the intellect is capable of
disclosing the world in ways which exceed our perception.
Further, the intellect has access to a genre of being which is non-perceptual: universals. I
can perceive numerous instances of equality, but not equality itself. This is not to deny that
perception has general structures. Indeed, a central aim of the present chapter is to describe how
perceptual structures can be leveraged into the development of intellectual structures. But
perceptual structures are ways of construing the concrete world of particulars we inhabit by our
bodies; perceptual structures allow us to perceive particulars and so it remains true that one can
think universals whereas one cannot perceive them. Moreover, universals are not definable in
terms of operations performed on particulars. As Husserl pointed out, abstraction conflates a
property as an individual moment and as a universal, for even when we remove every
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distinguishing feature of a particular instance of a property – even when we abstract the property
from the particular to which it belongs – it yet remains a particular instance of the property (2001,
p. 253).
In this way, perception and the intellect are incommensurable. Intellectual meanings
cannot be defined solely in terms of perceptual meanings, and a fortiriori, neither do the latter
suffice to evidence the former; where a meaning-intention is insufficient, a meaning-fulfillment
will be so as well.
The case I want to make against rationalism is more complex. I intend to argue that even
a priori knowledge must be founded on perceptual experience, in terms of evidence and
meaning. 57 I’ll proceed in two steps. First, I explain Merleau-Ponty’s argument that we have no
absolute knowledge. Second, I explain Husserl’s argument that the evidence we have for our
knowledge (intellectual evidence) is founded on experiential evidence.
The second rationalist proposition holds that our a priori knowledge, not being grounded
in experience, must be self-evident. Merleau-Ponty contests this point by arguing that evidence
(like perception) relies on a foreground/background structure, such that any proposition can only
appear evident in virtue of a background set of beliefs that are not being raised to explicit
awareness. I now consider Merleau-Ponty’s argument, from the “Cogito” chapter of
Phenomenology of Perception, that we have no apodictic evidence.
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Merleau-Ponty at times writes as if he wishes to eliminate the distinction between the a priori and the
empirical altogether. For example, Merleau-Ponty writes that “From the moment in which experience – that
is, the opening onto our factual world – is recognized as the beginning of knowledge, there is no longer any
means of distinguishing between a level of a priori truths and a level of factual ones …” (2012, p. 229).
One might, on the basis of these claims, think I am mistaken in even thinking that there is such a thing as
an a priori to be based on experience for Merleau-Ponty. Yet only a matter of lines after the previously
cited passage, Merleau-Ponty claims that the diversity of the senses is an a priori truth, and on the next
page distinguishes the a priori and the a posteriori as follows: “The a priori is the fact as understood, made
explicit, and followed through into all of the consequences of its tacit logic; the a posteriori is the isolated
and implicit fact” (2012, p. 230). As Hall points out (1979), Merleau-Ponty does not wish to eliminate the
distinction between the a priori and the empirical, but to reconfigure the distinction, such that the two are
not independent of each other but, so to speak, two sides of a coin.
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When Merleau-Ponty writes that no evidence is apodictic, he means that no evidence has
necessity or indubitability. Husserl, for example, defined apodicticity as "absolute indubitability"
or "the absolute unimaginableness (inconceivability) of [the state of affair's] non-being" (1999,
pp. 15-6). There is an obvious sense in which no perceptual evidence is absolute or apodictic: in
virtue of the perspectival nature of perception, we are never fully given the object of perception
(any side seen implies a side unseen and there is always the possibility that upon further
investigation we will discover that our apprehension of the perceptual object has been
mistaken). 58 Much more difficult to see is how it could be the case that no evidence, including
intellectual evidence, is apodictic. How, for example, could the logical truth “A or not A” be
other than apodictic?
In the “Cogito” chapter, Merleau-Ponty argues that there is no certainty that cannot be
doubted, claiming that "certainty is doubt" (2012, p. 417). Merleau-Ponty does not, of course,
mean that certainty and doubt are identical, only that they are two moments of a shared structure,
the structure of evidence. The one cannot appear unless it contains a germ of the other, and
consequently can never eliminate the other. 59 Here is the argument in brief:
It is no accident that even evidentness can be thrown into doubt; it is because
certainty is doubt, being the taking up of a tradition of thought that cannot
condense itself into evident 'truth' without my renouncing the attempt to make it
explicit. An evident truth is irresistible in fact and yet always open to doubt for
the very same reasons: and these are two ways of saying the same thing: it is
irresistible because I take for granted a certain acquisition from experience and a
certain field of thought, and precisely for this reason it appears to me as evident
for a certain thinking nature whose use I enjoy and that I carry forward, but that
remains contingent and given to itself. The consistency of a perceived thing, of a
geometrical relation, or of an idea is only obtained if I give up the attempt to
make it explicit everywhere, and if I come to rest in it. From the moment I have
entered the game, or engaged in a certain order of thought – whether it be, for
example, Euclidean space or the conditions of existence for some society – I
discover evident truths, but these are not irrevocable evident truths, since perhaps
this space or this society are not the only possibilities (Merleau-Ponty,
Phenomenology of Perception, 2012, p. 417).
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See Merleau-Ponty 2012, "The evidentness of perception is neither adequate thought nor apodictic
evidentness" (p. lxxx).
59
Note that Merleau-Ponty uses "absolute evidence" interchangably with "apodictic evidence," and in fact
it is the former which appears in the "Cogito" chapter.
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This argument contains two main steps: 1) apodictic or absolute evidence is presuppositionless,
and 2) we have no presuppositionless evidence. I’ll treat these two steps in turn.
First, apodictic evidence is presuppositionless. According to Merleau-Ponty, the very
presuppositions which make evidence possible also leave it open to doubt. It is only because, to
some extent, I agree to take certain presuppositions for granted that I can experience evidence, for
if all my presuppositions were constantly thrown into doubt then my ideas would lose their
evidence. But to the extent that I do not throw my presuppositions into doubt, they remain
contingent: they are only possible (perhaps among other possibilities), not yet necessary. These
presuppositions, being contingent rather than necessary, leave evidence open to doubt. 60
Euclidean geometry, for example, depends on a certain intuition of space, i.e., on a presupposition
about space. One can only derive the theorem that the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two
right angles through a construction presupposing a certain intuition of space. 61 As long as this
presupposition is not interrogated, the evidence for this theorem is irresistible; its evidence
appears apodictic. However, when it is revealed that Euclidean space is "contingent," i.e., only
one possible space, the theorem loses this apodictic evidence: it is true only for particular kinds of
space. Merleau-Ponty’s point with this example is that we experience the evidence possessed by
Euclidean geometry as certainty only to the extent that we agree to leave certain presuppositions
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One might object that propositions known analytically, i.e., in virtue of the principle of noncontradiction, are presuppositionless. Indeed, it is in terms of something like this principle that Husserl
defined apodicticity above: we know something apodictically when its negation is inconceivable – Schmid
has even argued that apodictic evidence is not given in “transcendental experience” for Husserl, but in
“reflection,” when one attains the insight that the supposition of the non-existence of a being in fact implies
its existence (2001). But first, this argument would depend on knowing the principle of non-contradiction
entirely without presupposition. And second, I think Merleau-Ponty would follow Husserl here in
distinguishing between “consequence logic” and “truth logic” (Husserl, 1969), where the former is
governed by the principle of non-contradiction, and the latter incorporates the experience of truth, i.e.,
evidence. We may be able to rule certain propositions out solely in virtue of their form, but we are not
actually concerned with truth until we are concerned with evidence.
61
See Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason B 741-7 and Merleau-Ponty 2012 (pp. 403-8). For more on MerleauPonty’s thinking about geometry, see Hass & Hass (2000).
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out of the question (e.g., the parallel postulate). 62 Because presuppositions are open to doubt,
apodictic evidence (which cannot be open to doubt) must be presuppositionless.
Second, according to Merleau-Ponty, our experience of truth always depends on a body
of presuppositions. Presuppositions are unthematized or implicit grounds. If grounds are
thematized, they can be either affirmed or denied on the basis of justification, i.e., they can be
treated as reasons. But, as I argued in chapter 1, as long as grounds are unthematized, they can't
properly count as reasons, but only as motives. This is not that our knowledge cannot at all be
grounded in reasons, only that it can never be fully grounded in reasons. Merleau-Ponty's claim,
then, is that all of our truths are at least partially grounded not in virtue of reason, but in virtue of
motivation. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "There are truths just as there are perceptions: not that we
could ever fully lay out before ourselves the reasons for any affirmation - there are only motives
…” (2012, p. 415). Evidence is motivated, in part by our experiences, by our past, etc.. And these
unthematized motives are the "situation" within which we experience evidence. Evidence is thus
not free-floating, but depends on a situation (a past and a present) which motivates it. MerleauPonty writes, "We possess a truth, this experience of truth would only be absolute knowledge if
we could thematize all of its motives, that is, if we ceased being situated" (2012, p. 416). This
situation names the set of presuppositions on which our truths or evidence depend: when I
perceive or when I have evidence, my past evidences contract into a background against which
the new evidence can appear. 63

62

Analyses like this of Euclidean geometry are problematic. It is not clear that Euclidean geometry does
not in fact do the best job of modelling real space. Specifically, it remains in question whether general
relativity – the classical evidence that Euclidean geometry is contingent – requires that space be nonEuclidean. The central point I wish to preserve of Merleau-Ponty’s, however, is that this is a question that
cannot be answered simply by appeal to an a priori intuition of space, and must be settled by empirically.
63
Evidence, in this respect, partakes of the same structure that Heidegger attributes to “guilt” in Being and
Time §58. According to Heidegger, Dasein is a “null-ground,” insofar as it both grounds itself qua project,
and does not ground itself qua thrown. Dasein “is never existent before its ground but only from it and as it.
Thus being the ground means never to gain power over one’s ownmost being from the ground up. … Being
a self, Dasein, as self, is the thrown being. Not through itself, but released to itself from the ground in order
to be as the ground. Dasein is not itself the ground of its being, because the ground first arises from its own
project, but as a self, it is the being of its ground. The ground is always a ground only for a being whose
being has to take over being-the-ground” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 273). Just as practically we are concerned
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In other words, there is no immaculate evidence. Evidence is always situated. 64 If, for
example, I have an inferiority complex, then an endeavor that to a normal subject would read as a
success may look to me like a failure. If I am religious, an experience that would otherwise read
as a coincidence may look like a sign. Similarly, a wine connoisseur will be able to evidentiate
propositions about wine that I cannot. The point is not just that we interpret our experience, but
that experience evidentiates judgments only through the mediation of a motivational situation or
context. At the most basic level, experience can only evidentiate judgments for me because I have
a primordial faith in the contact of perceptual experience with a world: if I were through some
derangement to become convinced that perception was necessarily illusory, then it would bear no
evidential weight.
According to Merleau-Ponty, the fact that all our judgments depend on presuppositions is
not merely a matter of practical limitations – that judgments are at times, excusably, made hastily.
Instead, it is an essential necessity that judgment rest on certain presuppositions: if anything is to
appear certain to me, it will do so because I “give up the attempt to make it explicit everywhere”
and “come to rest in it.” The structure of certainty is that whatever appears to me as certain does
so against a background of uninterrogated beliefs. Wittgenstein makes a similar argument in On
Certainty when he writes that if I wish to test a conviction, I can only do so by putting certain

with grounding our existence through our projects, so theoretically we are concerned to ground our
knowledge through evidence. But, as we are thrown into our existence, so we are thrown into an evidential
situation within which we have to ground our knowledge in truth. This is what the word presupposition
signifies here: that we do not ground our knowledge before this evidential situation, but only “from it and
as it”. Within such an evidential situation we are responsible for transforming this situation, to the extent
that we are concerned with truth (in the practical context, insofar as we “understand the summons” of the
“call of conscience”). Descartes’ project in the Meditations is possible because we are in this manner
“thrown” into an evidential context. Only because we are thrown into a body of presuppositions do we need
“once in life” to attempt a radical grounding of our knowledge. In this regard, Descartes’ project is a sort of
theoretical “wanting-to-be-a-conscience,” albeit in the deficient mode of forgetting its finitude.
64
The situation is analogous with respect to practical motivation: Sartre, in his analysis of Clovis’
conversion, points out that there is no such thing as a motive in itself, but only a motive with respect to an
end. One might say that Clovis is motivated to convert to Catholicism by the power of the episcopate in
Gaul, but as Sartre points out “In order for the power of the episcopate to be revealed to Clovis as the cause
of his conversion … it is necessary first for him to posit as an end the conquest of Gaul” (1984, p. 575).
Similarly, in order for a situation to be revealed as evidencing some judgment, an evidential context must
first be in place.
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other convictions out of question, e.g., I must trust the apparatus by which I perform the
experiment or the subject on which I experiment (Wittgenstein, 1972, p. 43). As Wittgenstein
puts it, "If I want the door to turn, the hinges must stay put" (1972, p. 44). In other words, if some
belief of mine is to change, then some other must remain the same. For example, I walk along the
shore and discover what I thought was a row of birches is in fact a shipwreck. This change in
convictions presupposes my belief that I am seeing the world as it is, that I am not possessed by a
hallucination in which a row of birches can transform themselves into a shipwreck. If it was the
latter, I would not say, “It was always a shipwreck, a fact to which I was blind,” but “By some
magic, the birches have become a shipwreck.” My belief in the world is the hinge upon which
turns the belief about what it is that I see. Every judgment, then, demands that something hold
fast, and for this reason Wittgenstein concludes that “justification comes to an end” (1972, p. 27).
Importantly, for Merleau-Ponty, the situatedness of all evidence is, in part, a historical
situatedness. 65 Ideas are given within a temporal horizon, i.e., there is a temporality of ideas. 66
On the one hand, every present evidence depends on a horizon of past evidences. In
Husserl’s terms, evidence is sedimented: any actively constituted meaning becomes passively
retained as a lasting acquisition, which then serves as a basis for future acquisitions. This is true
even in cases of explicit reasoning. If I deduce the truth of some conclusion, A, then A is available
as a premise for us in drawing some further conclusion, B: it has become an acquisition, the
grounds for the truth of which I don’t need to be attending to at the moment I am deriving the
truth of B (though if B is to be rigorously grounded, I do need to be able to reactivate the grounds
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Dillon sees the a priori in Merleau-Ponty as “an historically emergent sense of the whole,” grounded not
in the structures of the mind, but in the phenomenal world (Dillon, Apriority in Kant and Merleau-Ponty,
1987, p. 420). Dillon emphasizes, however, that “the priority of the a priori is an historical priority” (1987,
p. 418). But it seems to me important that we understand the historical situatedness of the a priori correctly,
for it must not rule out that there are certain trans-historical structures of experience, e.g., historicality
itself, as well as “figure and background,” “thing and non-thing” and the horizon of the past (MerleauPonty, 2012, p. 24). On my reading, our apprehension of these structures will be historically situated, but
this itself does not determine their historicality.
66
As I stated in my Introduction, I am interested in the epistemological and not the ontological dimension
of this claim.
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for A). Millikan, for example, can make use of Stoke’s law in the oil drop experiment without
needing to verify it himself (though he is able to do so). The change of an electron thereby
derived is afterwards an acquisition that can be used to derive many further results. In a process
of sedimentation, then, a chain of evidences is built up between propositions, in which the
evidence of the higher ultimately depends on the evidence of the lower, without the higher
needing to be reactivated all the way down to the most fundamental levels in order to be used for
further acquisitions. Here, the self-evidence actively being obtained in drawing new conclusions
relies on a passively retained chain of evidence.
In this vein, Merleau-Ponty writes that tradition is the power to forget origins (1973, p.
68). In the context in which we are now working, the idea is that any active evidence, any
evidence that I am explicitly attending to, relies upon a set of passively retained evidences that
make it possible and that it covers over as a condition of appearing at all. I cannot hold a whole
chain of evidence in mind as I draw the final conclusion, I can only retain each step as a
background that enables a foreground conclusion. Of course, I must in principle be able to retrace
my steps if the conclusion is to be rigorously grounded. But the point is that at the moment I draw
the conclusion, each step must retreat into the background of my thinking. In this sense, then, it is
a necessity that each present evidence relies on certain acquisitions made in the past, which it
need not reactivate and cannot be reactivating at the moment it appears evident. Thus, there is a
time of ideas as well.
On the other hand, every present evidence has a horizon of future evidences. Every
present evidence is open to becoming the sedimented history in virtue of which future evidences
will be able to appear. This future horizon is also apparent in the fact that present evidences are
intrinsically open to alteration or cancellation in the future. This was the import of MerleauPonty’s claim that certainty is doubt. We saw that Euclidean geometry, for example, depends on a
contingent description of space, and so is revealed to be a situated truth:
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… Euclidean geometry is one day revealed as evident merely for a certain
historical period of the human spirit; it merely signifies that men were able, for a
time, to take a homogenous three-dimensional space as the 'ground' of their
thoughts and to adopt unreflectively what generalized space will later consider to
be a contingent description of space (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 414).
Thus, just as there is a past-horizon of ideas, there is also a future-horizon, in which ideas are
open to being utilized, to augmentation, but also to being subsumed within a more comprehensive
truth. 67 Thus, our ideas, as historically situated, passively depend on a set of presuppositions.
Let this suffice for an argument for the position that all our evidence depends on
presuppositions. Given these two steps – that apodictic evidence is presuppositionless and that
our evidence is never presuppositionless – Merleau-Ponty is licensed to conclude that evidence is
never apodictic. Still, this by itself does not provide me with the conclusion I intend to reach, that
all knowledge depends on experience. For one might think that some knowledge is justified
independently of experience but is not therefore infallible. This, for example, is how Bonjour has
defined his “moderate rationalism.” To reach this further conclusion, I turn to Husserl’s argument
that the evidence for all knowledge, including a priori knowledge, is founded in experience.
In Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl describes a hierarchy of evidence, running
from prepredicative experience up to universal judgments. 68 According to Husserl, experience has
priority in terms of evidence to all other acts possessing truth value: "the truths and evidences
that are first in themselves must be the individual ones" (1969, p. 205). Experience is the means
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This claim – that the evidence of our knowledge is given within a temporal horizon, in virtue of which
our knowledge always possesses revisability – is admittedly one of the more contentious claims of this
dissertation, for it seems to deny the obviousness of the most obvious beliefs. How, for example, could the
law of non-contradiction be said to be open to revision? It might help to understand this claim by analogy
to the revisability of our perceptions, for every perception too is in principle open to revision. And yet we
typically reach a point in our perceptions in which, having attained a sufficient perceptual grasp on some
object, we are satisfied with the perception. I am perceptually satisfied, for example, that my computer is
resting on my desk. It would seem absurd in this case to tell me, “Well, but you can never be certain that
your computer is resting on your desk.” Nevertheless, here too, the perception is intrinsically open to the
possibility of revision in light of new evidence, however unlikely such a revision may be. In terms of
knowledge, my point should best be understood to be that certainty and doubt are moments of a whole,
rather than that our knowledge is dubious, for I am not saying that our grasp of the world in knowledge,
such as the law of non-contradiction, is dissatisfactory, only that it is in principle open to revision.
68
A similar case is made in the Logical Investigations, when Husserl argues that categorial intuition is
founded on sensuous intuition.

89

by which individuals are given directly. 69 On the basis of experience one can form an "individual"
or "experiential" judgment (e.g., on the basis of my experience of the apple, I can form the
judgment "the apple is red"), which as the sort of judgment most immediately related to
experience, is the sort of judgment with the most original evidence. Empirical judgments
obviously refer to experience, as both that which gives the "elementary cores" (the matters, the
subject and the predicate) for judgment and as what gives the "data" that "give norms for the
correctness of categorical judicial meanings at the lowest level concerning individuals" (Husserl,
1969, p. 209). Thus, the first step in the theory of evident judgments is "the genetical tracing of
predicative evidences back to the non-predicative evidence called experience" (Ibid.). Universal
judgments too are to be related back to experiences of individuals – though mediately rather than
immediately – even though they do not contain individuals as parts (as individual judgments do).
This works somewhat differently in the case of material and formal universal judgments. Material
universal judgments draw content from experience, and so demand a return to intuitions of
individuals (not any individuals in particular, only to some exemplar) (Husserl, 1969, pp. 212-3).
Formal universal judgments (e.g., the principles of logic) need only some examples of
categorialia (any sorts of logically structured judgments), and thus don't depend on any
experiential content. Still, they refer to individual experiences for their "formal-ontological
validity," i.e., for their applicability to "everything conceivably existing" (Husserl, 1969, p. 214).
Thus, every conceivable judgment has relation back to individual objects, and we can speak of a
reduction of all truths to the truth of experience (Husserl, 1969, p. 204). In this sense, Husserl
writes, "In respect of its being, reality has precedence to every irreality whatsoever, since all
irrealities relate back essentially to an actual or possible reality" (1969, pp. 168-9).
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"Individuals are given by experience, experience in the first and most pregnant sense, which is defined as
a direct relation to something individual" (Husserl, 1969, p. 206) and, "Experience is an evident seizing
upon and having of either an immanent or a real individual Datum itself” (Husserl, 1969, p. 156).
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These conclusions might be formulated into an argument as follows. Intellectual
meanings are expressed in judgments. Judgments can either be empirical (about particular objects
of experience) or universal (about universal objects which cannot be directly experienced).
Universal judgments can be material (i.e., have experiential content) or formal (have no
experiential content). We can show that each of these three types of judgment – empirical,
material universal, or formal universal – has its evidence in virtue of perception.
1.

Individual Judgments

There is an obvious sense in which individual judgments, or judgments of experience,
depend upon experience for their evidence. Such judgments include empirical particulars within
themselves, and so one can’t fulfill the judgment without fulfilling an intention of the individual.
Since the mode of dependence between individual judgments and experience was the concern of
chapter 2, I’ll assume this point is familiar. However, as we have seen, general judgments do not
contain individuals. So how is it that they refer to experience for their evidence?
2.

Material Universal Judgments

Material universals are universals that include some material content, i.e., content
garnered from experience, e.g., "Every sound has tone." Such universals rely on experience for
their evidence. Husserl writes: "Every A Priori with a material content … demands a return to
intuition of individual examples - that is: to 'possible' experience - if criticism is to bring about
genuine evidence" (1969, p. 213).
For example, take the proposition, "Every sound has a tone." This proposition is universal
and necessary (it is an a priori truth), but material insofar as it has sensuous content (it refers to
sound, which is not a logical category). 70 At the same time, such a proposition can only be
fulfilled through experience – without the possibility of sonorous experience, the proposition
would be a set of empty significations. Obviously, no particular experience can establish the
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For this distinction between formal and material a priori, see e.g., Husserl 1969 (p. 29).
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necessity of this proposition. But it is not the individual per se that fulfills the judgment. The
individual as an exemplar fulfills it. If I grasp the noise penetrating my apartment from the road, I
can freely vary its tone or pitch in my imagination. However, I cannot imagine it as a sound that
has no tone. Such a sound would not sound – it would be no sound. On the basis of this individual
as exemplar then, I fulfill the judgment that "Every sound has a tone."
3.

Formal Universal Judgments

Formal universals, such as the laws of logic, don't include any material content. Instead,
they have purely categorial content. It might seem, then, that there is no clear sense in which such
universals would demand supplementation by experience in order to have evidence: whereas
material universals must ultimately be fulfilled through experience, formal universals can be
fulfilled through any example of categorialia. But, as we have seen, Husserl argues that all
categorialia (all judgments) are themselves fulfilled on the basis of experience. Thus, formal
universals are mediately founded upon experienced individuals – insofar as they are founded on
categorialia, which are founded on experience. Husserl writes,
The sense-relation of all categorial meanings to something individual, that is, on
the noetic side, to evidences of individuals, to experiences, – a relation growing
out of their sense-genesis and present in every example that could be used by
formal analytics – surely cannot be insignificant for the sense and the possible
evidence of the laws of analytics, including the highest ones, the principles of
logic. Otherwise, how could those laws claim formal-ontological validity: united
with their validity for every possible predicative truth, validity for everything
conceivably existing? This conceivability surely signifies a possibility of
evidence, which leads back ultimately, even though with formal universality, to a
possible individual something or other and, correlatively, to a possible experience
(1969, p. 214).
To test this point, let us try to think what it would be like to judge without having any experience.
Suppose we were, by whatever means, familiar with all the significations we currently possess,
but simply lacked all sensuous intuition or experience. What would our judgments be to us then?
First, there would be no means by which to distinguish true from false individual judgments.
Without experience, I could well judge "The apple is green," and I could just as well judge, "The
apple is red," but neither of these judgments could I fulfill or thereby determine as true. My
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judgments would be constrained by the law of non-contradiction, but they would not thereby
possess truth. Second, in the case of material universals, there would be no criterion by which to
distinguish judgments with purely imaginative content from those with experiential content, i.e.,
one could not distinguish possible judgments from true ones. One can, for example, make as
consistent universal judgments about unicorns as about horses. The mark that makes judgments
about the latter have truth value is the possibility of experience.
What about in the case of a priori truths? Because such laws have necessity, they can be
based on imaginative particulars as well as perceived particulars. For example, I can verify modus
ponens for myself as easily in an imagined case as in an experienced case. So how is experience
integral to the evidence of a priori universals? Faced with a parallel problem about the perception
of universal ideas (as opposed to universal judgments, which I am considering) in Logical
Investigations, Husserl distinguishes between assertive and merely contemplative universals
(2001, pp. 293-4). If we intend a universal purely contemplatively, we suspend interest in its
"'being' or 'non-being'" and consider only its "'possibility or impossibility" (Ibid., 294). In
contrast, if we intend a universal assertively, we are concerned with its being or non-being, and in
this we depend on a reference to the universal being "confirmed or refuted by adequate future
perception" (Ibid., 293). In other words, if we are concerned not merely with a universal's
possibility, but with its truth, then we are referring not just to imagination, but to experience. A
universal is confirmed,
Whenever the universal meaning is fulfilled by an adequate percept, i.e., by a
new consciousness of the universal which constitutes itself on the basis of a 'true'
abstraction form the corresponding individual percept. The universal object is
then not merely presented and posited, but is itself given to us (Ibid., 294).
Similarly, in the case of judgments we can distinguish between contemplative and assertive
judgments. If we mean judgments assertively, if we affirm their truth, then we must be referring
not merely to the imagination, but to experience, as the basis on which such judgments can be
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fulfilled. On the basis of imagination we can at most assert the possibility of such judgments, so
that without experience we could not assert their actual truth.
Perhaps the best way to see this is to imagine a case in which the problem is not that we
have no experience, but that we have an experience that disconfirms a universal judgment. For
example, there is a well-known debate between realism and operationalism as to quantum logic
and its divergence from classical logic, with regard to the distributive property of disjunctions. 71
If the laws of classical logic were self-evident independently of experience, then no empirically
derived results could put these laws into question – the debate would have no good sense. But it is
no good to dismiss the debate as unreasonable on the grounds that the laws of logic cannot be
drawn into question by experience, for this is merely begging the question. To be sure, I don’t
assert the realist position in this debate (that the laws of classical logic are violated by quantum
mechanics). I assert only that the question here cannot be dismissed a priori, and so the evidence
of the laws of classical logic is in fact not entirely independent of experience. My point is that the
question can only be resolved by a correct interpretation of empirical results: to say whether these
laws do not apply in the case of quantum mechanics, we have to wait for a certain kind of
experience. This is why the mere fact that there is a question here for us tells us everything we
need to know. This is one way of making the point that formal universal judgments depend upon
experience for their validity with regard to beings: only empirical evidence can finally determine
whether formal universal judgments are valid of the objects of experience. Thus, if we find a kind
of experience that really does seem to throw formal judgments into question, we do not dismiss
this experience outright, as we would have to if laws were a priori evident. Instead, we – with a
certain reserve and due circumspection – listen to experience.
I conclude that both rationalism and empiricism are untenable. The rationalist is right that
there is incommensurability between knowledge and perception. But the empiricist is right that
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See Putnam (1968) for an incipient text in this debate.
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our knowledge is not self-grounding and must be grounded in experience. Only experience can
ground knowledge, and yet experience cannot ground knowledge. This is the antinomy at the
heart of the genesis of knowledge.
3. Motivation as a Ground of Knowledge
I have claimed that Merleau-Ponty understands the relation between perception and
knowledge in terms of motivation and that if we follow Merleau-Ponty in this regard, we will be
able to resolve the antinomy that undergirds rationalism and empiricism. In this section, I explain
why this is so.
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the relation between perception and knowledge might be
best described under the heading: “the primacy of perception.” Perception has “primacy” in
relation to knowledge, insofar as knowledge is founded on perception. Merleau-Ponty writes, for
example, that “the certainty of ideas is not the foundation of the certainty of perception but is,
rather, based on it” (1964, p. 13). The concept of foundation invoked to describe this relation is
technical phenomenological term. Husserl defines foundation, Fundierung, as follows:
If a law of essence means that an A cannot as such exist except in a more
comprehensive unity which connects it with an M, we say that an A as such
requires foundation by an M or also that an A as such requires to be
supplemented by an M (2001, p. 25).
To say that knowledge is founded on perception means, in this sense, that knowledge is a
dependent moment, i.e., that it is not self-subsisting, but instead if there is knowledge, then there
is also perception. Merleau-Ponty clearly relies on this definition, but gives the term a more
narrow sense when he defines a Fundierung relationship as one in which
The founding term ... is primary in the sense that the founded term is presented as
a determination or a making explicit of the founding term, which prevents the
founded term from every fully absorbing the founding term; and yet ... the
founded is not merely derived from [the founding], since it is only through the
founded that the founding appears (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 414).
The founding terms has primacy insofar as it is that which the founded determines and explicates.
And yet, conversely, the founded is not reducible to the founding, since it is the founded that
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makes the founding appear explicitly and determinately. We can understand the primacy of
perception, then, to mean that knowledge is dependent on perception insofar as knowledge is an
explication and determination of perceptual experience. At the same time, the primacy of
perception entails that knowledge is not reducible to perception, because it affects perception with
a standard of determinacy that perception alone could not attain. And, indeed, this is precisely
how Merleau-Ponty defines the relation between perception and knowledge:
The perceived object … has a two-fold relation to what is understood. On the one
hand, it is only the sketch or fragment of meaning which calls for a repetition [in
the understanding] that fixes the perceived object and finally makes it exist. On
the other, the perceived object is the prototype of meaning and alone
accomplishes the actual truth of what is understood (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p.
106).
Knowledge is founded on perception, because knowledge is just an explication and determination
of perceptual meanings. But as an explication and determination of perception, knowledge is not
reducible to perception, which ultimately offers a merely fragmentary meaning. Consequently,
Merleau-Ponty can define the thesis of the primacy of perception as follows:
In speaking of the primacy of perception, have never, of course, meant to say
(this would be a return to the theses of empiricism) that science, reflection, and
philosophy are only transformed sensations or that values are deferred and
calculated pleasures. By these words, the ‘primacy of perception,’ we mean that
the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, truths,
values are constituted for us; that perception is a nascent logos; that it teaches us,
outside all dogmatism, the true conditions of objectivity itself; that it summons us
to the tasks of knowledge and action. It is not a question of reducing human
knowledge to sensation, but of assisting at the birth of this knowledge, to make it
as sensible as the sensible, to recover the consciousness of rationality. This
experience of rationality is lost when we take it for granted as self-evident …
(1964, p. 25)
The thesis of the primacy of perception, then, carves out a space between rationalism and
empiricism. It is not an empiricist thesis, because it holds that knowledge transcends perception,
or in other words, that intellectual meanings and evidence 72 are not reducible to (definable in
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Merleau-Ponty writes, "We are not reducing mathematical evidence to perceptual evidence. We are
certainly not denying, as will be seen, the originality of the order of knowledge vis-a-vis the perceptual
order. We are trying only to loose the intentional web which ties them to one another, to rediscover the
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terms of) perceptual meanings and evidences. 73 On the other hand, it is not a rationalist thesis,
because it denies self-evidence to reason and seeks to describe instead how the “natural light” of
reason comes to birth within the perceptual field. 74 As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "The perceived
world is the always presupposed foundation of all rationality, all value and all existence. This
thesis does not destroy either rationality or the absolute. It only tries to bring them down to earth"
(1964, p. 13). 75
It seems to me that it is only possible to get this thesis of the primacy of perception
properly into view in virtue of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of motivation. Perception is supposed to
found knowledge, but it cannot cause our knowledge, for the content of knowledge transcends the
content of perception. Further, as the rationalist shows, perception does not suffice as a reason for
knowledge. Consequently, we can only understand the sort of grounding with which perception
furnishes knowledge in terms of motivation.
It must be noted that reading Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception in
terms of motivation is not standard. Merleau-Ponty does little to connect these two concepts, and
a central innovation of this dissertation is to use the later concept to clarify the former.
Nevertheless, Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the relation between perception and knowledge
support my reading of it. Consider the following two quotes:
1) “We call this level of experience [namely, perception] ‘primordial’ – not to assert that
everything else derives from it by transformations and evolution (we have expressly said
that man perceives in a way different from any animal) but rather that it reveals to us the
paths of the sublimation which preserves and transforms the perceived world into the spoken world" (1973,
pp. 123-4). Or, he writes that intelligible being "has its own evidence" (2010, p. 12).
73
Rockmore seems to me decisively to misunderstand this point in classifying Merleau-Ponty’s account of
the primacy of perception as “a nonstandard form of the empiricist claim familiar in Kant’s view that
knowledge of any kind begins in experience” (Rockmore, 2011, p. 202). Of course, Merleau-Ponty does
think that knowledge begins with experience. But he thinks this “beginning” in a way radically different
than the empiricist – who entirely misses the transcendence involved in the transition to knowledge – and
the rationalist – who, like Kant, thinks that experience is a merely occasioning cause of our knowledge. But
I have argued that knowledge cannot be reduced to experience, in the manner to empiricist intends, or
separated from experience, in the manner the rationalist intends.
74
“The perceived object is the prototype of meaning and alone accomplishes the actual truth of what is
understood” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 106).
75
Or again, "There is thus no destruction of the absolute or of rationality here, only of the absolute and the
rationality separated from existence" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 27).
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permanent data of the problem which culture attempts to resolve” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964,
p. 25).
2) As we saw above, Merleau-Ponty writes that the perceived object is a “sketch or
fragment of meaning which calls for a repetition [in the understanding] that fixes the
perceived object and finally makes it exist” (Merleau-Ponty, 1973, p. 106).
Perception poses the “problem” to which knowledge responds; it calls for knowledge. This is the
language of solicitation, which I described in chapter 1 as a kind of motivation. So, it seems to me
that my reading has initial plausibility on this basis. My primary support for this reading, though,
will derive from how well it will be shown to describe the primacy of perception in what follows.
What does it mean to say that perception motivates knowledge? Following the features of
motivation laid out in chapter 1, it means that the relation is between two meanings, need not be
explicit, is spontaneous, is internal and reciprocal, and tends to equilibrium. Further, perception
does not ground knowledge with necessity and yet our knowledge is normed by perception.
Finally, it means that knowledge transcends perception. I’ll emphasize a few points here.
First, the fact that the relation is internal means that the two are inseparable. The former
cannot serve as a mere occasion for the latter, because the latter owes its meaning (and not just its
existence) to the former – motivation is a Fundierung relation. This does not mean that the latter
can only exist as long as the former exists, only that the latter would not have the meaning it does
if the former had never been apprehended. Conversely, this means that we shouldn’t expect
perception to be strictly unaltered by knowledge. The way we perceive (perceptual meanings)
will presumably be at least partially altered by our knowledge. For example, the acquisition of
natural number augments our capacity to perceive number.
Second, the move from perception to knowledge aims to achieve a higher degree of
stability or equilibrium in a system by explicating and determining that system. Much as in
Plato’s description of thought summoners, perception is unstable: it lacks the resources to resolve
the contradictions it engenders. Such contradictions must be resolved by transitioning to a higher
level, i.e., the more determinate system of structures that knowledge provides. For example,
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children tend to have an undifferentiated concept of air and nothing: they fail to distinguish
between the two (Carey, 2009, pp. 403-4). This is because air “looks” empty – perception tends
not to discriminate between the two. Nothing is stranger to the child than to imagine air as full, as
suddenly becoming itself visible, for how then could one see? The child imagines one would be
immersed in an impenetrable cloud and, further, traversing space would present the same
difficulty as traversing water. But this undifferentiated concept of air/nothing results in
contradictions with the other beliefs that children hold, e.g., that they can feel air move across
their skin (wind) and fill or empty their lungs (breath), and that one cannot breathe in space,
where there is in fact nothing. The child is led to these difficulties because she draws a strict
distinction between the “full” (substance) and the “empty” (nothing). The child’s education must
teach her that this distinction does not hold: in fact, “full” solids and “empty” air are both states
of matter; in fact, neither is full or empty, for both are different arrangements of particles moving
in the void. This resolves the contradictions the child’s beliefs faced: if air is not nothing, then it
makes sense that it moves and that one cannot breathe in space. This contradiction is only
resolved by transitioning to a new level, one which describes air in a manner that perception did
not. Knowledge resolves the contradiction present in perception by transition to a new and more
determinate level (a conceptual or structural system that can distinguish between air and nothing),
which results in a greater degree of stability.
Third, motivation makes use of the best points of both rationalism and empiricism.
Motivation accommodates the rationalist point that there is incommensurability between
experience and knowledge, because motivata transcend their motives in the sense that the former
is not definable in terms of the latter. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, in the transition to knowledge:
We are dealing with transcendence and not a static identity, and here … truth is
not an adequation but anticipation, repetition, and slippage of meaning. Truth
allows itself to be reached only through a sort of distance. The thing thought is
not the thing perceived. Knowledge is not perception … (1973, pp. 128-9). 76
76

It seems to me that Low’s conception of an “empirical a priori” to be found in Merleau-Ponty is mistaken
on this point, since it takes the a priori as something “directly drawn from experience” (Low, 2013, p. 281).
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But it also accommodates the empiricist point that knowledge is grounded in experience
(Merleau-Ponty’s thesis of the primacy of perception) because it holds that motivation is
normative. Thus, on my account, perception norms the very knowledge that transcends it.
Fourth, motivation can make use of the best points of rationalist and empiricism because
it doesn’t think of the relation between experience and knowledge in terms of causality and
reason. In other words, I am arguing that perception neither causes nor justifies knowledge.
Experience can’t cause knowledge, because even if we assume that experience affects us
causally, it can at most cause particulars to enter our awareness, not universals. Similarly,
Benaceraff has argued that experience can only cause knowledge of concrete objects, but
universals (specifically, mathematical entities) are abstract, and so mathematical entities cannot
be causally produced in us (Benacerraf, 1983). But because Benaceraff believes that the only
justification for beliefs is causal production of them in us, he holds that beliefs about such objects
are unjustified. But neither does experience justify our knowledge, for our knowledge is richer
than what experience can justify. Further, if the very rules of reasoning are founded in perception,
then perception cannot primarily be related to our knowledge in the mode of reason (more on this
point later).
Finally, motivation encounters profound challenges from both rationalism and
empiricism. The empiricist holds that any idea of which we have no impression is
indistinguishable from fiction. But we have no perceptual impression of much of our knowledge,
because knowledge transcends perception. On the other hand, the rationalist holds that perceptual
experience is insufficient to ground a priori knowledge. But motivation holds that perceptual

Low conceives this direct drawing as follows: “A certain aspect of experience is given so routinely and
regularly (all perception is spatial, for example) that it deserves to be called an empirical a priori; it
deserves to be called a transcendental condition, a condition in whose absence experience simply would not
take place” (Ibid.). But I have argued that Merleau-Ponty does not conceive of the a priori as something
given in experience, but rather as transcending experience. As I will argue in what follows, the spatial
character of perception is not directly given in experience, but an accomplishment of synthesizing the
sensory modalities of space.
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experience norms, i.e., grounds, a priori knowledge. If my account is going to work, it needs to
address these two challenges. I will now contest the two claims at the core of these challenges, by
arguing that a) the contingent can ground the necessary and b) knowledge can transcend its
ground without being indistinguishable from fiction.
A. The Contingent Can Ground the Necessary
Rationalists argue that perceptual experience cannot ground knowledge, because
perceptual experience is contingent whereas knowledge is necessary; there is an ontological
difference between the content of experience and the content of knowledge that makes the former
unsuitable to ground the latter. I argue that motivation allows us to make a seemingly
contradictory claim: the contingent can ground the necessary.
The rationalist objection, as I put it, harbors an ambiguity. On the one hand, necessary
knowledge can mean knowledge of a proposition which is to hold necessarily. On the other hand,
necessary knowledge means knowledge that is known with necessity. In the first case, the
necessity is a quality of the intended proposition (the known). In the second, it is a quality of the
knowledge itself. Leibniz is right that no perceptual evidence, being contingent, can serve as a
sufficient reason to hold an intellectual evidence with necessity: a universal truth cannot be
deduced from a fact. This distinction allows me to make two points.
First, Leibniz shows that perceptual evidence cannot establish necessary knowledge in
the second sense. But I, following Merleau-Ponty, already argued that not only can perception not
establish such knowledge, but we have no such knowledge, i.e., there is nothing that we do know
with necessity or in his terms, with absolute evidence. Thus, the objection that perception does not
allow us to know with necessity will get no traction with my line of thinking, because I hold that
there is no such thing as absolute evidence.
Second, the fact that perception cannot establish knowledge with necessity does not mean
that it cannot establish knowledge that is to hold with necessity: particular experiences can
motivate knowledge which is intended as universal and necessary. For example, already my first
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encounter with a person engenders a sense of who they are: it carries me beyond this particular
encounter and toward the person. My feeling for the person is already universal in the sense that it
concerns not just the way the person acted in the particular encounter, but the person’s style
which will manifest itself in all their deeds. Of course, this feeling may be disconfirmed by future
encounters, and in this sense was not universal at all. Yet it intended not the particular but the
universal. At the same time, it is the particular, the first encounter, that keys us into the universal.
The particular motivates a universal that cannot be deduced from it. Take instead the example of
a scientific law. A scientific law is grounded in experiments, that is, in particular cases. From
these particular cases, the scientific law cannot of course be deduced with necessity. Yet a
necessary law is intended in the particular, and thus scientific laws can be knowledge necessary in
the first sense but not the second.
In fact, both empiricism and rationalism misconstrue the relation between the perception
of a particular fact and the intellection of a universal essence. Leibniz’ argument for the
insufficiency of experience to establish universal truths joins up with Hume’s critique of causality
in sharing a false idea of induction. In “Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man,” MerleauPonty argues against an empiricist conception of induction as “a process by which, in considering
a group of facts, we discover a common character and set it apart by abstraction” (1964, p. 68).
We do not start from a set of isolated particulars and then abstract a common character which is
already contained in each. Merleau-Ponty adduces as evidence against this conception of
induction the process by which Galileo arrived at his conception of the fall of bodies. Galileo
could not have proceeded by abstracting a common character found in the many experiences of
falling bodies, because his conception starts from the pure case of a freely falling body, of which
we have none in experience (every falling body that we experience is affected by factors such as
wind resistance). Thus, “the conception of the fall of bodies which guides his experiment is not
found in the facts. He forms it actively; he constructs it” (Ibid., 69). Having constructed the pure
case of the freely falling body, Galileo can then explain the “confused facts” through the
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introduction of additional considerations (e.g., resistance). Galileo’s law is not contained in or
derived from particular cases; it is creative, original. And yet it is only such cases that can serve
to motivate Galileo’s construction, through the meaning they make available and the problems
they pose.
To put the argument in other terms, we do not derive a universal connection from a set of
distinct particular connections, as follows:
A1 → B1
A2 → B2
A3 → B3
A→ B
Instead, with the experience, “A1 → B1” there may already be initiation into the insight “A → B”.
Each further experience gives evidential weight to the universal. It’s not that I build up the
general out of particulars, but that the general is vaguely present with the first particular and each
particular evidentiates it further. As Husserl puts it,
It is from this that Hume ought to have started, from self-evidence: the fact that in
circumstances U, a W appears, in and of itself already lends something like
weight to the assertion ‘In general, in circumstances U, W appears’; and this
weight increases with the number of cases experienced (1973, p. 394).
On this conception, the universal is neither caused (i.e., content is abstracted from a number of
impressions) nor justified (i.e., is deduced from the particulars). It is instead evidenced in each
particular experience. The knowledge of such a universal will not be necessary in the sense of
being known with necessity, but such a universal is always evidenced precisely as necessary (is
intended as necessary). This, as Husserl puts it in the same passage, is “the motivating power of
experience” (Ibid.). In this manner, the concept of motivation allows us to accept the arguments
against empiricism proposed by Hume and Leibniz without accepting their conclusions: Hume,
holding that we have some ideas that cannot be caused by the world in perception, draws the
skeptical conclusion that such ideas are mere fictions; Leibniz, holding that we have some
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knowledge that cannot be justified by perception, draws the rationalist conclusion that we have
innate knowledge. Merleau-Ponty claims instead that perception motivates the intellect’s grasp of
it, and thus grounds beyond what it contains.
B. Knowledge can transcend its ground without being mere fiction
Hume formulated a version of the challenge here when he claimed that we can hold no
idea valid of which we have no impression. Because we have no impression of many of our ideas
– personal identity, substance, necessary connection (causality) – Hume concluded that these
ideas are fictions, grounded in habit and sentiment. In other words, Hume concluded that because
these ideas are not produced in us by causal impacts of the world on our senses, and no sufficient
reason can be adduced for establishing them, they must be produced by the imagination. Hume
thus reaches a skeptical position regarding these ideas.
The core of the challenge is that to the extent that an idea or proposition exceeds its
ground it is a mere fiction. Motivation allows us to see how this is not so. As I described in
chapter 1, a motive delineates and norms a field of possible responses to it. These responses are
not contained in the motive; instead, they exceed the motive. But they are normed by the very
motive they exceed. The input of motivation grounds the output, even while the output exceeds
the input.
There is a kernel of truth to Hume’s invocation of “fiction” and “imagination,” because
motivation is creative in the sense that it engenders a product which is original (another way of
saying that it exceeds its ground). But “fiction” doesn’t capture the process of motivation,
because describing our knowledge as fictitious suggests that it isn’t responsible to reality,
whereas describing our knowledge as motivated suggests that it is. Our knowledge is normed by
experience, and this means that it is responsible to that experience; knowledge has a different
kind of purport than fiction. Because it is normed, knowledge is grounded in a way that fiction
isn’t.
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C. Examples
In this way, motivation can avoid the challenges posed by both rationalism and
empiricism. I now illustrate how motivation works through several case studies.
1. Space
I draw my first example from Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of space. Merleau-Ponty argues
that the contingent modes of access to space provided by the senses are inseparable from the
meaning space has for us. This might seem unlikely, for the intuition of space, being unique and
common to each of the senses, must be a priori. Space is the universal form to which each of the
senses lend their particular matter. Vision, touch, and hearing all disclose the same space, which
is why the tactile experience of space can be coordinated with the visual experience of space.
Consequently, with respect to space, each of the senses are contingent. If both vision and touch
disclose the same space, neither of them are an inseparable part of the intuition of space; neither
the blind person nor the hypoesthesiac lacks an experience of space, and thus each sense is
accidental to the experience of space. The senses are contingent and subjective modes of access to
the necessary and objective intuition of space.
But, on the other hand, space only has the meaning it does for us in virtue of the senses
that disclose it. For it is not true that each sense discloses space in the same manner. Vision and
touch, despite disclosing the same world, each give the world with a structure that is not
transposable into the other. Take, for example, Jonathan Franzen’s description of a child’s
experience of the underside of the table he has been sentenced to remain at until he finishes his
dinner:
Even the most extreme boredom had merciful limits. The dinner table, for
example, possessed an underside that Chipper explored by resting his chin on the
surface and stretching his arms out below. At his farthest reach were baffles
pierced by taut wire leading to pullable rings. Complicated intersections of
roughly finished blocks and angles were punctuated, here and there, by deeply
countersunk screws, little cylindrical wells with scratchy turnings of wood fiber
around their mouths, irresistible to the probing finger. Even more rewarding were
the patches of booger he’d left behind during previous vigils. The dried patches
105

had the texture of rice paper or fly wings. They were agreeably dislodgable and
pulverizable.
The longer Chipper felt his little kingdom of the underside, the more
reluctant he became to lay eyes on it. Instinctively he knew that the visible reality
would be puny. He’d see crannies he hadn’t yet discovered with his fingers, and
the mystery of the realms beyond his reach would be dispelled, the screw holes
would lose their abstract sensuality and the boogers would shame him, and one
evening, then, with nothing to relish or discover, he might just die of boredom
(Franzen, 2001, p. 267).
According to Franzen, vision has a power of distance which collapses space, whereas the
proximity of touch expands it; vision surveys a realm in one glance, and having captured it,
removes the mysterious quality of tactile space (the solicitation of which was irresistible to the
probing finger), and so gives way to boredom; the materiality of the screw holes coalesces into a
concrete meaning; what was so agreeable in the sensuality of the texture of dried boogers, in the
light of the eye (as if in watching one were being watched, for vision transports us into the
objective) turns to shame. This power of distance means that whereas touch can only give us
simultaneity with a small extension (that of the body), vision can coordinate two distant events
which touch can only traverse with time (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 232). Thus, vision makes
possible a distant simultaneity that touch could not. This is why a patient blind from birth, once
their cataracts have been removed, can claim never to have had the experience of space prior to
the operation (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 231 & 536). Of course, the patient is not rigorously
correct in this claim: for he reaches to touch what he sees, attempting to palpate sunlight for
example, and this is only possible if he locates vision and touch within a common spatial
universe. And yet the patient could only experience the arrival of vision as an event, as a
revelation, if vision gives space in a way that touch did not. The patient does not readily know
how to coordinate vision and touch, and this is only possible if vision and touch do give the same
structure of space. Space is not the same after the arrival of vision, and this means that space is
not something "above" the senses, but rather a meaning produced by the synergy of the senses
involved in normal perception of spatial objects. Only by this synergy between the senses does
each particular sense become a contingent grasp of space, and thus space is not something
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separable from the senses, but only separable from each particular sense, just as the body exceeds
each of its organs while being only the power of their synthesis.
The contingent senses are essential – and not accidental – not only to the a priori
intuition of space, but also to our intellectual grasp of this space in geometry. This position seems
impossible, because each sense is contingent to our grasp of geometry. Blind people are able to
learn geometry, and this means that vision is a contingent mode of grasping the truths of
geometry. But this fact does not hinder the sense of geometry from being transformed by the
arrival of vision. The patient whose cataracts have been removed claims that the circle and square
are not genuinely perceived by touch, but only recognized according to signs (the presence and
absence of edges) (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 233). The patient may well overstate the case. Yet the
fact that the patient can be surprised by how a circle or square looks – that they are not what he
had anticipated – shows that vision discloses geometry in a way different from touch. Both vision
and touch disclose geometrical truths, and thus each is contingent with respect to these truths. But
each gives these truths a unique sense, which the definition alone (e.g., a figure the radii of which
are all equal) does not capture. The definition is perfectly transposable between the blind and the
seeing geometer. And yet the sense it captures is different for each. Perhaps some other sense not
yet imagined could give a new meaning to this definition. Perhaps one could perform many
geometrical operations correctly without possessing either touch or vision. Yet without any
senses these operations would have no meaning. In this case, the contingent is the inseparable
ground of the necessary.
2. Galileo’s Discovery of Kinematic Laws
My second example, taken from Wertheimer and Merleau-Ponty, belongs to the history
of science: Galileo’s discovery of the kinematic laws that underlie classical physics. Galileo’s
laws significantly restructure the laws of motion that perception suggests. For example, Galileo’s
laws unite under one law cases of motion that seem to be described by different laws. It is easy to
determine perceptually that heavy objects fall downward, and pre-Galilean physics viewed this as
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evidence that the natural home of heavy bodies is the earth. Uniform rectilinear motion (i.e.,
horizontal motion in a line), on the other hand, was described by a different set of laws: the body
will move until its vis impressa no longer acts on it. The distinction between these two kinds of
motion seems perfectly obvious. Yet Galileo unites both cases under a single law.
I’ll summarize Wertheimer’s description of the process of structural reorganization that
Galileo’s thinking undergoes (Wertheimer, 1945). It is perceptually available that heavy bodies
fall, and that the longer they fall the faster they fall. Galileo sets out to determine how bodies fall
more precisely. Since the speed of falling objects is great, exact measurements of time are
difficult for Galileo to make. Instead, Galileo experiments with rolling objects down inclined
surfaces: he conceives free fall as merely a special case of fall, fall at an angle of 90°.
Experimenting with different angles of decline, Galileo finds that the lesser the angle, the lesser
the object’s acceleration; the closer to 90°, the greater the acceleration. It then occurs to Galileo
that the converse is true of an object thrown upwards: it undergoes the greatest negative
acceleration if thrown vertically upwards, and lesser negative acceleration the smaller the angle of
incline. What about when the object is neither thrown upward or dropped, but simply rolled
forward? Since the angle is zero here, the object will undergo no acceleration or deceleration. In
other words, its motion is constant. This leads Galileo to the conclusion that a body in rectilinear
motion moving at constant velocity will never come to rest, except under the influence of friction.
Inertia replaces the view that the body will move until its vis impressa no longer acts on it: it is
not that the body runs out of vis impressa, but that an external force – friction – acts on it. Galileo
unites rectilinear motion and the acceleration of falling bodies under a single law, thereby
transforming both.
In this way, Galileo’s laws generalize, or move from particular cases to a universal law.
Merleau-Ponty writes,
When Galileo succeeded in bringing under one signification the factors of
uniform acceleration and deceleration – for example, the stone thrown in the air
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and the uniform rectilinear movement of a body on which there is no impinging
force – these phenomena became variants of a single dynamic (1973, p. 105).
These phenomena, which for perception seem to operate according to distinct structures, are
revealed to be coordinated by a common law. The law generalizes, because it makes these distinct
structures into “variants of a single dynamic.” The law provided by the intellect is not false of the
perceived particulars. Instead, it clarifies them in a way that perception could not have imagined.
The intellect draws out truths about the perceptual world that perception does not contain. Here, it
determines and explicates perception through generalizing and formalizing. 77
At the same time, the general law draws its meaning from the experiences it explicates.
Merleau-Ponty writes of the signification developed by Galileo:
[It] can in principle appear only through the concrete shapes which it unified.
That it appears to us on the basis of ‘particular cases’ is not an accident of its
genesis with no essential effect. The signification is inscribed in its content, and
if we tried to abstract the signification from the circumstances in which it
appears, the signification would vanish before our eyes. The latter is not so much
a signification over and above the fact which signify it as our means of passing
from one fact to another or the trace of their intellectual generation (1973, p.
105).
In other words, it is only by gradual rearrangements of the perceptually available structures that
Galileo’s conclusions have meaning or evidence for us. We do not experience a kind of motion
which is as undivided between the two cases as the general is: we experience either the heavy
body falling or the rectilinear motion. A motion that would be neither of these has no meaning for
us. More, we do not experience inertia: all bodies perceptually available come to rest under the
influence of friction, and consequently perception does not decide between an interpretation of an
object expending its vis impressa or an object limited by friction that would ideally undergo
constant motion. How do we make sense of Galileo’s conclusion, then? Only in virtue of a
structural reconfiguration demanded by Galileo’s realization that deceleration decreases with the
angle of incline and acceleration increases with the angle of decline. If we do not see this demand
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See also Merleau-Ponty 1964 (p. 69).
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for ourselves, then the idea of inertia is a mere placeholder for a meaning that belongs within a
structure of other terms (motion, rest, acceleration, distance, space, etc.) and which I can perfectly
well use to perform calculations but has no meaning for me. I only have reason to see the truth of
Galileo’s laws when I see how they provide a more determinate and stable description of the
perceptually available phenomena. Thus, it is only within and on the basis of the contingent that
the more universal and necessary law is obtained; the former is not the mere occasion for the
latter, it is its life source.
3. Weight/Heft
My third example I draw from Wiser and Smith's recent research on science education,
which has explored the most effective means of encouraging conceptual change from children's
initial conceptual system to the scientific conceptual system (Wiser & Smith, 2016). Take one
example: children have an undifferentiated concept of weight/heft. That is, children understand
weight in terms of heft, resulting in incorrect beliefs, e.g., that very small objects have no weight.
This engenders a contradiction, because very small objects have no heft independently of each
other but do when added together: a grain of rice has no heft, but a bag of rice does. The child
recognizes that no amount of null weight objects can sum to an object having weight, but is
unsure how to resolve the problem. To account for this, knowledge discriminates between weight
and heft, determining the latter as an imperfect mode of access to the former: small objects have a
weight that perception cannot observe, because all mass has weight. Knowledge resolves the
contradiction present in perception by transitioning to a new and more determinate level (a
conceptual or structural system that can distinguish between weight and heft), which results in a
greater degree of stability. Part of the difficulty of science education is encouraging children to
adopt a conceptual system that contradicts the perceptual evidence available to them (e.g., that a
grain of rice has no heft).
The scientific concept of weight significantly transcends the perceptual concept of
weight: it enlarges the domain in which this concept applies, holding that all mass has weight, but
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also understands weight in terms that are unavailable to perception, defining weight as a measure
of force exerted by gravity. This scientific concept of weight has no intrinsic evidence or meaning
for the child. The problem, then, is how to move the child from her initial conceptual system to
the scientific conceptual system. And the difficulty is that the child has no stock of meanings or
evidence other than those available to perception with which to transcend the perceptual concept
system for the scientific system.
Wiser, Smith, and Doubler outline a series of stepping stones that allow the child
gradually to reconfigure their conceptual system (Wiser, Smith, & Doubler, 2012). An initial step
is to get children to believe that scales are more accurate measures of weight than hands. The
child can easily see that objects affect scales according to their heft: a heftier object makes the
scale go further down. And yet this belief conflicts with evidence available to the child. For
example, it may occur that of two objects which for the child have the same heft, one makes the
scale go further down than the other. The child learns that scales are more sensitive than hands.
The child can also learn that the scale is more reliable than hands: her peers may report all
different degrees of heft, whereas the scale is constant. A second step is to develop a concept of
scale weight. Initially, objects can be qualitatively sorted by their relative effect on the scale.
Then, they can be sorted quantitatively, by introducing units. The language used with the child to
describe measurement serves to "scaffold" conceptual change: from "The Playdoh cube is as
heavy as five teddy bears," to "The weight of the cube is the same as the weight of five teddy
bears," to "The weight of the cube is five teddy bears," to "The weight of the cube is 25 grams"
(Wiser & Smith, 2016, pp. 40-1). The child now has access to an extensive concept of weight, i.e.,
that the weight of the whole is composed of the weight of the parts, through which a child can
learn that all mass has weight (e.g., by a thought experiment in which the child continuously
halves a weight – if the weight of the whole is composed of the weight of the parts, the mass can
be divided indefinitely and each part should still have weight).
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Of course, more steps are required to obtain the full scientific concept of weight. But the
important thing to see is how complicated it is to acquire this concept. It is, of course, possible
that a child could be trained to operate perfectly correctly with the scientific concept of weight
without understanding it at all. One can understand the formal relations of the propositions,
"Weight is the measure of force exerted by gravity," "Gravity is a force of attraction between
masses," "Mass is the amount of matter in an object," and "Matter is a substance that takes up
space", without understanding their meaning at all, and further, without knowing whether they
have any truth. Such propositions only have a meaning insofar as the perceptual concept system
can be gradually manipulated or reorganized into the scientific concept system, and they are only
evident insofar as perceptual evidence (in particular, the contradictions it poses) requires this
reorganization. Again, the difficulty of science education is that these propositions aren't
definable in terms of the child's conceptual system and are not directly evidenced by perception
(indeed, they seem to conflict with perception), and yet the only resources the child has for giving
meaning and evidence to these propositions is precisely her perceptual concept system.
The undifferentiated concept of weight/heft is incommensurable with the adult concept:
from the adult perspective, it is confused and doesn’t make sense. At the same time, weight only
has its meaning as a determination or differentiation of the weight/heft concept. The child’s grasp
of weight is indeed contingent: it is only a subjective and in this sense arbitrary mode of access to
the objective. And yet something like an objective and necessary grasp of weight is only possible
within the space carved out by this confused concept. In this case, the contingent grasp of weight
grounds the necessary grasp, and the necessary grasp is not therefore a mere fiction, for it is in
fact more precise and determinate than its ground.
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4. Natural Number
My fourth example is taken from Susan Carey’s research on the development of the
concept of natural number in childhood. 78 Children do not initially possess any concept of natural
number. They do, however, possess some perceptual capacities related to number. Children can
distinguish between a larger and a smaller set if the difference between the two is sufficiently
large. Carey terms this capacity the analog representation of number, and finds that it operates on
Weber’s law, i.e., the ratio at which we can distinguish magnitudes is constant (I can distinguish 6
and 9 items, but not 18 and 19). Further, they are able to distinguish between and remember up to
three objects. For example, if an infant sees two crackers being hidden in one jar and three
crackers in another, they will preferentially move toward the jar with three crackers and will
remove three crackers from it (since they are unable to store 4 distinct items in memory, they
show no preference for a jar with 4 crackers over a jar with only 1). Neither of these capacities
amount to a concept of natural number. For example, neither of the infant’s numerical capacities
can distinguish between 19 and 20, while natural number can. Further, neither has the resources
to represent numbers like 7 or 1,152. Natural number possesses the crucial characteristic of
relating numbers in a sequence defined by the successor function, i.e., that each number in the
sequence is reached by adding 1 to the previous number. The child’s perception of number
involves no such capacity. Thus, natural number is not definable in terms of perceptual numerical
capacities.
On the other hand, natural number only has its meaning in virtue of these perceptual
capacities. Let us see how the child develops a concept of natural number. First, children learning
natural number are taught a count list: “1, 2, 3 …”. This count list is composed of explicit
symbols that are intrinsically meaningless and initially have meaning only in virtue of their
relation to each other (their place in the succession of symbols). As already mentioned, children
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have a capacity to distinguish between 1, 2, and 3 objects. Once they have learned the count list
and these numbers, they are in a position to perform the crucial induction: mapping their
understanding of number onto the count list. This allows them to learn the meaning of numbers
that they could not have learned otherwise.
While natural number transcends perceptual numerical capacities, it only acquires
meaning on the basis of those capacities. The count list can only acquire a meaning insofar as the
child learns to map their already available representations of 1, 2, and 3 onto the count list – the
inductive step cannot be taken without this recognition. It is only because the child can leverage
the numerical structures implicit in perception, that they can develop sophisticated cognitive
numerical structures.
One might object: I have no innate capacity to represent 1,152, but I understand this
number. But consider the meaning this number has for me. I cannot recognize a mass of
toothpicks scattered on the floor as 1,152 toothpicks or a 1,152-sided figure as having that many
sides. Instead, it has its meaning in terms of the position it occupies in the count sequence, in
terms of its relations to other numbers: it is one more than 1,151 and one less than 1,153, and I
could, through such addition or subtraction of units eventually arrive from 1,152 to any natural
number. The meaning it has derives from the function of succession, which meaning arises out of
a reconfiguration of our initial stock of perceptual meanings (1, 2, and 3). Moreover, it never
loses the meaning it has for me in terms of elementary perceptual structures. The analog
representation of number persists even in the adult’s grasp of the verbal integer list, which is why
adults are much faster to decide that 9 is more than 5 than they are to decide that 6 is more than 5
(Dehaene, 1997). There is nothing about natural number that is more conducive to the former
than the latter decision (indeed, in learning natural number we become so familiar with the count
sequence “4, 5, 6” that one might expect the opposite result), but the analog representation of
number does explain this adherence to Weber’s law.
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These four examples demonstrate that the contingent can ground the necessary and that
what is grounded in this manner is not therefore mere fiction. The contingent is the inseparable
manner of our access to the real; it grounds precisely in its groundlessness.
4. A Priori Justification
Contemporary debates between rationalism and empiricism treat the issues of meaning
and justification separately. One debate, primarily among philosophers, concerns the justification
of our knowledge. Most parties to this debate agree that we have some innate representations, but
disagree about how our representations are evidenced. Empiricists hold that the only source of
justification for our knowledge is experience, while rationalists hold that we have a capacity for
rational insight in virtue of which some knowledge is justified independently of experience. A
second debate, primarily within the field of cognitive science, concerns whether humans possess
any meanings independently of experience. Most parties to this debate assume that all evidence is
empirical, but disagree about how we acquire the meanings that experience evidences.
Empiricists hold that all representations are acquired from sensori-perceptual experience, while
nativists hold that some representations are innate. I'll consider both these debates in turn.
The debate between rationalism and empiricism in philosophy concerns how our
knowledge is justified. Analytic orthodoxy of the past century has held that the only ultimate
source of justification is experience. Some of these empiricists are foundationalists about
experience, holding that all our beliefs are indirectly justified by experiences, which are directly
justified. Others are coherentists, holding that there is no such thing as direct justification and all
our beliefs are indirectly justified by their relations to other beliefs, which are ultimately
constrained causally by experience. In either case, the only ultimate source of constraint or
justification is experience. According to this empiricist orthodoxy there is no such thing as a
priori justification. The past two decades have seen the emergence of a dissenting position.
Rationalists, of whom I will take Laurence Bonjour as representative, hold that we have a

115

capacity for "rational insight" in virtue of which some of our knowledge is justified independently
of experience. I'll start by explaining Bonjour's position and the empiricist objections to it.
In his In Defense of Pure Reason, Bonjour defends what he terms a "moderate" rationalist
position (1998). Like the classical rationalists (and indeed, many classical empiricists), Bonjour
maintains that we have two sources of justification. Some of our knowledge is justified (a
posteriori) by appeal to experience. And some of our knowledge is justified (a priori) by appeal
to reason alone, independently of experience. Bonjour differs from the classical rationalists,
however, in holding that rational insight – that in virtue of which some knowledge is justified a
priori – is fallible. Bonjour claims that nothing about the idea of experience-independent insight
necessarily implies infallibility and moreover there seems to be enough evidence that none of our
knowledge is infallible that the classical position is untenable.
Bonjour provides three main arguments for holding that there is a priori justification.
First, Bonjour appeals to putative examples of knowledge that could only be justified a priori,
e.g., "Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the same time," "If a certain person A is
taller than a second person B and person B is taller than a third person C, then person A is taller
than person C," "There are no round squares," and "Either David or Jennifer ate the cake, but
Jennifer did not eat it. Therefore, David did." Propositions of this sort don't seem to need to be
evidenced by experience, but seem to be intuitively self-evident. Bonjour argues that such
propositions are apprehended in acts of rational insight, i.e., in a way that is both direct,
immediate, non-discursive and intellectual or reason-governed. It is this rational insight that
justifies one in believing such propositions to be true.
Bonjour's second and third arguments claim that the denial of a priori justification
implies extreme skepticism. The second argument points out that the idea of empirical
justification depends on having some rational insight. The contents of experience are particular
and are limited by the narrow scope of what we can observe. But we hold many beliefs that
exceed the scope of perceptual experience – beliefs about the past, the future, unobserved
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particulars, and not least of all, general claims. Either inferences from experiential beliefs to nonexperiential beliefs are valid – in which case they depend on rules of inference that cannot
themselves be inferred from experience, because they are conditions for such inferences – or are
invalid, in which case we are left with a pretty severe form of skepticism.
Bonjour's third argument claims that any argument depends on some a priori
justification. All arguments involve an inference from some premises to a conclusion. We hold
inferences to be valid when we have a reason to think that the conclusion is true if the premises
are true. But reasons for holding inferences valid cannot involve appeals to experience. Suppose
one were to justify an inference in this manner. The experience to which one appealed could itself
be formulated as a premise, in which case the conclusion is either explicitly included in the
premises, and so no inference is necessary, or it is not, in which case the inference goes beyond
what can be derived from experience. Consequently, one must either hold some form of
rationalism or an extreme skepticism which denies that there are valid arguments. Rejecting the
skeptical position, Bonjour holds that we have some capacity for a priori justification.
Empiricists tend to object to Bonjour's position along two main lines. The first aims to
remove the motivation for the rationalist position by showing how empiricism can account for the
kinds of examples of knowledge that Bonjour considers. The second holds that the rationalist
position is too obscure to be acceptable.
First, empiricists argue that there is a good way to construe our possession of seemingly a
priori knowledge without resorting to a priori justification. Michael Devitt, for example,
proposes a coherentist picture that he thinks avoids Bonjour's objections (2005). Devitt argues
that the kinds of examples invoked by Bonjour can be justified by experience; we just need a
different understanding of how justification by experience works. Propositions are not justified
independently of each other, but in a holistic manner, i.e., together with a set of other beliefs and
background assumptions. A proposition like "Nothing can be red all over and green all over at the
same time" is not justified through any particular experience, then, but as a part of general
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network of interconnected beliefs that allow us to make sense of experience. It is this network
which is tested by experience, and if it passes the test, so do its parts.
Further, empiricists argue that accounts like Devitt's are preferable to Bonjour's, because
the latter is obscure. How is it that we are able to perform a cognitive act that gives us immediate
access to necessary truths? 79 While there is question enough how we are able to have direct
access to individuals in perception, there is at least some understanding that this involves a story
about sensation, embodiment, and the organization of sensation into meaningful wholes. No
analogous story is told about rational insight; it is only claimed that we indeed have such insight.
Once again, thinking in terms of motivation suggests a third position. It seems to me that
Bonjour's description of a "rational insight" has a phenomenological weight that must be
acknowledged. In the examples that Bonjour considers, we do apparently have direct insight into
the truth of certain propositions, and this insight is not perceptual but rational. Something like this
is implied by Merleau-Ponty's insistence that intellectual evidence is not reducible to perceptual
evidence. 80 But, phenomenologically, this description of the experience of insight is inadequate.
As every intellectualist analysis is prone to do, it overlooks the internal relation between a
foreground and its background. Every foreground, while it presents itself as immediately and
directly accessible, is mediated by the background that it stands out against: tone is perceived in
virtue of keynote, color in virtue of lighting. The same is true of rational insight. Rational insight
presents itself as immediate, but in fact it is only able to appear in virtue of a background of
sedimented truths. And, I suggest, these sedimented truths ultimately lead us back to perception.
As long the rationalist does not acknowledge this background, the empiricist is right that the idea
of a priori justification is obscure. 81
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See, e.g., Boghossian (2001).
See, e.g., Merleau-Ponty’s claim that he is not attempting to reduce mathematical evidence to perceptual
evidence (1973, p. 123).
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Hass and Hass distinguish between intuitionism and Merleau-Ponty’s line of thinking in a similar
manner: “For Merleau-Ponty mathematical proof happens amidst a field of proliferate possibilities and
takes shape through genuinely creative, transgressive insights – insights that once formalized, actually
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What makes the appearance of immediacy so convincing is that all of Bonjour's examples
are deeply sedimented truths. Because they are so familiar, they present themselves with the
character of self-evidence. What is needed is to attend to the acquisition of an a priori insight.
Take Wertheimer's example of how a child discovers the formula for the area of a parallelogram.
Suppose a child has learned the formula for calculating the area of a rectangle, but when
asked to calculate the area of a non-rectangular parallelogram is stumped. There are various
methods by which a child can proceed, but all involve manipulation of perceptual structures and
their knowledge of the formula for rectangles. In one method, a child first sees the parallelogram
as a rectangle with a triangle protruding from either end. Second, the child reorients this figure,
seeing the triangle on one side as a protrusion and the triangle on the other end as corresponding
to a gap (as a rectangle with a triangular piece missing). The child then sees that the gap can be
filled in with the triangular protrusion at the other end, such that the parallelogram can be
transformed into a rectangle (see Figure 3.1). The child concludes that the area of a parallelogram
is computed with the same formula as the area for a rectangle. The child now has this formula
readily available and with time may come to think of the area of the parallelogram as an obvious
truth. But this belief is belied by the child's initial situation, in which the formula is nowhere to be
found. Of course, the child can be simply told that the relevant formula for a parallelogram is
“Area equals width times height.” But the child only has rational insight into the truth of this
formula – the formula only has meaning or evidence – if it is seen (intuited) in the rearrangement
of the perceptual structure of the parallelogram.
We are able to extend this analysis back to Bonjour's examples. Even though nothing
could be more obvious than the transitivity of height to us, let us try not simply to assume that the
child is able immediately to see that from the facts that A is taller than B, and B is taller than C
that it follows that A is taller than C. How will the child arrive at this insight about the transitivity

disguise the open character of the activity and the dramatically other potential lines of development” (2000,
p. 183).
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of height, then? If she puts A, B, and C before her vision (or imagination) she will be able
perceptually to observe that A is indeed taller than C. But this is a mere fact: she does not yet see
the structural necessity involved in transitivity. But she can arrive at this necessity if she now tries
to vary the height of these figures in imagination. She supposes that C is in fact very tall,
expanding C in her imagination to be taller than A, while leaving A taller than B and B taller than
C. What results (see Figure 3.2)? If we assume that she has not yet had insight into the necessary
implications of transitivity for height, there is nothing contradictory in this supposition. A
contradiction only results if we apply transitivity to note that if B is taller than C, and C is taller
than A, then B must be taller than A. This contradicts the first supposed premise, that A is taller
than B. But, again, this contradiction results only if transitivity is presupposed, and therefore
cannot justify transitivity. In contrast, the child's imaginative supposition makes the contradiction
immediately evident. If the child tries to imagine C taller than A, then she can see that C will be
taller than B, and this contradicts her suppositions. Perhaps she tries to fix this by now expanding
the size of B in her imagination, so it is taller than C. But if she does this, then B will be taller
than A, and this contradicts her presuppositions. In this way, she acquires insight into a
perceptual structure: that height is transitive. Henceforth, the insight will present itself as an
immediate rational insight. But it was not there in her original perceptual situation, nor in the
original meaning of height, for as we saw, if she attempted to derive transitivity from a proof by
contradiction, she could do so only by presupposing transitivity. The insight is therefore not
arrived at by a logical arrangement of significations, but by insight into a perceptual structure,
arrived at through the manipulation of a perceptual situation. The rationalist analysis, which
attends only to the rational insight, is indeed obscure, for it leaves veiled the sedimented
perceptual structure which supports the rational insight.
Bonjour proposes an important objection to my position, namely that for denying the
immediacy of rational insight, it results in skepticism. According to Bonjour, if we do not have
immediate insight into the rules for validly inferring from perception to knowledge, or more
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generally from premises to conclusions, then none of our knowledge is justified. For if these rules
are not immediately justified, they will themselves be derived from experience, but being the
rules for justified inference from experience, will not themselves be justified. And if these rules
are not justified, nothing derived by them will be justified. It seems to me that this objection is
devastating for the empiricist picture: if there are no such rules known a priori, there is no way
that our knowledge can be justified by experience.
I think this objection cannot be avoided. Bonjour is right that on my position, none of our
knowledge is ultimately justified. But Bonjour's criticism is already acknowledged and accepted
in Merleau-Ponty's claim that our knowledge is ultimately supported not by reasons, but by
motives:
There are truths just as there are perceptions: not that we could ever fully lay out
before ourselves the reasons for any affirmation – there are only motives, and we
merely have a hold on time, not a possession of it – but because it is essential to
time to take itself up to the extent that it leaves itself behind, and to contract itself
into visible things or into things that are evident at first glance. Every
consciousness is, to some extent, perceptual consciousness. Were it possible to
unfold at each moment all of the presuppositions in what I call my 'reason' or my
'ideas,' then I would always be discovering experiences that have not been made
explicit, weighty contributions of the past and of the present, and an entire
'sedimented history' that does not merely concern the genesis of my thought, but
that determines its sense (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, pp. 415-6).
This move from reasons to motives allows us to see something important. Bonjour simply
assumes that the only normative relation between beliefs is reason. This assumption is false: I
have argued that motivation is a normative relation. Moreover, it is a property of motivation that
its output can transcend its input, and so it can move from the contingent to the necessary, from
the a posteriori to the a priori. In the manner we saw above, the contingent grasp of the heights of
three individuals can motivate a structural insight. Because Bonjour does not see motivation as a
possible ground for the rules of inference, he does not see how justification can arise out of our
initially unjustified access to the world. Certainly, on my picture, there is no apodictic
justification: our beliefs have a temporal horizon in virtue of which they are open to being revised
in the future. But neither is there apodictic justification on Bonjour's "moderate" rationalism.
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Moreover, it is not clear that the lack of immediate insight into rules of inference from experience
to knowledge is a defect of my position. As Devitt has pointed out, our evidential practices have
changed significantly over the past centuries, e.g., with the rise of statistical methods. It seems
more likely to me that we build rules for inference at the same time that we build knowledge on
the basis of inference. Thus, my position does not culminate in skepticism; it simply denies an
untenable account of justification, which the empiricist and the rationalist share.
5. Empiricism and Nativism
I now turn to the question whether we have any innate cognition, and if so, what
character it has. Nativism plays the rationalist part in this debate, holding that we do have innate
cognitions. In contrast, the empiricist position holds that we have no innate cognitions. The
question is whether all meanings are ultimately perceptual meanings, i.e., can all knowledge be
formulated in perceptual terms?
First, I should clarify some terms. This debate understands perception in a manner that
Merleau-Ponty would find impoverished, namely in terms of qualities available to sensation, such
as color, size, shape, and motion. Some sensory/perceptual qualities (e.g., shape and depth) are
the output of innate sensory/perceptual analyzers. But such representations as object, cause,
magnitude, and agency are thought not to be perceptual. Clearly, this debate does not understand
the same thing by perception that Merleau-Ponty does. For Merleau-Ponty, perception is rich
enough to include meanings such as object, cause, magnitude and agency. This is because
Merleau-Ponty understand perception as the embodied experience of particulars, engendered by a
set of passive synthetic processes.
Next, to say that a cognition is innate does not mean that one has a mental representation
of that cognition prior to experience. For example, if the concept red is innate, this does not
necessarily mean that one has a representation “red” prior to experiencing red things. Modern
models of perception are a bit like certain classical rationalists in holding that we have innate
mechanisms that analyze perceptual inputs to produce representations like depth, but unlike those
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rationalist insofar as they “do not require that the representations that enter into modular
perceptual computations be consciously accessible” (Carey, 2009, p. 31). Nor does it mean that
one is born with such a representation, for it might emerge as part of normal maturational
processes. Instead, to say that a concept is innate means that it is not learned from experience.
Generally speaking, the empiricist position is that we have no innate cognitions. This
position is usually maintained according to at least one of two premises. First, a strong
formulation of the position holds that all meanings are ultimately perceptual. As Locke would
have it, all our ideas are constructed out of the simple ideas received through experience. To put
this idea in more contemporary terms: all our knowledge can be formulated in terms of perceptual
primitives (e.g. causality as the succession of two sensations). A somewhat weaker premise,
which still supports the conclusion that we have no innate cognition, is that our only innate
representations are perceptual. On this view, all our knowledge is achieved on the basis of
language and other cultural educative practices which are discontinuous with innate perceptual
mechanisms (Quine advocates something like this view), or some other mechanism (for example,
Piaget’s stage theory). Thus, the empiricist holds that we have no innate cognitions, though this
leaves open whether we have innate perceptual representations (which is likely). I will be
primarily interested in the strong empiricist premise, that all knowledge can be formulated in
terms of perceptual primitives.
Nativists hold that we have at least some innate cognition. Following Chomsky’s work on
language acquisition, a large body of research has developed that supports this conclusion.
Chomsky’s work argued that the complexity of language and the readiness with which children
learn it indicate that language is guided by innate syntactical structures. Since then, many studies
have shown that very young infants are capable of having more than sensory representations, e.g.,
representing objects that are placed behind a screen (Baillargeon, Spelke, & Wasserman, 1985)
(Xu & Carey, 1996). There are a number of other non-perceptual representations (e.g., number,
cause, agent) that very young infants possess but are not likely to have been learned. In response
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to such results, Spelke and others have posited that humans have a system of innate “core
knowledge” or “core cognitions.” Perhaps the most radical formulation of the nativist position
was given by Fodor, when he argued that concept learning is in fact impossible (Fodor, 1975).
This is not a necessary feature of the nativist position, and of course it is implausible that
concepts such as terrier or jet engine are innate. A more conventional formulation of the nativist
position is that we have at least some innate cognition, and this cognition constrains our
acquisition of non-native knowledge.
Both positions are incompatible with Merleau-Ponty’s account of the genesis of
intellectual meanings or cognitions. The strong empiricist premise reduces intellectual meanings
to perceptual meanings (indeed, to what Merleau-Ponty would consider sensory meanings). On
the other hand, the nativist position loads all of knowledge into innate cognitions, in claiming that
the former is constrained by the latter. Neither allows for the genesis of meaning that is central to
Merleau-Ponty’s account, the former holding that all knowledge is formulable in terms of
perceptual primitives, the latter holding that all knowledge is formulable in terms of innate
cognitive primitives.
I am more interested in how each position accounts for development than in how each
describes our initial cognitive situation, i.e., whether we have innate perceptual representations or
innate cognitions. Merleau-Ponty’s position is not that we have no biologically innate
mechanisms that figure in the constitution of perception (in the rich sense). In fact, MerleauPonty’s position, it seems to me, is much closer to the nativist’s in this regard. The empiricist
description of perception is too bare, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, to provide a good description of
our initial cognitive situation. The claim that we have core cognition, on the other hand, is
compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s account of perception. Not only do the contents of core
cognition (e.g., agent, cause, etc.) figure into the content of perception, according to MerleauPonty, but like perception, core cognition is not an explicit theory. Core cognition of number, for
example, includes no explicit representation of the axioms of arithmetic (Carey, 2009, p. 135).
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Further, the outputs of core cognition are particular perceptions (e.g., “That moving object, X, has
object Y as its goal”), not universal judgments (e.g., “Only agents have goals”). These outputs are
passive, in the sense that they are not revisable; in Fodor’s language, they are “encapsulated.” In
short, this account of core cognition leaves very little that Merleau-Ponty would disagree with.
Merleau-Ponty would object to the claim that we have core cognition in the sense that we have
innate conceptual/theoretical knowledge of the world which is therefore not founded on
experience, but contemporary theories of core cognition do not posit such knowledge.
Merleau-Ponty’s position is that all intellectual meanings are motivated by the stock of
meanings involved in perception. This position requires two claims: a) intellectual meanings
transcend the initial stock of meanings involved in perception (i.e., the former is not definable in
terms of the latter), but b) the former are founded on the latter. As I pointed out above, neither
empiricism nor nativism can countenance the first claim, and so neither can countenance the idea
that intellectual meanings are motivated. However, these are not the only positions that
developmental cognitive scientists take. Indeed, an emerging body of research, spearheaded by
Susan Carey, supports the two claims I have just attributed to Merleau-Ponty. In the remainder of
this section, I explain Carey’s position and how it supports Merleau-Ponty’s claims.
In her The Origin of Concepts, Carey lays out three theses that define her view. First, that
we possess some innate cognitive structures, which she calls core cognition. Second, that humans
have a unique capacity to create cognitive systems that “transcend sensory representations and
core cognition” (Carey, 2009, p. 18). These cognitive systems transcend core cognition in the
sense that they are discontinuous and locally incommensurable with core cognition. Third, that
we create such cognitive systems in virtue of what she calls “Quinian Bootstrapping.”
First, Carey argues that we have an innate cognitive structure that she calls core
cognition. Core cognition differs from sensory/perceptual representations systems, insofar as it
plays a rich conceptual, inferential role. But it also differs from theoretical conceptual knowledge,
insofar as it consists of “modular innate perceptual-input devices” – in my terms, insofar as it is
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passive (“encapsulated”), has sensory input and produces the rich perception of the world that
Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenologically (Carey, 2009, p. 11). Carey’s point is that we have
innate systems for representing the world that are not merely sensory, such as object, magnitude,
causation, agency (goal-directedness). Such representations cannot be defined in terms of
sensation. But they are also not explicit theories: they do produce explicit representations of
particulars, but the manner in which they do so is not consciously accessible, and much of their
conceptual content is inaccessible. They are also not theories (intellectual meanings in MerleauPonty’s sense), because their outputs are representations about particulars, whereas theories
represent universals.
Second, our cognitive systems are not continuous over our lifespan, i.e., we develop
cognitive systems that are discontinuous with core cognition. In other words, it is not the case that
“the resources needed to express all concepts humans can represent are available throughout
development, even at the beginning” (Carey, 2009, p. 248). Recall, this is a nativist thesis, insofar
as the nativist holds that all concepts that humans can represent are innately available (or at least,
the resources for these concepts are). For example, we develop representations of magnitude,
namely natural number, which core cognition cannot capture. According to Carey, the cognitive
systems we develop as adults are discontinuous and incommensurable with core cognition. In
other words, the shift to adult cognitive systems involves not just as amplification of core
cognition, but fundamentally changes representations like number, object, cause, agent, etc. This
means that parts of core cognitive systems appear incoherent from the perspective of adult
cognition or cannot be expressed in terms of adult cognition. Children, for example, have an
undifferentiated concept of subtraction and division, yielding something like “an operation that
makes a number smaller” (Carey, 2009, p. 355). Thus, they hold that if you divide the number 1 a
sufficient number of times, you will get to 0. Or again, they have an undifferentiated concept of
weight and density (Carey, 2009, p. 389). Such undifferentiated concepts are incoherent from the
adult perspective: how could the child coherently think in terms of a concept that is in fact two
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distinct concepts? The child’s cognitive system is incommensurable with the adult’s cognitive
system in this sense: the child’s concept does not coherently translate into the adult’s cognitive
system. But, according to Carey, such incommensurability is always “local,” i.e., there is
incommensurability between only some portion of the two cognitive systems. For example, in the
move from the child’s first grasp of natural number to the sophisticated adult grasp of number,
there is indeed incommensurability, but both are cognitions of number, both represent natural
number, etc.
Third, we create new cognitive systems in virtue of what Carey calls “Quinian
bootstrapping.” The term “bootstrapping” is meant to capture what is puzzling about this process,
namely that it is a process of “creating new representational resources that are not entirely
grounded in antecedent representations” (Carey 20). Basically, Quinian bootstrapping works by
posing a set of explicit symbols which are intrinsically meaningless, which serve as placeholders
for new meanings. For example, in the acquisition of natural number, the child initially learns the
intrinsically meaningless set of symbols in the count sequence. Carey attributes the following
characteristics to core cognition:
1) relations among symbols are learned directly, in terms of each other; 2)
symbols are initially at most only partly interpreted in terms of antecedently
available concepts; 3) symbols serve as placeholders; 4) modelling processes –
analogy, inductive inference, thought experiment, limiting case analyses,
abduction – are used to provide conceptual underpinnings for the placeholders; 5)
these modeling processes combine and integrate separate representations from
distinct domain-specific conceptual systems; and 6) these processes create
explicit representations of knowledge previously embodied in constraints on the
computations defined over symbols in one or more of the systems being
integrated (Carey, 2009, p. 418).
I don’t want to pursue the details of Carey’s description of the bootstrapping process. What
interests me is how it provides an alternative to empiricism and nativism that is very close to the
one I have been proposing. On the one hand, the output of Quinian Bootstrapping is not definable
in terms of its input. But on the other, the output only has a meaning by leveraging the stock of
meanings present in the input. As discussed above, the count sequence by itself would remain
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totally meaningless: an arbitrary sequence which we can reproduce, but doesn’t have any sense. It
is only when the child maps her capacity to perceive 1, 2, and 3 objects onto the count sequence
that it is, as it were, gradually illuminated and becomes a means of organizing the world.
Carey thus proposes an account of cognition that resists both a strong empiricism and a
strong nativism, because it is an account of the genesis of knowledge, i.e., of the development of
knowledge out of structures that it transcends. In doing so, it supports Merleau-Ponty’s two
claims about the genesis of knowledge.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have argued that the grounding relation between perception and
knowledge should be understood in terms of motivation. Understanding the relation in this way
allows us to resolve the antinomy at the heart of rationalism and empiricism: perceptual
experience must ground our knowledge, and yet our knowledge is incommensurable with
perception.
One key feature of thinking in terms of motivation is that it requires the contingent to
ground the necessary. On this picture, the contingent is not a mere occasion for acquiring a
necessary truth, but is an inseparable feature of the necessary. It is because our a priori truths are
founded on our contingent modes of perception that, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, “certainty is
doubt,” or in other words, the a priori has a temporal horizon: a past out of which it arises and a
future within which it may be overturned. This account, while it posits a Fundierung relation
between perception and knowledge, is not for that reason foundationalist. For the foundation
provided by perception is contingent, and it is the very inadequacy of this ground that propels
knowledge toward the necessary. This distinguishes motivation from empiricism, because the
former does not claim that the structures of experience are a sure foundation – indeed, in our
progress toward the true, they must be overturned, precisely while they are in another sense
maintained.
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On the other hand, motivation distinguishes this account from the sort of antifoundationalism defended by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in their Embodied Mind. There, they
propose an enactivist view of cognition, according to which “cognitive structures emerge from
the recurrent sensorimotor patterns that enable action to be perceptually grounded” (1991, p.
173). This position holds that subject and object are codependent, and consequently that the world
can only be understood as something enacted in our contingent bodily modes of engaging it. This
leads them to conclude that our cognition has no sure foundations. Thus far, the conclusions of
Embodied Mind are compatible with the position I have been describing. But Varela, Thompson,
and Rosch go on to argue that the appropriate reaction to the groundlessness of our cognition is to
give up our grasping after grounds and instead to embrace groundlessness. In contrast, I argue
that the progress of knowledge, both historically and within the life of the individual, is the
accession to surer grounds. 82 Varela, Thompson, and Rosch are right that we do not leap from out
of our subjective modes of access to the world into objective determinations of the world. Yet, the
genesis of knowledge provides us with a more stable and determinate grasp of the world. We
approach the necessary, but only within the contingent. Indeed, this move from within the
groundless toward the surer ground is an essential structure of existence that Merleau-Ponty calls
transcendence:
Existence is the very operation by which something that had no sense takes on
sense, … by which chance is transformed into reason … . ‘Transcendence’ is the
name we shall give to this movement by which existence takes up for itself and
transforms a de facto situation. … Everything is necessary in man … . And
everything is also contingent in man … (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 174).
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Dillon puts it well in writing that “The argument that proceeds from the rejection of all absolutes [i.e.,
ultimate grounds] to the rejection of all grounds (and hence all truths) is specious. There are finite grounds,
finite truths. It is on the finite ground on which we stand that we must base the truth that we need in order
to live as long and as well as we do” (1987, p. x). See also the conclusion to Dillon 1987, “Abyss and
Logos.”
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Figure 3.1. Area of a Parallelogram. Reprinted from Parallelogram, In Wikipedia. Retrieved
August 14, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallelogram. 2010 by Jim.belk. Reprinted
with permission.
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CHAPTER 4. MERLEAU-PONTY AND KANT
In chapter 3, I explained how Merleau-Ponty, and phenomenology generally, provides an
alternative to the rationalist and empiricist conceptions of the relation between experience and
knowledge. But Merleau-Ponty does not provide the only or the first such alternative. Indeed,
Kant’s project could be described in these same terms. Kant is not an empiricist about knowledge,
insofar as he thinks a priori knowledge is possible and that an empirical deduction of the
categories cannot secure their validity. Nor is he a rationalist, because he grounds a priori
knowledge on the possibility of experience; his project is well described as a critique of pure
reason. Further, Kant’s transcendental idealism advances beyond the empirical idealism of early
modern philosophy onto the same terrain as phenomenology, both attempting to describe, in
Merleau-Ponty’s terms, an “in-itself-for-us” or, in Kant’s, an “appearance itself.”
At the same time, Kant’s resolution of the antinomy of empiricism and rationalism seems
to be incompatible with Merleau-Ponty’s, in at least two ways. First, Kant seems to describe the
conditions for the possibility of experience in terms that Merleau-Ponty would consider
intellectualist. 83 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty provides good reasons to think that the conditions Kant
considers are not in fact conditions for the possibility of perception, or so I will argue. Second,
Kant develops a sense of the a priori which is incompatible with the description I gave in chapter
3 of an a priori founded on experience. 84 Kant develops a line of argumentation, namely
transcendental argumentation, according to which certain structures of the understanding can be
known or justified a priori. These structures are not to be justified by having been gathered from
actual experience. Instead, they are justified as conditions for the possibility of experience.
Consequently, knowledge of these structures is a priori knowledge. For Kant, in other words,
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The literature on the relation between Merleau-Ponty and Kant focuses on accusations of intellectualism.
See, e.g., Matthews (2006, p. 31), Longuenesse (1998, pp. 204, 271, 395), or see Melnick (2013) for a more
detailed examination of such accusations.
84
Merleau-Ponty himself clearly distinguishes his sense of the a priori from Kant’s (2012, pp. 229-30). See
Dillon (1987) for a discussion of the differences between the a priori as it is in Kant and Merleau-Ponty.
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knowledge is a deduced as a condition for the possibility of experience, not as motivated in the
course of actual experience.
My general thesis in this chapter will be that, contrary to appearances, the philosophies of
Kant and Merleau-Ponty are largely compatible. 85 This, I will argue, is because the two aim their
projects at different levels of experience. What Merleau-Ponty means by perception is a level of
experience that might be described as pre-predicative or pre-objective. In contrast, for Kant
experience means empirical judgment. Further, these different senses of experience are
accompanied by different senses of the sort of normativity involved in experience. Whereas Kant
approaches experience with the standard of justification, Merleau-Ponty approaches it with the
standard of motivation. But my contention, as well as Merleau-Ponty’s, has not been that other
forms of grounding, namely reason and causality, don’t have spheres of legitimate application,
only that they are not exhaustive of the forms of grounding and that they are not well applied to
perception and the primary bond between experience and knowledge. In this sense, Kant’s and
Merleau-Ponty’s projects are not only largely compatible, but also complementary, describing
different levels of experience and normativity that together provide a complete description of
experience. However, I will also argue that Merleau-Ponty’s description of a pre-predicative
sphere of experience places limitations on Kant’s account of the a priori. In particular, I will
argue Kant’s account of a priori justification relies on an insight into the general structure of
experience, which cannot be justified a priori in the manner Kant lays out. Instead, these
structures must be described as a priori in the sense I defined in chapter 3, namely as motivated
in the course experience.
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In what follows, I will generally leave aside Merleau-Ponty’s own reading of Kant, which while
interesting can obscure the philosophical issues at hand. For a good discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s
treatment of Kant, see Matherne (2016, pp. 207-211) or, for a markedly different take, chapter 6 in
Rockmore (2011).
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1. Kant on Experience
In this section, I will explain Kant’s account of the epistemological role of experience.
One place where this role can be readily seen is in Kant’s description of the method of
transcendental deduction. But to identify what a transcendental deduction is, we will first have to
determine what a deduction is and what makes Kant’s deduction a transcendental one.
In his account of the deduction, Kant famously distinguishes between questions
concerning fact (the quaestio facti) and questions concerning right (the quaestio iuris). Whereas
the former is concerned with establishing what is actually the case, the latter is concerned with
establishing a right or entitlement, i.e., a justification. It is the latter sort of question with which a
deduction is concerned. A deduction of the categories means a demonstration that we are justified
in using the categories. We are justified in using categories if they are objectively valid, i.e., if
they can be used to cognize objects. Whereas with regard to the categories the quaestio facti
would only be concerned to demonstrate that we do possess a priori concepts, the quaestio iurus
is concerned to demonstrate that we are justified in using these concepts.
A transcendental deduction aims to justify a concept a priori. A priori, as I am using it
here, refers not to the innateness of a concept (although Kant is also interested in this), but to the
sort of justification it possesses. One might attempt to justify a concept’s use by showing how
that concept is derived from experience or can be identified within experience. For example, Kant
claims that we can always use experience to prove the objective reality of our empirical concepts
(p. B 117). A transcendental deduction aims to provide a different sort of justification, namely,
one which does not rely on experience. For Kant, it is important to justify the categories a priori,
because experience cannot justify the categories with the necessity that cognition of them entails,
and because the categories are not derived from experience. An empirical deduction of the
categories could not properly count as a deduction, because it would demonstrate not the
legitimacy of the concept, but only the factual situation whereby we come to possess that concept.
Thus, according to Kant, any attempted empirical deduction of the categories would amount only
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to an answer to the quaestio facti. Such attempts are useful only in their proper sphere, namely,
that of the “explanation of our possession of a pure cognition” (p. B 119). 86
The idea of a transcendental deduction, then, turns on the distinction between justification
and explanation which is at the core of this dissertation. Experience, according to Kant, can at
most serve as an explanation of our possession of the categories; it does nothing to justify our use
of them.
Nevertheless, experience does play a critical role in the justification of the categories, for
it is only on the basis of experience that the categories can be shown to have objective validity.
As Kant puts it, “the transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts has a principle to which the
entire investigation must be directed: viz., the principle that these concepts must be cognized as a
priori conditions for the possibility of experience” (p. B 126). More generally, experience plays a
critical role in the justification of our a priori synthetic knowledge, just not with respect to its
actuality (the fact of experience): Kant, unlike his rationalist predecessors, grounds metaphysical
knowledge on experience. Thus, Kant writes,
Experience, as empirical synthesis, is in [regard to] its possibility the only kind of
cognition that provides reality to all other synthesis. By the same token, this latter
synthesis, as a priori cognition, has truth (agreement with the object) only
because it contains nothing more than what is necessary for synthetic unity of
experience as such (pp. B 196-7).
What makes a priori synthesis possible, according to Kant, is experience in regard to its
possibility. How does Kant reach this conclusion?
Analytic judgments are licensed simply in terms of the concepts of the subjects of those
judgments. According to Kant, in judging that "All bodies are extended" I am merely elucidating
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With regard to our possession of a priori concepts, experience should be thought of as an occasioning
cause. As Kant puts it in the introduction to the B-edition, “Even though all our cognition starts with
experience, that does not mean that all of it arises from experience” (p. B 1). Experience, according to
Kant, is temporally our first cognition, for it is sensation that “arouses” the understanding. Nevertheless,
this does not entail that all the content of our cognitions is derived from experience, because the
understanding is a condition for the possibility of experience, and so any content added to experience by
the understanding will be derived not from experience but from the understanding, experience merely
serving to awaken this content.
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a content of the concept "body." In contrast, synthetic judgments are "ampliatory," they require
something outside of the concept itself in order to be licensed. 87 In the case of empirical truths,
such as "It’s raining," this "something else" is clearly my experience of the weather. But what is
this something else in the case of a priori synthetic judgments? Clearly, the formal condition of
truth, non-contradiction, is not enough to answer this question (as it was in the case of analytic
judgments), because a synthetic judgment can both be non-self-contradictory and fail to agree
with its object (there is nothing contradictory about my judging that it’s snowing – it is simply
wrong to do so) (p. 84). And experience can license only particular judgments, not necessary and
universal judgments. Thus, Kant's guiding question in the Critique of Pure Reason is "How are
synthetic judgments possible a priori?" (p. B 19).
Kant answers, as we have seen, in terms of experience not with regard to its actuality
(which licenses only a posteriori judgments), but with regard to its possibility: "the possibility of
experience is what provides all our a priori cognitions with objective reality" (p. B 195). Kant's
reasoning is that certain cognitions are necessary conditions for the possibility of experience, and
because we have experience, we know these cognitions (because they are necessary conditions) to
be true necessarily. Cognitions which are necessary for the possibility of experience can be a
priori, because they are not derived from experience but instead make experience possible, and
synthetic, because they are licensed by a "something else," namely, the possibility of experience.
One of the central aims of the Critique of Pure Reason is to justify a variety of a priori
judgments, in particular the “synthetic principles,” on the grounds that they are conditions for the
possibility of experience.
There is a core move, common to the transcendental aesthetic, the transcendental
deduction of the categories, and Kant’s account of the synthetic principles: each justifies a certain
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“In synthetic judgments, where the predicate does not lie within the concept of the subject, I must have
besides this concept something else (X) on which the understanding relies in order to cognize nonetheless
that the predicate belongs to the concept" (p. A 8).
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sort of cognition as a cognition of a structure that is a condition for the possibility of the
experience that we do actually possess. This move is the characteristic feature of transcendental
arguments. A transcendental argument, beginning with the given features of ordinary experience,
deduces the transcendental conditions of these features; it moves from the conditioned (our
experience) to its condition (transcendental laws); from what is first for us (experience) to what is
first in itself (the transcendental).
2. Kant on Justification
The central question in the justification of the categories and the synthetic principles is
“How is the experience of objects possible?” This question differs importantly from the kind of
skeptical question Descartes had considered, i.e., “How can we know that our experience of
objects is correct?” Kant is not asking how we can infer reliably from representations within our
minds to states of the outer world. Properly speaking, Descartes’ question only arises for the
transcendental realist. 88 For the transcendental realist, perception is only a set of inner
representations, causally produced in the mind by the impact of the world outside oneself in
space. Because such representations are caused, the transcendental realist can infer the existence
of outer objects. But this inference is unreliable: it leaves undetermined whether the cause is
actually in the world or merely in us (as in a dream). For this reason, Kant argues, the
transcendental realist ends up an empirical idealist (p. A 369). In contrast, Kant’s transcendental
idealism allows him to be an empirical realist. What we have in experience, according to Kant, is
the real itself, directly given in outer sense. However, this real cannot be understood as anything
“outside us,” because it is in space and time, and space and time are nothing but the forms of our
intuition. Certainly, the real is outside of any given empirical subjectivity, but this is because any
empirical subjectivity is itself something located within space and time. Kant’s transcendental
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See the Fourth Paralogism in the A edition.
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idealism does not imply an empirical idealism; there is, on his account, such a thing as “the
appearance in itself” or an object of experience.
And yet, insofar as everything in space and time is, in the transcendental sense, an
appearance or presentation, it is not immediately obvious how there can be such a thing as an
object of experience. The general problem is that if in experience we have only to do with our
presentations, then there is nothing outside our presentations with which to compare our
presentations. And if this is the case, it seems that there can be no such thing as empirical truth,
for truth as the tradition has understood it is just correspondence between our presentations
(cognitions) and the object outside of our cognitions. Kant’s solution to this problem is that there
is only an object of experience insofar as our presentations are governed by rules, and that
empirical truth will be defined as correspondence between our presentations and those rules.
Thus, in the A deduction, Kant writes,
When we have brought about synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition – this is
when we say that we cognize the object. This unity is impossible, however,
unless the intuition can be produced according to a rule through a [certain]
function of synthesis, viz., a function of synthesis that makes the reproduction of
the manifold necessary a priori and makes possible a concept in which this
manifold is united. … This unity of the rule determines all that is manifold, and
limits it to conditions that make possible the unity of apperception. And the
concept of this unity is the presentation of the object = x (pp. A 104-5).
Again, Kant’s problem is not the skeptical problem, about how we can infer outer the states of the
world from our inner presentations. For Kant, we are directly referred to the real through outer
sense. 89 However, all we are given through outer sense is a manifold of intuition and this
manifold can be synthesized in all manner of ways. The question is how we can distinguish
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Rockmore (2010) has accused Kant of inconsistently endorsing both constructivism (according to which
the subject “constructs” its object, i.e., the phenomenon) and representationalism (according to which
appearances are internal representations of objects in themselves). Only with Fichte’s elimination of the
thing in itself, according to Rockmore, does philosophy properly move from representationalism to
constructivism. While it may be that Kant’s account of the thing in itself entails a sort of
representationalism, Kant’s question about how there can be an object of experience does not entail any
sort of representationalism: the problem here is not moving from internal representations to external objects
(as Kant’s language sometimes suggests), but from a subjective to an objective arrangement of the directly
given world of phenomena.

138

between objective and merely subjective synthesis of this manifold. In the Second Analogy, Kant
writes,
What, then, do I mean by the question as to how the manifold may be combined
in appearance itself (which, after all, is nothing in itself)? Here what lies in the
successive apprehension is regarded as presentation; but the appearance that is
given to me, despite being nothing more than a sum of these presentations, is
regarded as their object, with which the concept that I obtain from the
presentations of apprehension is to agree. We soon see that, since agreement of
cognition with the object is truth, the question can only be inquiring after the
formal conditions of empirical truth; and we see that appearance, as contrasted
with the presentations of apprehension, can be presented as an object distinct
from them only if it is subject to a rule that distinguishes it from any other
apprehension and that makes necessary one kind of combination of the manifold.
The [element] in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary
rule of apprehension is the object (p. B 236).
In this regard, the problem of empirical truth is reformulated: given that we receive through
intuition only a manifold, with what is our apprehension of this manifold to correspond so as to
be true? Kant’s answer, again, is that our apprehensions can only be objective if the manifold
received in intuition is bound by rules; it is to these rules that our apprehension must correspond
if it is to be true.
Before turning to this solution, we need to be more precise about how this problem arises
for Kant. Again, the basic issue is that the manifold of intuition does not determine any particular
synthesis or organization of itself. In the "Stufenleiter" Kant presents a taxonomy of the genus
"presentation," writing,
Under [the genus "presentation"] falls presentation with consciousness
(perceptio). A perception that refers solely to the subject, viz., as the modification
of the subject's state, is sensation (sensatio); an objective perception is a
cognition (cognitio). Cognition is either intuition or concept (intuitus vel
conceptus) (p. B 376).
Thus, according to Kant, both intuitions and concepts are perceptions that refer to objects.
However, while intuition is perception referring to the object, it by itself can only give a
manifold, not a unitary object, and not a unity of experience as a whole; as Kant claims at the
beginning of the B-deduction, "a manifold's combination (conjunctio) as such can never come to
us through the senses" (p. B 129) and so "combination is an act of the understanding" (p. B 130).
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Through the application of concepts and the synthesis of cognitions through the categories, i.e.,
through the understanding, the manifold of intuition is synthesized into unitary objects and
ultimately into a coherent whole of experience concordant with the transcendental unity of
apperception. So, cognitions refer to objects in virtue of the understanding.
However, there is a threat to this straightforward argument. Intuitions, or cognitions
generally, can be synthezised by the understanding in judgments, but also by the imagination in
associations. Kant distinguishes these options in section §19 of the B-deduction, writing,
Suppose that I inquire more precisely into the reference of given cognitions in
every judgment, and that I distinguish it, as belonging to the understanding, from
the relation in terms of laws of the reproductive imagination (a relation that has
only subjective validity). I then find that a judgment is nothing but a way of
bringing given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. This is what the
little relational word is in judgments intends [to indicate], in order to distinguish
the objective unity of given presentations from the subjective one (p. B 142).
Kant specifies that it is only because a judgment is referred to the necessary unity of apperception
(i.e., the original or transcendental, as opposes to the empirical) that it is valid objectively. In
contrast, the imagination combines presentations according to laws of association, which are
empirical, and so have only subjective validity. What is given empirically will, as a matter of fact,
be combined in a variety of different ways: "One person will link the presentation of a certain
word with one thing, another with some other thing" (p. B 140). Whatever laws of association an
individual applies in their reproductive imagination to associate two presentations is contingent, a
habit they have developed empirically through repeatedly finding one presentation linked with
another. Thus, this empirical unity is a subjective unity which is only "a determination of inner
sense," and "through association of presentations, itself concerns an appearance and is entirely
contingent" (pp. B 139-40). So, it is only through the understanding, and the necessity it provides
through rules, that we can present an object, i.e., that our experiences can have objective purport.
This, according to Kant, is the significance of the copula in judgments: in judgment we can say,
"Bodies are heavy," but all we can say according to the imagination is, "When I support a body,
then I feel a pressure of heaviness" (p. B 142). In other words, the reproductive imagination is
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capable only of a subjective validity because it can only combine presentations in perception of
the "subject's state" (p. B 142): when I support the body I have the sensation – a perception of my
subjective state – of heaviness.
What judgment, and the categories generally, establish is not that our presentations are
correct, but that they have objective purport at all. Kant writes that,
The reference to [the necessary unity of apperception] is there even if the
judgment itself is empirical and hence contingent – e.g., Bodies are heavy. By
this I do not mean that these presentations belong necessarily to one another in
an empirical intuition. Rather, I mean that they belong to one another by virtue of
the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis of intuitions (p. B 142).
In particular, empirical judgments – made by particular, empirical subjects – presentations do not
come together in any necessary way, and so such judgments are open to being incorrect.
However, in particular, empirical judgments, presentations do belong to one another according to
necessary laws (ultimately, the unity of apperception), and so have objective purport.
In other words, I agree with the line of interpretation given by Longuenesse, who
distinguishes between two senses of objectivity at play in Kant’s discussion of the objective unity
of apperception: a first, according to which a unity of apperception “conforms to an object” (i.e.,
forms a true representation) and a second, according to which a unity of apperception relates our
representations to an object (i.e., forms a representation that tends to truth, or has truth value,
though it may be true or false) (Longuenesse, 1998, p. 82). If I think I am seeing a rock jutting up
from the sand on the beach, but it turns out to be driftwood, my cognition was objective in the
second sense (insofar as it was referred to the object), but not in the first (insofar as it did not
present the object correctly). According to Longuenesse, it is this second sense of objectivity that
the categories allow for. This seems right to me – Kant is aiming to explain how we can make
empirical judgments, statements with objective purport, in the first place. He effectively says as
much in writing that he does not mean that presentations belong necessarily to each other in
empirical intuition and that empirical judgments are contingent.
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In this sense, the categories and the synthetic principles are justified insofar as they are
conditions for the objects of experience: without them, experience would (per impossibile) not
have objective purport and nothing like empirical truth would be thinkable. Kant’s second
analogy provides a good example of this line of thinking.
In the Second Analogy, Kant argues for the “principle of temporal succession according
to the law of causality,” namely that “All changes occur according to the law of the connection of
cause and effect” (p. B 232). It is a feature of experience that it delivers to us objective time
orders. When – to use Kant’s example – I see a boat floating down river, I take it that the boat
itself has over time moved from one position to the next; that this succession is not merely a
contingent, and so subjective, feature of my apprehension of the boat. Further, in experience we
distinguish between objective temporal succession (succession that is in the object, like the boat
floating downstream) and subjective temporal successions (succession that is only “in me,” for
example, my perspectival apprehension of a table as I walk around it). In the second analogy,
Kant asks how it is possible that we experience objective time orders. For what we are given
through intuition is a temporal manifold, which can be organized in a variety of manners. Under
what conditions can an organization be called objective, or rather, under what conditions can we
make claims as to the objectivity of temporal orders? 90
According to Kant, the imagination does not suffice to provide objective time order.
Because the imagination organizes the manifold of intuition according to laws of association, the
organization it produces is contingent (pp. B 223-4). The imagination could just as well present
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To be clear, when I talk about an objective temporal succession, I am talking about objectivity in the
second sense proposed by Longuenesse: objective purport. In the Second Analogy, Kant is not attempting
to establish how we can guarantee the certainty of our judgments about time orders, but how we can make
judgments about time order with objective purport at all. Guyer and others, it seems to me, get this
backwards (Guyer, 1987). For a good discussion of the relative strengths and weaknesses of Guyer’s and
Longuenesse’s positions see Osborne (2006). And for a defense of the line of interpretation I think is
shared by myself and Longuenesse, see Allison (2004, pp. 256-60). The decisive consideration pointed to
by Allison, I think rightly, is that interpretations like Guyer’s, which take Kant to establishing how we can
make correct judgments, in effect elevate empirical laws into necessary conditions of experience, a
consequence which does not sit well with Kant’s project (2004, p. 257).
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the boat floating upstream, or jumping back and forth, for that matter. Consequently, the
imagination cannot distinguish between succession that is in the object and succession that is only
in the subject. At the transcendental level, imagination does not suffice to provide our experiences
with objective purport.
Since neither intuition nor imagination can provide for this objective purport, the
understanding must. It does this by providing the rules for the organization of the temporal
manifold, namely, that all changes occur according to the law of cause and effect. If a succession
is governed by a causal law, then the succession has a necessary sequence. Because the boat is
caused to float downstream by the force of the river, the temporal sequence must portray the boat
as being further upstream in a prior moment and further downstream at a later one. At the
transcendental level, the fact that any experience of change will be governed by causality is what
allows our experience to be of objects, i.e., to have objective purport. As we saw Kant put it
above, the condition of empirical truth is correspondence to a rule:
Appearance, as contrasted with the presentations of apprehension, can be
presented as an object distinct from them only if it is subject to a rule that
distinguishes it from any other apprehension and makes necessary one kind of
combination of the manifold. That in the appearance which contains the
condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object (p. B 236).
In this section, we’ve seen that for Kant it is judgment and its structures that allow for the
objects of experience. Part of what enables this conclusion to come into focus is the fact that Kant
approaches experience with the dichotomy of justification and explanation. For example, in the
Second Analogy, Kant claims that through imagination I can be “conscious only that my
imagination places one state before and the other after, but not that the one state precedes the
other in the object” (p. B 233). In other words, imagination and its laws of association only
explain how I apprehend a succession in a given order; they do not justify this apprehension. In
this light, Kant’s claim is that as long as we are dealing with explanations and not justifications
we cannot, at the transcendental level, distinguish between objectivity and subjectivity at all. It is
only by invoking the understanding, and its standard of justification, that something like an object
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of experience (an appearance in itself) becomes possible. As Kant puts it, “… the mere
succession in my apprehension, if it is not determined by a rule by reference to something
preceding it, justifies no succession in the object” (pp. B 240, my emphasis). 91 Kant’s point, on
my interpretation, is that the objective purport of experience is only possible due to laws that
entitle (or justify) us to distinguish between objective and subjective successions. If, absent such
entitlement, one still took one’s apprehension to refer to an object, one would be dreaming:
… If I posited what precedes and the event did not succeed it necessarily, then I
would have to regard this event as only a subjective play of my imaginings; and
if I still presented by it something objective, then I would have to call it a mere
dream (p. B 247).
For Kant, claims to objectivity are either to be explained (as in the case of a dream in which there
is no normativity and so the only question to consider is how the dream arose as it did) or
justified (as occurs in waking experience, in which normativity is determined by the necessity of
rules and so the reference to objects is guaranteed by the necessity of causality).
3. Kant and Merleau-Ponty on Perceptual Experience
There seems to be an obvious sense in which Kant’s thinking and Merleau-Ponty’s
disagree. For Kant is posing conditions for the possibility of experience, but throughout the
Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty argues that the sort of conditions posed by Kant
misconstrue experience: these conditions “intellectualize” perception, are not conditions for
perception as it is lived, and are only a reflective reconstruction of perception. Indeed, MerleauPonty criticizes Kant for intellectualizing perception. 92 In this section, I’ll explain and defend the
good grounds Merleau-Ponty has to deny that the conditions Kant attributes to experience are in
fact conditions for perception. However, I do not think that this denial puts Merleau-Ponty’s
project in conflict with Kant’s. Instead, I will argue that Merleau-Ponty and Kant are describing
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See also “… The objective succession will consist in the order of the manifold of appearance whereby
the apprehension of the one item (viz., what occurs) succeeds the apprehension of the other (viz., what
precedes) according to a rule. This alone can entitle me to say of the appearance itself, and not merely of
my apprehension, that a succession is to be found in it …” (p. B 238).
92
See Merleau-Ponty 2012 (pp. lxxvii, 107, 131, 228, 315).
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two different levels of experience and so their projects are compatible, even complementary.
Whereas Merleau-Ponty is interested in describing pre-reflective experience – what he calls
perception – Kant is interested in describing empirical judgment. I take it that this description of
Merleau-Ponty's project is non-controversial. My description of Kant's project, though, bears
some comment, for many commentators take Merleau-Ponty and Kant to be working on the same
level. 93 For Kant, experience, in the proper sense, is a cognition of an object. But experience only
functions as a cognition (in the proper sense) if it is understood as an empirical judgment. For
example, in the following passage from the second analogy, Kant explicitly defines the
perception of an object as an empirical judgment:
… If my perception is to contain the cognition of an event, i.e., of something's
actually occurring, then it must be an empirical judgment in which we think of
the consequence as determined, i.e., as presupposing in terms of time another
appearance that it succeeds necessarily, or according to a rule (pp. B 236-7).
The reason for this, as we saw explained in the B-deduction, is that only at the level of judgment
do our perceptions have objective purport. Thus, if we are speaking of the experience of objects,
we are speaking of empirical judgments. 94 Consequently, when Kant is talking about the
conditions for the possibility of experience, he is talking about the conditions for the possibility of
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Disagreements about how much Merleau-Ponty shares with Kant make this assumption. Both those who
hold Merleau-Ponty and Kant offer competing accounts of perceptual experience – for example Melnick
(2013) and Longuenesse (1998, pp. 204, 271, 395) – and those who hold that their accounts in fact share a
great deal – for example Matherne (2016) –make this assumption. For what it’s worth, it seems to me that
even were they operating at the same level, the two would share more than is frequently admitted.
Matherne has provided a compelling account of the connection between Kant’s schematism and MerleauPonty’s account of the body schema via the work of Pierre Lachièze-Rey, a major influence on MerleauPonty’s reading of Kant. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the two accounts would ultimately be at odds,
for as I will argue, what Kant calls conditions for the possibility of experience cannot be conditions for the
possibility of perception.
94
This is something of an overstatement. Kant admittedly does still wish to distinguish judgments from
intuitions, writing for example that it is the same function which gives unity to both judgments and
intuitions (pp. B 104-5) – clearly implying that while the two rely on the same function, they are not
therefore the same. On the other hand, Kant is clear that bringing a manifold of presentations under one
apperception is the logical function of judgments, and the categories are these logical functions (p. B 143).
It is because categories are logical functions of judgments, I take it, that Kant writes in the Second Analogy
that if a perception is to be objective – i.e., a cognition and not a sensation (p. B 376) – then it must be an
empirical judgment. Kant is interested in experience as empirical cognition (cf. A 125), and this means
experience organized by the functions of judgment. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty is interested in describing a
kind of experience, namely perception, which does not in this qualify as empirical cognition.
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empirical judgment. But not only is it not immediately obvious that conditions for the possibility
of empirical judgment are conditions for the possibility of pre-reflective experience, MerleauPonty gives us good reason to think that they aren’t.
Further, the standards of empirical judgment are not those of pre-reflective experience. In
other words, corresponding to the two senses of experience employed by Merleau-Ponty and
Kant, the two have different senses of normativity. Kant understands normativity in terms of
justification, because justification is the proper standard by which to measure judgments. But
justification is not the standard on which pre-reflective experience operates. As I have argued in
this dissertation, the standard on which pre-reflective experience operates – the sort of
normativity to which it responds – is motivation. Kant does not acknowledge this sort of
normativity; he approaches experience with the dichotomy of explanation and justification. Thus,
he thinks that the imagination can only explain how we order a succession, and that if we persist
in attributing objectivity to this order, we are no more than dreaming. But in this dissertation, I
have shown how Merleau-Ponty carves out a space of grounding between explanation and
justification, between necessity and mere dreaming. This is the space of motivation. In virtue of
motivation, Merleau-Ponty can point out that experience has objective purport without relying on
the standard of justification. From this it does not follow that experience is a mere dream and the
reason for this is that experience, while not justified, is nevertheless normed, namely, in the
manner of motivation.
I'll now proceed to a more detailed discussion of these points. I'll begin by demonstrating
how the distinctions I have just laid out operate with respect to two particular examples, the
second analogy and the axioms of intuition, and then I will move to a general discussion of
objectivity and normativity in Kant and Merleau-Ponty.
First, while the second analogy does show that the principle of sufficient reason is a
necessary condition for empirical judgments about objective time order, Merleau-Ponty gives us
good reason to think that it is not a necessary condition for pre-reflective experience of objective
146

time order. That is because Merleau-Ponty gives an account of how our organization of temporal
succession is normed by a passive temporal synthesis. As a consequence of this account of time
order, Merleau-Ponty denies that we face the problem about the constitution of objective
experience that Kant solves with the principle of sufficient reason.
For Kant, the problem is to know how we think of a given time order, A - B - C - D - E,
as objective, or how it is that we can distinguish objective and subjective time orders. The manner
in which these representations come together in the imagination is contingent, and the
imagination could just as well represent the order as E - D - C - B - A. So, our apprehension of
this order has objective purport if the time sequence is thought as having a necessary order, such
that it is necessarily the case that A - B - C - D - E. Importantly, this problem arises only if we
think of the moments, A, B, C, D, E, as independent of each other, i.e., as possessing a content or
meaning which is in not determined by the other members of the sequence. Because each moment
is independent of the others, they can be arranged in any order, e.g., the boat flowing upstream,
downstream, or jumping back and forth.
Merleau-Ponty's response to this problem would be to point out that there are no
independent moments given in experience. Every moment is given as possessing a temporal
horizon of past and future which figures in its meaning or content. In the language I used in
chapter 1, each moment is internally related to the other moments of a sequence. In experience,
we are not given the independent moments, A, B, C, D, E; rather, the smallest unit we could find
would be b - C - d, or c - D - e, where the lower-case letters indicate the temporal horizon which
figures in the meaning of each moment. In this case, each moment is given in virtue of its relation
to the temporal whole, i.e., the sequence, and for this reason the problem that Kant means to solve
by invoking the principle of sufficient reason does not arise at the level of pre-reflective
experience. Our apprehension of the temporal whole is normed by the temporal horizon definitive
of each moment: given that the smallest unit of temporal experience has the form b - C - d, it
would be a violation of the meanings of the moments to organize the sequence: E - D - C - B - A.
147

No causal law is needed to norm this succession: the normativity arises from the meaning of the
moments themselves. This normativity does not have the force of justification, but because it is
normative it also does not count as mere explanation. Instead, the sort of normativity at play here
is motivation.
This idea needs to be illustrated. In apprehending a melody, for example, I apprehend a
sequence of notes, A - B - C - D - E. The sense of each note is apprehended in terms of the whole
melody to which it belongs. When I hear E, I hear it as the culmination of an ascending scale.
Conversely, already with A there is a readiness for further notes to follow, even though there is
very little determination of what will follow. That is, each note is given with a temporal horizon.
In virtue of this horizon, I experience the order in which I apprehended the notes as normative. If
I imagine playing the sequence backwards, E - D - C - B - A, I get the sense that this is not how
the sequence actually occurred. Thus, I find myself constrained in experience by the motive force
of the sense of the melody. Or, for example, take our apprehension of the motion of a rolling ball.
Let us say that in a series of moments, A - B - C - D - E, the ball occupies the positions 1 - 2 - 3 4 - 5, respectively. The primary content of experience here is not a set of discrete momentposition coordinates. Instead, the primary content of experience is the direction of motion (from 1
to 5). It is possible to analyze this motion into discrete moment-position coordinates, but only at
the price of abstracting from the actual content of experience, which has as its smallest unit, for
example, the ball at C-3 moving toward D-4 and coming from B-2, i.e., the moment immersed in
a temporal and kinetic horizon.
In other words, we find that in pre-reflective experience the sequence – the whole – is
prior to the moments – the parts. Consequently, our apprehension of a sequence is normed, and so
not a mere dream. However, the sort of normativity that this pre-reflective experience involves
does not meet the standard of justification: it does not provide the organization with necessity, but
only with actuality. It remains possible that the temporal horizon which constitutes the sense of
each moment is a subjective feature of the sense of that moment, for the horizonal aspect of this
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sense may be merely subjective. To respond to such skeptical worries, reflective analysis is
compelled to abstract each moment from its temporal horizon and treat each as an independent
moment in virtue solely of its non-horizonal content (e.g., the mere position of the ball abstracted
from the direction that animates the position). Once this has been done, it is the case that the
independent moments can be ordered in any fashion and merely asserting that they take the order
they did in experience would lack all justification: the passive synthesis of temporality now seems
only to explain the order in which we apprehended the sequence, not to tell us anything about the
sequence in the object. And now for there to be any normative organization of the moments there
must be a causal law governing the contents of the moments and so justifying the order of
apprehension. In this regard, we can see that pre-reflective experience is unstable and collapses
when faced with the standards of justification. But it also has its own sort of normativity –
motivation – for the possibility of which the necessity of causal laws is not a condition. The
problem that Kant solves with the synthetic principles arises only at the level of empirical
judgment, even while the seeds for this problem are present within pre-reflective experience. 95
I’ll take as a second example Kant’s axioms of intuition. Since we have not yet
encountered the axioms, I’ll say a couple words about them. This principle holds, "All intuitions
are extensive magnitudes" (p. B 202). Kant's argument for this principle runs as follows: every
intuition has the form of space and time, and any intuition in space and time contains a
homogenous manifold, so no intuition can be apprehended except through the synthesis of a
homogenous manifold. In other words, no appearance can be apprehended except as the synthesis
of a homogenous manifold of intuition. But, according to Kant, the consciousness of such a
synthesis is the concept of magnitude, and so no appearance can be apprehended unless it is
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It is important to bear in mind throughout this discussion that we are considering not how particular
empirical judgments can be reliably made, but only the transcendental conditions of particular experiences
(i.e., empirical judgments). My point here is not that the passive synthesis of the imagination suffices to
provide particular experiences of objectivity but that it suffices to provide experience with the overall form
of objectivity: no further transcendental condition is needed than this passive synthesis.
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thought through the concept of magnitude. This magnitude is extensive, because it is one in which
the parts make possible, and so precede, the whole: any intuition is an aggregate of spatial or
temporal parts.
Kant's conclusion is undeniable: there is no pointilistic intuition, every intuition has some
spatial or temporal extension. But while quantity is an appropriate category by which to approach
empirical judgment, it is not the appropriate category by which to approach perception.
I think one could respond in a Merleau-Pontian vein to Kant’s argument here as follows:
Perception in fact cannot make use of the concept of extensive magnitude in order to synthesize
an intuition. Any extensive magnitude is an aggregate of units. But there are no units in
experience prior to the synthesis of an intuition. It is not the case that perception begins with a
collection of parts and must assemble these into a coherent whole, as if perception were a jigsaw
puzzle. If perception did begin with parts, then we would run into the problem that these parts are
themselves extensive magnitudes, and so would have to be assembled out of prior parts. This
assumption obviously results in a regress, where any immediately given part is mediated by itself
being the aggregate of prior parts. Consequently, a whole must be given first, which afterwards
can be analyzed into parts. These parts can then be treated as wholes, as units, out of which the
whole can be composed. But this analysis necessarily comes after the fact: there must first be a
one, a whole, which can be analyzed into parts or itself treated as a part and assembled into a
larger whole. Thus, synthesis does not depend on extensive magnitude: instead, it makes
extensive magnitude possible.
Let us think this argument through phenomenologically. What is the incipient moment of
perception like? Merleau-Ponty analogizes this incipient moment to a nebula.
If I am waiting for someone at the door of a house on a poorly lit street, each
person who comes through the door appears momentarily under a confused form.
Someone is leaving the house, and I do not yet know if I can recognize this
person as the one I am waiting for. The well-known silhouette will be born from
this fog like the earth from its nebula (2012, p. 338).
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Of course, this example is not primordial: it describes the move from recognizing "someone" to
recognizing a particular individual. And yet it gets to the precise issue I am pursuing, namely, the
advent of determinacy. Prior to the whole, perception does not give us discrete units, but a nebula
within which a form can coalesce. The proof of this is that I do not in this case perceive precise
features of the other's face and then draw a conclusion about who it is. For the parts themselves
are not yet determinate. Rather, as the other comes into view, this nebula begins to acquire
determinacy until suddenly I recognize the one who is leaving. Once this person has been
identified, the parts are transformed, they acquire a determinate character: I know the eyes, the
hair, etc. Only in very unusual cases, e.g., in perceptual disorders, do we work from the parts to
the whole. Chuck Close, who suffers from prosopagnosia ("face blindness"), is famous for his
style of decomposing faces into parts and then assembling these parts into a single image.
Consider his description of why and how he paints portraits:
It's not so strange that I … made portraits. I was driven to make portraits. I was
trying to understand the faces and commit them to memory, of people that I
know and love. And for me it has to be flattened out. Once it's flattened out, I can
commit it to memory in a way that I can't if I'm looking at you. If you move your
head half an inch it's a whole new head I haven't seen before. But once it's flat …
I have no trouble seeing that was a face because I can see flat patterns of face. …
I'm overwhelmed by the whole. I can't make a decision. I've broken [the image]
down into small bite size incremental units. And the degree to which I can move
from incremental unit to another and build clusters that stack up to make
something is because I am profoundly interested in artificiality (Close, 2012).
Close cannot see the face as it presents itself to a subject without prosopagnosia, i.e., as a whole
in its mobility and depth. Instead, he must first flatten the image and attend to abstract features of
the face (patterns). For us, the essential point is that he does not look to the face as a whole,
because to do so would be blinding, i.e., he could not find any meaning there: the whole is
"overwhelming." Instead, he attempts to see the face through its parts. What is important for us to
see is how different the result is from how those without prosopagnosia see faces, and indeed how
Close perceives things other than faces. For the result of this style is that while from a distance
the portrait present a coherent figure, the closer one gets the more it decomposes into distinct
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pockets of materiality. Precisely because the whole is in this manner built out of the parts – rather
than being generated in the organic interaction of whole and part – it acquires the air of
artificiality. Here, even the reflection in the eye, seen from up close, is on the verge of dissolving
into mere color (see Figure 4.1)
If prior to the arrival of a one – the whole – perception does not give us a set of distinct
units, then what is it like? For the normal subject, prior to the form, perception gives only a
nebula, an indeterminate fog which coalesces into a whole with the advent of determinate unity. It
is tempting to take cases of Gestalt reversibility, like the Rabbit-Duck, as indicating that
perception delivers us a matter on which we impose a form. One reasons: if the same sensibilia
can be both a duck and a rabbit, it must in reality be neither. Perhaps we even, by refusing to
focus on the image, manage to see it as neither, but as a mere shape. And yet this would be
wholly to mistake the significance of such figures for perception. For perception, the figure is not
mere matter, indifferent to form. On the contrary, it calls alternatively for both forms. The figure
is not too poor, but too rich. Prior to the whole, the matter does not have determinate parts, and
there is nothing in it resembling a one, a unit. It is instead a chaos, but a chaos straining toward
form, i.e., a nebula. This nebula is intrinsically oriented toward form, which is why with the
arrival of unity, this nebula vanishes like a phantasm at dawn.
Extensive magnitude is, then, not a condition for the possibility of the experience of a
unity, because the whole must precede its parts and is what makes its parts be parts (determinate
unities) in the first place. What is true is that extensive magnitude must be able to accompany all
our experience of unities, because it is true that every perception arises out of the nebulous
generativity of sense and in this way there is no simple (rather than complex) perception. For this
reason, every form can always be decomposed into parts from which it can be recomposed. But in
this case we must say that extensive magnitude is licensed by perception and not its condition. On
the other hand, none of this means that extensive magnitude is not a condition for empirical
judgment about intuitively given manifolds. It is plausible that empirical judgment requires us to
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attend to the parts as fully constituted, i.e., discrete and limited, parts out of which the whole can
be aggregated.
We can now raise this analysis to a more general level. Kant's general question is how is
it that there is for us an object in experience. Kant's answer is that there is an object for us only
insofar as our presentations are rule-governed. But this is actually a condition for there being an
object of empirical judgment, not an object of pre-reflective experience. 96 The reason for this,
again, is that the problem Kant solves with rule-governedness in fact only arises once one has
accepted the terms of reflective analysis. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no problem about how our
presentations have objective purport, for our presentations are primarily of objects. Only
subsequent to experience is it possible to abstract our subjective, perspectival apprehensions of
objects from the experience of the object itself. These subjective apprehensions are not that out of
which experience must be built; they are the result of reflection on experience.
According to Merleau-Ponty, our experience is primarily of the world (of things) because
our perception is guided by our body schema, i.e., the passive coordination of the body's general
possibilities for perception and action in virtue of which particular situations are taken up. Our
uptake of the world is always mediated through this body-schema. For example, Merleau-Ponty
considers the case of a patient whose occulomotor nerves have been paralyzed (2012, p. 48).
When this patient has the intention of moving his eyes left, he sees the landscape in front of him
move left. One might think that perception reasons that since the eye is (assumed to be) moving
left, and the retinal image of the landscape has been left unchanged, the landscape itself must
have moved left with the (assumed) movement of the eye. And yet there is no problem here of
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It is reasonable to have qualms about my application of the term “object” to Merleau-Ponty’s description
of perception, given that Merleau-Ponty calls experience “pre-objective,” e.g., (2012, p. 81). The structures
of objectivity, properly speaking, pertain to the subjects of empirical judgments, i.e., that of which
predications are made. These are not the same structures as those of the pre-objective things disclosed in
perception. I continue to use the term “object” when discussing Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy for the sake of
facilitating a discussion between Merleau-Ponty and Kant. Nevertheless, “object” ought to be understood in
a qualified sense in this context.

153

building the perception of motion out of our perspectival apprehension of the object (the retinal
image). For the patient has no presentation of the retinal image. Instead, he immediately sees the
landscape move left – this is the only presentation available to him. This is because he is from the
beginning installed in the world by his body schema, in this case, the passive awareness of his eye
movement which in this case has malfunctioned. The case of this patient makes clear what we
ordinarily do not notice: that perception is always already (immediately) mediated by the body
schema, such that we are immediately at the object and not our perspectival apprehension of it.
There is no problem in perception of getting from perspectival presentations of an object to a
presentation of the object itself. Instead, we begin with the presentation of the object, and
afterwards can analyze out perspectival apprehensions. It is, in a sense, a surprise to me that of
the table I am now seeing I in fact perceive only the thin veneer of a particular surface. To think
this thought I must decompose my primary engagement with the table into the mere sensory
contour of the table that I receive with my eye. The difficulty of learning to draw is not only the
difficulty of learning to use one's hand with skill, but also of learning to see from a determinate
perspective. A circular object, for example, a plate, must be drawn as an oval, which is to say as a
condensation of the perspectival apprehension of depth into two dimensions. This phenomenon,
that in perception we are immediately at the object, is what Merleau-Ponty calls perceptual faith:
the fundamental conviction that in perception we have to do with the phenomenon itself and not
mere appearance. But, according to Merleau-Ponty, because this conviction is only a faith, i.e.,
because it is unjustified, it is inherently open to skepticism. It is part of the very movement of
perceptual faith that it gives way to the standards of judgment.
It would be a mistake to think that these phenomena disagree with Kant's insights. For
Kant, I have argued, is not trying to show how the presentation of an object can be built out of
perspectival presentations of an object, which Merleau-Ponty has shown is not a problem in prereflective experience. Instead, Kant is trying to show how the experience of an object can be
justified, or rather, how there can be empirical judgment of objects at all. Doing this requires one
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to demonstrate, per impossibile, that one's presentations could not justifiedly be thought as more
than subjective if they did not admit of being organized according to certain rules. But, this whole
question is not the same as the question as to how there is pre-reflective experience of objects,
which experience is normed not by justification but by motivation. However, reflection always
runs the risk of forgetting the fact that by approaching experience with the standard of
justification it transforms pre-reflective experience into empirical judgment. If it forgets this and
claims to provide the basis of pre-reflective experience then it will misconstrue the lived character
of perception; by holding perception to the standards of the intellect, it will make the parts prior
to the whole, the moment prior to the sequence, the perspective prior to the thing. It is against this
risk that Merleau-Ponty suggests a method of hyper-reflection, according to which reflection
would reflect upon itself and its own conditions, i.e., would become genetic (1968, p. 38).
Merleau-Ponty always distinguishes human perception from the sort of uptake of the
world of which animals are capable. Whereas animals project a milieu around themselves, human
perception engages a world. In other words, perception gives the world and things as
transcendent, as beyond any immanent apprehension. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
A thing is not actually given in perception, it is inwardly taken up by us,
reconstituted and lived by us insofar as it is linked to a world whose fundamental
structures we carry within ourselves and of which this thing is just one of several
possible concretions. Although lived by us, the thing is no less transcendent to
our life, because the human body, along with its habits that outline a human
environment around itself, is crossed by a movement toward the world itself.
Animal behavior aims at an animal milieu (Umwelt) and at centers of resistance
(Widerstand). … Human behavior opens onto a world (Welt) and to an object
(Gegenstand) beyond the tools that it constructs, it can even treat one’s own body
as an object. Human life is defined by this power that it has of denying itself in
objective thought, and it draws this power from its primordial attachment to the
world itself. Human life ‘understands’ not only some definite milieu, but rather
an infinity of possible milieus, and it understands itself because it is thrown into a
natural world (2012, p. 341).
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What is distinctive of human perception is that it opens onto a transcendent world: there are
things for us and not only centers of attractions and resistance. 97 Merleau-Ponty often invokes the
example that for most primates, a box has either the significance of being a chair for sitting or a
step for reaching, but never both. 98 If the primate sees the box used for standing, even if it has
used it for sitting in the past, it will no longer view it as a tool for sitting. Thus, the box has only a
functional significance, and is not for the animal anything beneath this meaning that could
coordinate multiple functional meanings, as it does for human perception, which “understands”
the box. Note that Merleau-Ponty’s claim is not that human perception is unique by the fact that it
is taken up by the intellect (as McDowell, it seems to me, claims), but that human perception is
intrinsically unique, insofar as it opens onto a world, which is why it does open onto the
intellect. 99 For it is the fact that human perception is geared toward the world that gives rise to the
intellect, as that which, beyond perception, can contact the world in its depth. It is this orientation
toward determinacy that Merleau-Ponty calls perception’s “silent thesis”:
Science and philosophy have for centuries been carried along by the originary
faith of perception. Perception opens onto things. This means that perception is
oriented – as if toward its own end – toward a truth in itself in which the reason
for all appearances is found. Perception’s silent thesis is that experience, at each
moment, can be coordinated with the experience of the preceding moment and
with that of the following one, that my perspective can be coordinated with the
perspectives of other consciousnesses – that all contradictions can be removed,
that monadic and intersubjective experience is a single continuous text – and that
what is indeterminate for me at this moment could become determinate for a
more complete knowledge, which is seemingly realized in advance in the thing,
or rather, which is the thing itself (2012, p. 54).
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As Heidegger puts it, animal behavior is absorbed by its environment. It is “given over to” things in its
environment, but does not apprehend those things as such: “The captivation of the animal therefore
signifies, in the first place, essentially having every apprehending of something as something withheld from
it” (Heidegger, 1995, p. 247).
98
See, e.g., Merleau-Ponty 1973 (p. 104).
99
For McDowell, human perception is unique in virtue of the fact that it employs conceptual capacities (of
the sort that can be used in judgments). When McDowell, following Gadamer, distinguishes between a
world and an environment, he does so in terms of the animal’s inability to “weigh reasons and decide what
to do” and think (McDowell, 1996, p. 115). McDowell’s discussion of rationality and animality is
fascinating and perspicacious, but on my principles, it misunderstands what is unique about human
perception by understanding this uniqueness in terms of reason rather than in terms of perception itself.
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It is definitive of human perception that it has the intellect, and the whole critical infrastructure
that involves, on its horizon. In a sense, it is true that if perception did not have the categories and
the synthetic principles as a possibility that it opens onto, it would be no more than a dream,
because then it would not be itself, i.e., geared toward the world. What this means is not that the
intellect is a condition for perception, but that it must be able to accompany perception. As
Merleau-Ponty writes,
We must say not that [the condition of possibility of experience] precedes
experience (even in the transcendental sense) but that it must be able to
accompany it, that is, that it translates or expresses its essential character but does
not indicate a prior possibility whence it would have issued (Merleau-Ponty,
1968, p. 45).
4. Reflective Method
In this final section, I will argue that Kant depends on the motivating power of perception
in a manner that he does not realize, and that this fact challenges the a priori status of the
categories and the synthetic principles, at least on a certain understanding of what it means to be a
priori. The considerations that lead me to this conclusion have to do with an understanding of
Kant’s method, i.e., with the general form of transcendental argumentation. I will argue that this
form requires that any a priori knowledge derived by transcendental argumentation be ultimately
grounded in the motivating power of perception.
To make this argument, I first need to be clear about my understanding of the general
form of Kant’s transcendental argumentation. Karl Ameriks distinguished between two ways of
interpreting Kant’s transcendental deductions, one as progressive and the other as regressive
(1978). Both interpretations agree that the basic step distinguishing a transcendental argument is
the conditional connection between a proposed body of knowledge and a transcendental condition
for this body of knowledge. But on a progressive interpretation (proposed by, e.g., Strawson)
Kant’s purpose in drawing this conditional connection is to refute skeptical objections to the
proposed body of knowledge, i.e., secure the proposed body of knowledge. In contrast, on a
regressive interpretation (defended by Ameriks), Kant assumes the proposed body of knowledge
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as given, and on these grounds concludes that the transcendental condition for this knowledge is
objectively valid. In the context of the Second Analogy, a progressive interpretation would hold
that Kant is attempting to secure our knowledge of objective time order from skeptical worries. In
contrast, a regressive interpretation would hold that Kant is assuming that we do have knowledge
of objective time order, and is demonstrating the validity of causality as a condition for the
possibility of that knowledge. 100
I take it that Kant’s transcendental argumentation is regressive. This is because the
purpose of Kant’s transcendental arguments is to establish the objectivity validity of
transcendental conditions, and to do so he must presuppose the experience the conditions of
which he is deducing. If instead he were attempting to secure our experience from the skeptic, his
argument would not demonstrate the objective validity of transcendental conditions but
presuppose it.
Consequently, I understand the general form of Kant’s transcendental argumentation as
follows: Kant deduces the objective validity of a priori knowledge as knowledge of structures
which are condition for the possibility of experience. This form of argumentation can be
explicated as follows:
a)

If experience takes the form X, then the objects of experience must be

characterized by the general form Y.
b)

Experience takes the form X.

c)

Therefore, the objects of experience must be characterized by the general form Y.

Here X names a generally agreed to feature of our experience, and Y names a piece of a
priori knowledge. The minor premise describes our experience, while the major premise is the
transcendental move; the turn from experience to the conditions for its possibility. For example,
Kant’s argument in the Second Analogy boils down to the claims that we do experience an
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See also Watkins 2004 (pp. 206-7).
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objective time order, and that only if the objects of experience are governed by causal necessity is
it possible that we experience an objective time order. To reach the conclusion that the objects of
experience are governed by causal necessity, then, Kant must hold that we do in fact experience
an objective time order. So, the transcendental condition is justified in the conclusion only insofar
as the minor premise holds. But the minor premise cannot be justified in this same fashion,
precisely because it is the condition upon which the conclusion is justified. Instead, it must be
presupposed. 101
This poses a problem for Kant’s account. For if the minor premise is presupposed, it
cannot be justified a priori. Synthetic a priori judgments are justified as conditions for the
possibility of experience. But the synthetic judgments that figure in the minor premise of a
transcendental argument (such as “Experience takes the form X,” for example, “Experience is
disclosive of an objective time order”) are not conditions for the possibility of experience: they
are descriptions of experience. 102 Therefore, they do not count as synthetic a priori knowledge.
And if these do not count as synthetic a priori knowledge, then the conclusions derived from
these will not be justified purely a priori, but only a priori given certain features of experience.
What can be known a priori by transcendental argument is only that the categories and the
synthetic principles are objectively valid; as conditions for the possibility of experience, any
object given in experience would have to have the look prescribed to it by the categories. But this
does not settle whether any objects can in fact be given to a being whose experience is governed
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One might object to this line of thinking by claiming that Kant only presupposes the unity of
apperception, which is justified analytically. The analytic unity of apperception requires an a priori
synthesis of all presentations, i.e., the synthetic unity of apperception. This, in turn, requires laws of
synthesis. So, these laws are justified analytically and not on the basis of any presuppositions about the
character of experience. The problem with this response is that there is no way of getting from the synthetic
unity of apperception to the laws of experience without knowing something about the character of
experience. For example, the synthetic unity of apperception does not by itself entail causal order – it does
so only if additionally one presupposes that experience has objective time order. Consequently, this
response does not avoid the problem.
102
The minor premise of a transcendental argument is a judgment, because it predicates of experience a
certain characteristic, e.g., objective time order. But they are not analytic, for nothing of the concept of
experience as such entails time order (a being possessing intellectual intuition would have experience not
characterized by time order).
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by the categories, a matter which can only be settled by experience itself. To move from objective
validity to cognition of objects, then, one must supply an additional premise that can only be
provided by experience. Perhaps Kant, ultimately, is only interested in demonstrating the
objective validity of synthetic a priori judgments (i.e., that if there are objects, then they would
have to have the form … ). If this were so, then it would not conflict with the thesis I have been
defending, namely, that there is no a priori justification that is not founded on experience. But it
seems that the intent of the first critique moves in another direction, namely, determining what
exactly is it that can be known a priori.
Might we think that the features of experience are known a priori but not in a manner
that is justified by a transcendental argument? It seems to me that this would cut against the core
principles of the first critique, for it would amount to a sort dogmatism, i.e., “The pretension that
we can make progress by means of no more than a pure cognition from concepts … without
inquiring into the manner and the right by which reason has arrived at them” (p. B xxxv). In other
words, such a response would not be fully critical.
To be clear, I am not making a skeptical objection. I assume we do know the features of
experience that Kant presupposes in his transcendental arguments. My point is only that these
features are not justified by Kant’s own principles, and that if this is so, then the whole
transcendental infrastructure will ultimately rely on something other than justification. The wrong
conclusion would be to think that therefore Kant’s conclusions are merely to be explained by
facts about our subjectivity, i.e., the skeptical conclusion. Instead, the features of experience that
Kant presupposes are motivated. They are known a priori, but in the sense of a priori knowledge
I described in chapter 3, i.e., not known independently of experience, but founded on experience
because motivated in the course of experience. 103
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This would include a kind of a priori not found in Kant: what Husserl calls the material a priori. See
Gallagher (1972) for an explanation of the difference between Kant and Husserl here.
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Reflective thinking relies on the experience that it explains. The priority at the
transcendental level of the condition to the conditioned is reversed phenomenologically and
epistemologically: here the conditioned, experience, is itself the condition, the epistemic starting
point. This does not contradict Kant’s project; it only reframes this project by placing it within a
genetic context that occurs beneath the level of description with which Kant is primarily
concerned. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, “The whole reflective analysis is not false, but naïve, as
long as it dissimulates from itself its own mainspring” (1968, p. 34). 104 In contrast, it is into this
main-spring – into its own ground – of reflective method that Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
inquires, and it is here that an account of motivation is required.
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This line of thinking both partially converges with that of Fink (2005) – insofar as both are concerned
with the origin or the world-form – but also moves in another direction. My critique has been
epistemological, whereas Fink’s is transcendental, holding that critical philosophy is mundane to the extent
with the connection between worldly beings and the world-form, whereas phenomenology is concerned
with the origin of the world.
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Figure 4.1. “James” with Close-up. Reprinted from artyfactory.com, 2004, Retrieved August 9,
2017 from https://www.artyfactory.com/art_appreciation/portraits/chuck_close.html. Reprinted
with permission.
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CHAPTER 5. SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS
Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason, provides a critique of metaphysics. By
metaphysics, Kant means cognition wholly independent of experience: "Metaphysics is a
speculative cognition by reason that is wholly isolated and rises entirely above being instructed
by experience. It is cognition through mere concepts … so that here reason is to be its own pupil"
(p. B xiv). As I explained in chapter 4, Kant develops a kind of a priori justification in the first
critique: transcendental justification, i.e., justification of synthetic a priori knowledge as a
condition for the possibility of experience. Metaphysics, in contrast, aims to provide a priori
justification through mere reason, and whereas the concepts produced by the understanding are
constitutive of the objects of experience, the concepts produced by reason are not. Because
metaphysics aims at cognition through mere reason, the sorts of judgments made by metaphysics
cannot be described as conditions for the possibility of experience. Consequently, according to
Kant, such judgments cannot be adequately justified, and so are purely speculative. In the
"Transcendental Dialectic," Kant explores the dialectical (that is, sophistical or illusory)
conclusions reached by reason independently of experience, demonstrating that these conclusions
rest on a common error, namely, that "the subjective necessity of a certain connection of our
concepts for the benefit of understanding is regarded as an objective necessity of the
determination of things in themselves" (p. B 353).
In chapter 4, I showed that Kant’s critical project is compatible with Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenological one, insofar as these two conduct their investigations on different levels: the
first on the level of empirical judgment with the standard of justification and the second on the
level of perception with the standard of motivation. In the present chapter, I will consider the
consequences of this line of thinking for Kant’s critique of metaphysics. While I think Kant is
right that the conclusions reached by dialectical reason are not justified by experience, these
conclusions may yet be motivated by it. Motivation, in other words, opens the door to something
like metaphysical thinking. This kind of metaphysical thinking – grounded on the motivating
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power of experience – could never suffice as a response to the skeptic. The skeptic approaches
our beliefs with the standard of justification, and motivated thinking does not meet this standard.
And yet, as I have argued, motivated thinking is the source of our epistemically fundamental
beliefs. All reasoning comes back to motivated belief; all justification is at some point grounded
on motivation. The skeptic merely turns the consequent against the ground, and not without
reason, for this is in a sense the philosophical project: the deliverance of belief onto the firm
ground of reason. The skeptic’s project is legitimate, and so a response must be made to the
skeptic. This is what Kant does in attempting to justify certain types of knowledge a priori.
However, it would be wrong to think that all beliefs that are not justified are therefore
unconstrained by experience; I have argued that motivated beliefs are unjustified but are solicited
by experience. It would be improper, then, to call this kind of metaphysical thinking “illusory” –
it is normed by experience. In other words, there is a kind of thinking that, through describing
experience, attempts to clarify the motivational lines running between experience and belief, and
in this manner to make clear and distinct the evidence of experience. This kind of thinking is
phenomenological. On this description, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and critical philosophy
do not conflict, they merely operate at different levels: phenomenology approaches belief with the
standard of motivation and critical philosophy approaches it with the standard of justification. Yet
neither are they properly independent of each other. The experience which phenomenology
describes tends of itself to pursue a more thorough grounding, i.e., justification. Conversely,
critical philosophy relies on the experience which phenomenology describes.
Bearing out this line of thinking to completion would require a dissertation of its own.
My aim in the present chapter is to demonstrate how such a project would look by considering
how it can be applied to a particular metaphysical question: that explored by Kant in the Third
Paralogism, namely, the identity of the self. In this chapter, I will argue that experience motivates
our belief in the identity of the self. But, as Kant points out, experience does not justify this
belief, and so a different line of thinking is required at the level of justification. I will describe
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how Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach to self-identity is compatible with Kant’s
critical approach, given that the two evaluate this belief with different standards. However, I will
also argue that Kant’s approach tacitly draws on the phenomenological description of selfperception. I take this to be not a shortfall of Kant’s project, just a demonstration that his project
implies the phenomenological project.
1. The Paralogisms
Kant’s claim in the Paralogisms is that rational psychology – the attempt to establish
knowledge about the self through reason alone – makes each of its major inferences on the basis
of a common error, namely, by conflating different manners in which we speak of a subject. The
general form these inferences take is as follows:
i. What must be thought as X is X
ii. A thinking being as such must be thought as X
iii. Therefore, a thinking being as such is X
According to Kant, the major premise refers to a being that can be thought in general, i.e.,
both thought and intuited, but the minor premise refers to a being that can be thought but not
intuited. In other words, the major premise refers to being as it is in itself, as it would be known
by an intellectual intuition. But, our intuition is not intellectual but sensible (i.e., it has space and
time as forms), and so does not deliver beings as they are in themselves but only as they are for
us. Consequently, we can have no knowledge of such a being. In the context of the Paralogisms,
this means that we can have no knowledge of the self such as it is in itself. Any experience of
myself necessarily occurs under the condition of time, the form of inner sense, and hence the “I”
is experienced not as it is in itself, but as it appears in time. In the Transcendental Aesthetic, Kant
writes,
Whatever is presented through a sense is … always appearance. Hence either we
must not grant that there is an inner sense at all, or we must grant that the subject
who is the object of this sense can be presented through it only as appearance,
and not as he would judge himself if his intuition were self-activity only … (p. B
68).
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In contrast, the minor premise refers to the self, a thinking being, insofar as we are
transcendentally constrained to think it. However, no intuition can be given that fulfills this
thinking. In other words, the major premise refers to the self as it is in itself, whereas the minor
premise refers to the self of transcendental apperception to which no content can be given by
empirical apperception. For this reason, no conclusion can be drawn from these two premises.
At the core of each Paralogism, then, is the distinction between transcendental and
empirical apperception. To understand the Paralogisms, we’ll have to understand this distinction.
Empirical apperception names our experience of ourselves, the self we are given or of
which we have intuition. The sort of intuition we have of ourselves is basically an awareness of
the flux of consciousness, i.e., that I am thinking now X, now Y, now Z, etc.. These thoughts are
an intuition of self because they are determinations of my mind, i.e., each thought is predicated of
me: “I am thinking X”. Thus, Kant equates empirical apperception with “inner perception,” i.e.,
“consciousness of oneself in terms of the determinations of one’s state” (p. A 107). Such
determinations include any manner of presentations, both subjective (such as feelings or
sensations) and objective (such as experiences and cognitions). 105 I can attend to all such
presentations as determinations of my state in virtue of my ability to perceive my own state. If I
perceive that a storm is beginning, I can attend not only to the storm, but to the thrill it causes just
under my skin, or to the perception itself of the storm, as a determination of my consciousness:
that at such a moment I am having such a presentation and not some other one.
According to Kant, such empirical apperception is incapable of delivering anything
constant. Our inner perception delivers instead a constant flux of determinations: a stream of
presentations in which nothing holds. But this means that empirical apperception is incapable of
demonstrating the subject’s identity. For, following Hume, if this flux of presentations were to
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“All presentations, whether or not they have outer things as their objects, do yet in themselves, as
determinations of the mind, belong to our inner state” (p. B 50).
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justify us in thinking that the subject is identical throughout this flux, then there would have to be
some constant presentation. Just as I cognize the identity of an external object by noting the
identity of some presentation in it throughout a given time frame, so to cognize the identity of the
self I would have to be given some identical presentation throughout the entire time frame that I
attribute to myself. No such presentation is to be found. Consequently, Kant writes that empirical
apperception “can give us no constant or enduring self in this flow of inner appearances” (p. A
107) and again that it is “intrinsically sporadic and without any reference to the subject’s identity”
(p. B 133).
In contrast, transcendental apperception presents the I not as it is given, but as we are
transcendentally constrained to think of ourselves. We are, according to Kant, transcendentally
constrained to think of the I as a unity for two distinct reasons. The first reason is that
transcendental apperception is a condition for the possibility of experience. As we saw in chapter
4, I can only be justified in thinking that there is something like an object of experience in general
if my presentations are bound by a necessary synthesis. And since we do experience objects, the
manifold presentations given by the intuition must be bound by a necessary synthesis. Our sortal
concepts (e.g., “triangle”) and the categories more generally provide particular rules for synthesis.
But these rules can only be justifiedly applied to the manifold if we have some ground for
thinking that all our presentations belong together. The transcendental unity of apperception – the
thought of the necessary unity of all my presentations – is this ground. As a condition for the
experience of objects (necessary unities), an experience which we do in fact have, this necessary
unity of apperception is transcendentally justified. 106

106

This argument, while ultimately common to both deductions, is made slightly differently in each. In the
A Deduction, Kant argues that concepts define a necessary synthesis of a manifold, and since any necessity
must have a transcendental basis, there must be some transcendental basis for this necessary synthesis. This
basis is transcendental apperception (pp. A 106-7). Similarly, Kant opens the B-Deduction by arguing that
experience depends on combination or synthesis of the manifold of intuition, that combination is the
presentation of synthetic unity of the manifold – such that the presentation of unity is not produced through
combination but is that which allows combination – and hence that the presentation of synthetic unity is a
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Kant also adduces a second, distinct sort of justification for the transcendental unity of
apperception. While in the first place this unity is justified as a condition for the possibility of
experience, in the second it is justified analytically, by analyzing the very concept of “my
presentation.” 107 In §16 of the B-deduction, Kant argues that the I think must be capable of
accompanying all my presentations (on threat of contradiction), and since my presentations are
manifold, everything manifold in a presentation must have reference to the same subject (the
same “I think”). The unity of apperception is thus derived analytically.
Transcendental apperception, while constraining our thinking, does not give an I, that is,
it offers no intuition of the self. Kant writes of transcendental apperception that “this presentation
is a thought, not an intuition” (p. B 157). As we saw above, it is this lack of intuitive fulfillment
that makes the Paralogisms possible. Transcendentally, the I must be thought as substance
(insofar as the “I” does not attach to thought as a predicate), as simple (a complex thought cannot
be distributed through multiple subjects, and hence the subject of a complex thought must be
simple), as identical through time (because variation occurs in time, and time is the form of inner
sense, and hence is referred to the identical subject), and as distinct from things outside it. But in
the Paralogisms this necessary form of thinking the subject – what Kant calls the “logical” subject
– is confused with a “real” subject, i.e., a subject that is or could be really given (p. A 350). The
rational psychologist mistakenly takes this necessary presentation of the self for a genuine
cognition of an object.
A. Apperception and Identity
According to Kant, empirical apperception is insufficient to ground cognition of the I’s
identity. As we saw, he claims that empirical consciousness is “intrinsically sporadic” or

condition for experience (p. B 131). Transcendental apperception provides this presentation of unity, and
hence is a condition for experience.
107
Note: It is unclear exactly what concept is analyzed to derive the unity of apperception. Allison thinks it
is the concept of discursive thinking (2004, p. 166). I follow Longuenesse, who claims it is the concept of
“my presentation” (1998, pp. 67, note 13). But what is important, for my purposes, is not so much what
concept is here analyzed, but that the unity of apperception is arrived at analytically.
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dispersed [zerstreuet] and “without reference to the subject’s identity” (p. B 133) and that inner
perception “can give us no constant or enduring self” in the flow of inner appearance (p. A 107),
i.e., in the shifting determinations of our state. Since Kant’s meaning behind these claims is not
immediately obvious, let me be clear about how I interpret them.
Kant equates empirical apperception with inner perception, i.e., “consciousness of oneself
in terms of the determinations of one’s state” (p. A 107). But the determinations of one’s state are
mutable. As Kant puts it in the third Paralogism, “We do not encounter in the soul any permanent
appearance …” (p. A 364). 108 Kant, I take it, is referring to the arguments made by Hume in his
Treatise of Human Nature. 109 There, Hume argued that no impression gives rise to the idea of
personal identity, and so personal identity is a fictitious idea. According to Hume, if any
impression were to give rise to the idea of self, it would have to “continue invariably the same
through the whole course of our lives,” but we have no such “constant and invariable” impression
(Hume, 2009, p. 526). What we are in reality, according to Hume, is a bundle of distinct
perceptions. Hume’s final argument runs as follows. The idea of identity is established in one of
three ways: 1) Our perceptions are not actually distinct and can be “run into one,” 2) We observe
some real connection between our distinct perceptions, or 3) We associate these perceptions in
the imagination and falsely attribute identity to them (Hume, 2009, p. 529). Hume argues that the
first option won’t work, because each perception is a distinct existence, separable from each other
perception. Further, the second option won’t work because we never observe real connections
among objects. Therefore, we associate perceptions on the basis of the relations of resemblance
and causality, which leads us falsely to attribute identity to these perceptions. Kant, of course,
argues that there is instead a transcendental basis for the unity of our perceptions, but agrees with

108

Kant excepts the mere presentation I, as an appearance that is permanent. But this appearance is not
given by inner sense (by intuition), and is only a thought.
109
For an argument for Kant’s familiarity with Hume’s critique of personal identity, see Kitcher 1990
(1990, pp. 97-100).
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Hume that empirical inner perception is insufficient to ground this identity, since empirical inner
perception contains no constant or enduring perception.
While I am not, therefore, empirically licensed to think of the self as identical, I am
transcendentally required to do so. This is because, at the transcendental level, time is in the “I,”
as the form of the I’s inner sense, and so for whatever time I am conscious, this time belongs
within the identical self. But for another subject, Kant considers, I am something within time, far
from time being within me (p. A 362). In other words, at the empirical level, I am something
within time, i.e., I intuit myself (through inner sense) and others intuit me (through their outer
sense) under the form of time, and since there is no permanent element in this intuition, no
permanent self is given. While I am transcendentally constrained to think of the self as identical,
then, this does not give me any cognition of myself as an identical subject, because no intuition
can be given for this thought. Consequently, the inference of rational psychology with regard to
personal identity is paralogistic, i.e., it conflates the transcendental with a cognition of the in
itself.
2. The Tacit Cogito
Merleau-Ponty might seem to be opposed to Kant’s thinking about apperception.
Certainly, Merleau-Ponty indicates as much (2012, p. 449). But, again, these two projects are not
opposed but compatible. Kant’s account of the transcendental unity of apperception seems to me
undeniable as a condition for the possibility of empirical judgment, but not as a condition for the
possibility of perception. For, as we saw in chapter 4, if experience is approached with the
standard of justification, then something like an object of experience is only possible if some rule
prescribes a necessary synthesis to one’s presentations: for any empirical judgment to have
objective purport, it must aim at some necessary synthesis. And, as Kant puts it in the Adeduction, “Any necessity is always based on a transcendental condition” (p. A 106). The
ultimate transcendental condition for any necessary synthesis of a manifold is that all the
manifold of intuition be necessarily united in a single consciousness, i.e., the transcendental unity
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of apperception. Or as Kant puts it in the B-deduction, the condition for any judgment (because
judgments, unlike associations, have objective purport) is a necessary unity of the manifold
judged. As we saw in chapter 4, this does not mean that in any empirical (and hence contingent)
judgment the “presentations belong necessarily to one another in empirical intuition” but rather
that they “belong to one another by virtue of the necessary unity of apperception in the synthesis
of intuitions” (p. B 142). If we approach experience with the standard of justification, the
standard appropriate to empirical judgment, then the necessary unity of apperception is a
transcendental condition for experience.
But justification is not the standard appropriate to perception, or so I have argued.
Instead, motivation provides the kind of normativity characteristic of perception. A crucial
consequence of this thought is that perception has objective purport without being governed by
the necessity of laws (though as I argued at the end of chapter 4, the necessity of laws must be
able to accompany perception). With respect to apperception, this means that a necessary
synthesis of the manifold will not be a transcendental condition for perception, and so neither will
a necessary unity of consciousness. Instead, because the perceptual synthesis of an object must
only be actual and motivated, it has as its condition only that consciousness have an actual and
motivated unity. Merleau-Ponty describes just such a unity of consciousness with his account of
the cohesion of a pre-personal life, or what he also calls the tacit cogito. In this section, I will
explain what kind of unity this is and how it is motivated in the course of experience. To do this, I
begin by explaining a series of distinctions drawn by Merleau-Ponty: the personal and the prepersonal, the tacit and the spoken cogito, and cohesion and identity.
A. Personal and Pre-personal Existence
By “personal existence,” Merleau-Ponty means the I that is in the phenomenological
sense active – the self that decides upon ends, deliberates, is directly conscious of objects, and
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articulates to itself its mode of existence (this is also the I that has a personal history). 110 Beneath
this personal self is a pre-personal self that both enables and challenges the personal self.
Whereas the personal self is active, conscious, and deliberate, the pre-personal self is
spontaneous, implicit, and semi-autonomous in relation to personal decision. A couple examples
will help to bear out this idea.
1) Merleau-Ponty introduces this distinction in his analysis of phantom limb, for in this
disorder we can see the two levels of existence in conflict. At the personal level, a subject
experiencing phantom limb knows themselves no longer to possess the lost limb. Yet they may
continue not only to experience sensations in this limb, but to experience it as part of their body
schema. They may feel the limb’s presence, may launch themselves into walking despite lacking
a leg, may continue to reach out for objects with an arm that is no longer part of them. Beneath
the actual body and the subject’s personal experience of it, then, is a habitual body which sustains
their interactions with the world without advertence. Merleau-Ponty writes,
My life is made up of rhythms that do not have their reason in what I have
chosen to be, but rather have their condition in the banal milieu that surrounds
me. A margin of almost impersonal existence thus appears around our personal
existence, which … is taken for granted, and to which I entrust the care of
keeping me alive (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 86).
We must distinguish then between our intentional interactions with the world and the habitual
mode of being in the world which sustains it. This underlying existence is not fully personal, but
neither is it impersonal: it is pre-personal. Of course, personal and pre-personal existence can be
more or less well aligned – a novice violinist experiences the clumsiness of her body, while the
virtuousa’s body lends itself to and merges with her action.
2) This distinction between something like deliberate and habitual existence shows up
again in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of freedom. There, Merleau-Ponty considers that a person who
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Husserl would draw a distinction here between pure ego and personal ego. See Ideas II §57 or (Husserl,
1999, p. 67). Merleau-Ponty wouldn’t challenge this distinction, I think, but it involves a level of specificity
that is not necessary at this point in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis.
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has built their life upon an inferiority complex is not likely to change (2012, pp. 466-7). In a
certain light, this “likely” makes no sense, he says: either one is free to change or one is not,
either one makes the decision to change or one does not. Yet the freedom and the decision –
which belong to the level of personal existence – can gear into our lives more or less well. If the
decision fails to take, as in the case of Sartre’s gambler (Sartre, 1984, pp. 69-71), then tomorrow
the motives for the decision will have disappeared, they will fail to have any weight for me when
again I pass the gambling table. In contrast, if the decision “takes,” it gradually becomes a
generalized mode of existence: day by day the decision becomes less a decision and more habit.
Merleau-Ponty writes, “Even our initiatives, and even the situations that we have chosen once
they have been taken up, carry us along as if by a state of grace” (2012, p. 480). Along with
personal existence, which deliberates and reaches the decision, is pre-personal existence, i.e., the
generalized existence which either supports personal existence (“carries us along as if by a state
of grace”) or erodes it, e.g., making it unlikely that the inferiority complex will be overcome.
3) This distinction bears also on our personal histories. Merleau-Ponty writes,
When I am overcome with grief and wholly absorbed in my sorrow, my gaze
already wanders out before me, it quietly takes interest in some bright object, it
resumes its autonomous existence. After this moment, in which we attempted to
lock up our entire life, time (or at least pre-personal time) again begins to flow,
and it carries with it … [our] heartfelt emotions … . Personal existence is
intermittent … (2012, p. 86).
Here personal existence, which is locked up in grief, is distracted by pre-personal existence,
which is open to the solicitation of stimuli in its environment. The autonomy of the gaze is the
important thing. It is not consciously directed (I may not even be aware that I am moving my
eyes), because consciousness is focused the experience of loss. Consciousness is closed to the
environment around it, but the gaze remains open. And so even when, as in grief, the personal
significance of a moment is immersive, the banal rhythms of the body – response to stimulation,
hunger, tiredness – intervene and renew the passage of time.
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4) In chapter 1, we saw Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the Gestalt theory result that the
following collection of dots
..

..

..

..

..

..

is always perceived as “six groups of dots, two millimeters apart.” This perception is not arrived
at by a conscious synthesis that groups the near dots rather than the distant ones. It is not a
personal decision. Instead, it is simply the manner in which I find things. As discussed in chapters
1 and 2, this perceptual structure is a “spontaneous valuation:” neither actively constituted nor a
passive (causal) impression, neither personal nor material, but rather pre-personal. In perception,
personal and pre-personal existence for the most part function in unison, though in the case of the
illusion (recognized as such) they conflict.
In each of these cases, we see an active “personal” existence negotiated with an
autonomous “pre-personal” existence. But how does this distinction play into Merleau-Ponty’s
account of self-consciousness?
B. Tacit Cogito and Spoken Cogito
Merleau-Ponty uses his distinction between personal and pre-personal existence to draw a
second distinction, between two kinds of self-awareness, namely, what he calls the “tacit cogito”
and the “spoken cogito.” I’ll briefly explain this distinction, and then clarify its relation to the
personal/pre-personal distinction. 111
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Merleau-Ponty develops his notion of a “tacit cogito” in the Phenomenology of Perception and, as is
well known, later draws it into question in The Visible and the Invisible, writing for example that the tacit
cogito is “impossible” (1968, p. 171). One might wonder, in this case, both whether it is legitimate to
attribute this concept to Merleau-Ponty and whether the concept itself is sound. But there is a question
about how strongly to take Merleau-Ponty’s rejection of the tacit cogito. Some, like Robert Vallier, take it
strongly, suggesting it amounts to a “serious criticism” of Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work (Vallier, 2005, p.
285). Others, like Marratto, argue that Merleau-Ponty is not so much “overcoming” as “refining” his earlier
notion of the self (Marratto, 2012, p. 172). It seems to me that we should not take Merleau-Ponty’s claim
that the tacit cogito is “impossible” too strongly. For he goes onto explain that this is because something
like a “cogito,” a thinking or reflecting consciousness, is only possible in virtue of speech, and so the idea
of a tacit cogito is an oxymoron. Yet, later in the same passage, he explains that there are nevertheless nonlanguage (i.e., tacit) significations, which are not “positive,” and exemplifies this as follows: “There is for
example no absolute flux of singular Erlebnisse; there are fields and a field of fields, with a style and a
typicality” (Ibid.). But this, as we will see in the next section, is exactly how he describes the cohesion of
the tacit cogito. Indeed, in a later note, Merleau-Ponty returns to using the term “tacit cogito” approvingly
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What Merleau-Ponty wishes to establish with this distinction is that I would not be able
to express the cogito meaningfully (and with evidence) if it were not instantiated in my experience
prior to expression. The spoken cogito – what we encounter, for example, when we read
Descartes’ Meditations – is a third-person cogito: when I read someone else’s "I think," the “I”
specified is not my "I." 112 If this proposition is going to have for me a) a sense and b) an authentic
sense (evidence) – if I am to be able to affirm Descartes’ proposition of myself – then the spoken
cogito must express and be founded upon a tacit cogito.
Merleau-Ponty is not so much interested in the capacity to verbalize self-consciousness as
in the capacity to think it articulately. According to Merleau-Ponty, one cannot think a meaning
that one cannot express, and so the capacity to express or articulate the cogito names the capacity
explicitly to think the cogito. 113 Thus the distinction between the spoken and the tacit cogito is a
distinction between an explicit and an implicit self-consciousness, or rather, between judgment
and experience. Put this way, Merleau-Ponty's claim is that we can only explicitly reflect on
ourselves (in any meaningful way), because we have a kind of implicit self-awareness prior to
reflection. This is revealed, for example, in the way that we are always concerned with ourselves
(something like what Heidegger calls "Care") without constantly explicitly reflecting upon
ourselves. Merleau-Ponty writes,
Beyond the spoken cogito, the one that is converted into utterances and into
essential truth, there is clearly a tacit cogito, an experience of myself by myself.
… The tacit cogito, presence of self to self, being existence itself, is prior to
every philosophy, but it only knows itself in limit situations in which it is
threatened, such as in the fear of death or in the anxiety caused by another
person's gaze upon me (2012, p. 426).

(Merleau-Ponty, 1968, pp. 178-9). Admittedly, there may be problems with the idea of the tacit cogito as
formulated in the Phenomenology of Perception. But the idea that the self is in contact with itself prior to
the explicit cogito is undeniable, and that it is so in virtue of “the cohesion of a field,” soon to be discussed,
is attested to by both the Phenomenology and The Visible and the Invisible.
112
Descartes, of course, intends that readers take up the “I think” for themselves, not as a second-hand ego.
The question here, however, is how it is possible for the readers to do this, to find themselves in the written
“I”.
113
For the idea that one cannot think a meaning that one cannot express, see Phenomenology of Perception,
Part I, chapter 6.
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Such limit situations reveal that I have a sort of presence to myself, in virtue of which I am
always ready explicitly to recognize that a situation concerns myself (as in fear or embarrassment
I recognize a situation as concerning myself).
But what exactly is the content of this tacit cogito? In other words, what is this
experience of myself that licenses my explicit judgments about apperception? It is, I claim, what
Merleau-Ponty calls the “cohesion of a life,” i.e., the experience of our lives as cohesive.
C. The Cohesion of a Life
Merleau-Ponty characterizes the kind of unity that subjectivity possesses as follows:
I am not a series of psychical acts, nor for that matter a central I who gathers
them together in a synthetic unity, but rather a single experience that is
inseparable from itself, a single ‘cohesion of life,’ a single temporality that
unfolds itself [s’explicite] from its birth and confirms this birth in each present
(2012, p. 430).
The “I” should be understood neither as a “bundle” or “heap” of distinct sensations or acts nor as
standing outside of these sensations or acts; it is their cohesion. The important thing is to
understand the kind of unity that “cohesion” implies. One way to get at this unity is by
contrasting it with Hume’s claim that the sensations which we entertain are distinct and separable.
For Merleau-Ponty, the kind of unity we possess means that our distinct experiences are in an
important sense not separable.
Merleau-Ponty writes,
My first perception, along with the horizons that surrounded it, is an ever-present
event, an unforgettable tradition; even as a thinking subject I am still this first
perception, I am the continuation of the same life that it inaugurated. In a sense,
there are no more distinct acts of consciousness or of Erlebnisse in a life than
there are isolated things in the world (2012, pp. 429-430).
The point is not, of course, that there is no difference between our experiences. The content of
inner perception does not all simply run together into a single sensation. 114 The point is that while
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This is precisely the point on which Merleau-Ponty disagrees with Bergson’s analysis of time (which
Merleau-Ponty thinks does run moments together): “Instant C an instant D … are never indiscernible, for
then there would be no time at all” (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 444).
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our experiences are different, they are not separable. One's feeling of grief, for example, is
different from one's consciousness of a loss. Yet, they are not separate. Of course, it is possible to
be conscious of a loss without grieving, and so there is an abstract sense in which the two are
separable. Yet the meaning that this loss has for me and the meaning of my grief are two
moments of a whole. The grief and the consciousness of the loss bear an internal relation to one
another in the sense defined in chapter 1: the meaning of each founds the meaning of the other.
Put otherwise, the two belong to a common field, where "field" is understood (roughly) to mean a
generality each member of which is internally related (actually or potentially) to the generality.
For example, lighting is a field, because the color of each member is perceived in terms of the
color of the lighting. A melody is a field, because each note acquires its meaning in virtue of the
melody, and in turn contributes to the meaning of the melody. The musical tone is, of course,
separable from the melody. But the note has the meaning it does in virtue of the field of notes to
which it belongs, the meaning of which it conversely influences: it would not have this meaning
without the field, and so the meaning is not separable from the field. When Merleau-Ponty writes
that there are no distinct Erlebnisse, he means that experience is a field in this sense: "I am a
field. I am an experience" (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 429). In other words, every experience is
internally related to the whole of experience.
One way to illustrate the idea that experience is a field is to note every perception is
passively interpreted in terms of typicalities. If I walk into a room for the first time, I will
comport myself in terms of familiar features of the environment: I am familiar with floors, with
tables, chairs, people, even if not with this particular floor, table, chair, or person. Or as MerleauPonty puts, things are always experienced in terms of style. 115
Each thing appears to us through a medium that it colors with its fundamental
quality. This piece of wood is neither an assemblage of colors and tactile givens,
not even their total Gestalt; rather, something like a woody essence emanates
from it, these 'sensible givens' modulate a certain theme or illustrate a certain
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For more on the concept of style in Merleau-Ponty, see Singer (1981).
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style that wood is, and that establishes an horizon of sense around this piece of
wood and around the perception I have of it (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 476). 116
Even an object of a novel type is experienced according to generalities, e.g., whether it manifests
agency. In fact, the difficult work is often not to see a particular as a case of a generality, but to
see the sense of the particular in its uniqueness, as this unique modulation of a generality. 117 Take
a phenomenon that might seem to challenge this principle: Suppose I am writing at my desk,
when suddenly a sound breaks into the silence of my apartment. The sound catches my attention;
I am startled and distracted by it. Is the sound not, then, separable from the writing that came
before it, is it not a fully distinct consciousness? But even if the sound were not mediated through
past generalities, it would still count as a field member, because as soon as it breaks into my
consciousness it is fully ready to join with a sequel: if a second note, a third, and so on sound, I
will discover that it was the first note of a melody. Already as the first note it belonged to a
temporal field, internally related to what was to come in virtue of this readiness. This kind of
analysis – which shows how individual meanings are internally related to a field – could be
repeated in any domain of human existence. 118
Crucially, fields are not an accomplishment of active consciousness. I can advert to a
field, as when I shift attention from the colored object to the lighting, from the particular notes to
the melody. But I need not do so in order for the field to shape its members. For example, I do not
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In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty remarks that any particular perceived red is what it is
only in virtue of the field “red,” consisting of other reds presently perceived and a past history of perceived
reds: “The color is yet a variant in another dimension of variation, that of its relations with the
surroundings: this red is what it is only by connecting up from its place with other reds about it, with which
it forms a constellation, or with other colors it dominates or that dominate it, that it attracts or that attract it
… . In short, it is a certain node in the woof of the simultaneous and the successive. … [It is] a punctuation
in the field of red things …” (1968, p. 132).
117
Cf. the distinction between originary and second-order perception at Merleau-Ponty 2012 (2012, pp. 456).
118
In chapter 3, for example, I argued that intellectual evidence always belongs to a system of evidence –
this is another way of saying that intellectual evidence bears an internal relation to a field. Or in practical
terms, each of us bears a style into their actions and interactions. Moreover, these distinct fields interact, as
in the example of an emotion (grief) forming a whole with a cognition (the consciousness of loss). The
“Instutition” lectures are concerned to show how domains as diverse as biological and psychological
development, love, cultural developments, and domains of knowledge operate on the basis of the passive
functioning of fields.
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need to advert to previously experienced instances of red for them to bear on this current
experience of red. Moreover, these previous experiences may be forgotten beyond the possibility
of recall to explicit consciousness and yet continue to bear on contemporary perceptions. The
normal function of the field is to be the background against which a particular figure acquires its
meaning. Further, the relation between particulars and a field is spontaneous: I do not normally
synthesize the note with the melody, it is simply given as such. In this sense, fields are prepersonal, and more generally, the field of experience (as a whole) is pre-personal: it shapes
particular experiences implicitly and passively, without itself being adverted to. 119
Thus, while it is true that there is no constant impression within the flow of experience,
this does not mean that experience constitutes a "bundle" or "heap" of distinct experiences. Our
experiences bear an internal relation to each other, ultimately within the field of sense or
experience that defines each individual. While this might not be apparent at the level of personal
existence, in which the stream of experience appears as a sequence of distinct Erlebnisse, prepersonal existence is unified by the cohesion of a field.
D. Motivation and Self-Consciousness
I have drawn three parallel distinctions, between a) personal and pre-personal existence,
b) the spoken and the tacit cogito, and c) identity and cohesion. If we now put these distinctions
together, we are in a position to understand Merleau-Ponty’s overall view of self-consciousness.
Merleau-Ponty distinguishes two levels of self-consciousness: first, pre-personal cohesion that is
tacitly aware of itself, and second, personal identity that is explicitly aware of itself. Pre-personal
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One way Merleau-Ponty makes this point is by describing the cohesion of the field of experience in
terms of institution rather than constitution. He writes of this distinction that "To constitute in this sense is
nearly the opposite of to institute: the instituted makes sense without me, the constituted makes sense only
for me and for the 'me' of this instant" (Merleau-Ponty, 2010, p. 8). In other words, constitution is active; in
it consciousness posits the being it apprehends. Institution, in contrast, is passive and does not depend on
consciousness. Birth – in the sense of the inauguration of a new existence – is exemplary of institution: it is
not an act and does not require consciousness. Yet with birth a new field of experience begins. Institution
thus allows us to understand how we think of ourselves to be the same beings today that we were at age 2,
an age to which we can attach no consciousness through memory. We can do this because our identity is
not actively constituted, but passively instituted.
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existence is concerned with itself and internally related to each of its moments. Personal existence
is explicitly aware of itself and of its identity across its moments. How should we conceive the
relationship between these two moments of self-consciousness? I argue that Merleau-Ponty
conceives the relation in terms of motivation.
On the one hand, personal existence is founded upon pre-personal existence. The unity of
apperception is guaranteed by pre-personal cohesion. The pre-personal field of experience, as a
generality, remains the same as itself throughout its many members. For example, a spatial field
is the same field at two different points that belong to it. In this manner, pre-personal existence
remains the same as itself – is in cohesion with itself – throughout the many contents of the
stream of experience. Two steps move from pre-personal cohesion to the identity of apperception.
First, apperception, as self-consciousness, belongs to personal existence, i.e., conscious
or intentional existence. In pre-personal cohesion, the I is merely tacit, a background feature of
experience:
Just like the unity of the world, the unity of the I is invoked rather than
experienced each time I perform an act of perception …, and the universal I is the
background against which these brilliant figures stand out … (Merleau-Ponty,
2012, p. 429).
On the other hand, it is possible through reflection to advert to this background and make it a
foreground. Much as Kant puts it, conscious experience can be raised to self-consciousness: I can
attribute that consciousness to myself, can add the "I think … " to it.
Second, I identify the "I" that I currently apperceive with past apperceptions, in order to
arrive at personal identity. Pre-personal cohesion enables this move. As we have already seen,
pre-personal existence is a field, and so it coheres with itself throughout the stream of
experiences. Apperception adverts to this field. My apperception at the present moment can be
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identified with my apperception at a previous moment because both are a way of expressing the
field of experience at a particular experience, and this field has cohesion with itself. 120
There is thus a pre-reflective contact of myself with myself (a tacit cogito) that allows me
to reflectively identify myself over time. But while the spoken cogito is thus founded on the tacit
cogito, the tacit cogito conversely stands in need of the spoken cogito. In other words, MerleauPonty thinks the relation between these two forms of self-awareness in terms of expression, a
form of relation with which we are now familiar as a case of motivation. The spoken cogito
determines and clarifies what is only vague and indeterminate in the tacit cogito:
The consciousness that conditions language is merely a comprehensive and
inarticulate grasp of the world, like that of the child's upon his first breath, or of
the man who is about to drown and who frantically struggles back toward life.
And if it is true that every particular piece of knowledge is established upon this
first perspective, then it is also true that this first perspective waits to be
reconquered, fixed, and made explicit through perceptual exploration and
through speech. … The tacit Cogito is only a Cogito when it has expressed itself
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 426).
As a two-way relationship (foundation in one direction and determination in the other), the
relationship between pre-personal cohesion and personal identity is well described in terms of
motivation. Thus, there is actually a sort of personal identity motivated within the course of
experience. This kind of personal identity does not suffice to meet the standard of justification
because it provides no necessity, but it is nevertheless grounded in experience.
First, notice that the tacit cogito is not quite empirical apperception or transcendental
apperception. It is not empirical apperception because it is not itself an element within the stream
of consciousness (inner sense), which according to Hume and Kant, is what empirical
apperception would have to be if it were to provide any impression of an identical self. But
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I might also express the foundational relation here in the following terms. As Husserl puts it, “Anything
built by activity necessarily presupposes, at the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand …
“ (Husserl, 1999, p. 78). What is the passive given upon which activity operates to identify personal
existence? Suppose that the simplest form of the active operation of identification is this: I reflectively take
I at time 1 and reflectively take I at time 2, then recognizing these as the same I; I identify them. The
passive given that enables this operation is that I at time 1 and I at time 2 are given as cohering with each
other. In identification I grasp this given cohesion explicitly, in terms of identity.
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neither is it transcendental apperception, because it is not a necessary unity of the stream of
consciousness. Instead, it is something like the cohesion of this stream.
Second, Merleau-Ponty’s account of personal identity does not secure any necessity for
the unity of apperception. This personal identity is not grounded as some permanent element in
the stream of consciousness. Hume is right that there is no such impression. Instead, like
transcendental apperception, personal identity has to do with the form taken by the varying
elements within the stream of consciousness, namely, the cohesion of this stream; it is not an
impression within the stream, but the fact that our different "impressions" are never fully distinct.
Or more precisely, while our experiences are distinct, they are not separable: each bears an
internal relation to the rest in virtue of belonging to a common field. This cohesion is normative
and actual. It is actually the case that our impressions are never fully separable. Of course, it is
possible to imagine our impressions as distinct from each other, by abstracting them from the
horizon of sense which informs them, just as one can abstract notes from the melody to which
they belong and arrange them in a different order. But if one intended this rearrangement to be
actual, one would sense it to be wrong. For each impression is given with a horizon of sense
which constrains us to arrange experience in a particular way. Only when we approach
experience with the standard of justification, i.e., when we seek a necessary connection between
our impressions, does this sort of cohesion turn out to be inadequate. Thus, pre-personal cohesion,
and the personal identity that it motivates, are sufficient to provide for the sort of unity we find in
perception. However, only a transcendental unity of apperception, such as that described by Kant,
suffices to provide for the unity we find in empirical judgments.
3. The Unity of Transcendental and Empirical Apperception
So far, we have seen that the projects of Merleau-Ponty and of Kant are complementary.
Whereas Merleau-Ponty describes the structures of pre-reflective experience or perception, Kant
describes the essential structures of reflective experience or empirical judgment; whereas
Merleau-Ponty describes the pre-reflective experience of the self, Kant describes the manner in
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which reflection is constrained to think of the self. I tried to show towards the end of chapter 4
that Merleau-Ponty’s project needs Kant’s, because Kant aims to provide an account of that to
which pre-reflective experience tends (justification), and conversely that Kant’s project needs
Merleau-Ponty’s, because Merleau-Ponty provides an account of the ground of the structures of
experience on which transcendental argumentation depends. In this section, I will make a similar
claim about the reflective and pre-reflective experiences of the self. Specifically, I will argue that
Kant’s reflective account of the self draws on the pre-reflective experience of the self in a way
which Kant does not recognize, namely, to hold that transcendental and empirical apperception
pertain to the same subject. In other words, I do not see how Kant, on the terms of reflective
judgment alone, can account for the fact that these two kinds of apperception refer to the same
subject.
A. The Problem
The problem I wish to pose is that on the terms of Kant’s account of transcendental and
empirical apperception alone, Kant can refer to the I of transcendental apperception and the I of
empirical apperception as the same I only homonymously. But transcendental and empirical
apperception are supposed to refer to different ways of cognizing the same subject. The former
names how I am a priori constrained to think the subject, while the latter names the subject as it
can be intuited. But the I of transcendental apperception, even though it is supposed to refer to the
same I as that of empirical apperception, does not allow us to cognize anything about that I,
because the predicates pertaining to the I of transcendental apperception do not determine the
contents of the intuition provided in empirical apperception; I am constrained to think of the
subject as identical throughout its experience, existing, and spontaneous (as well as under the
categories discussed in the Paralogisms), but these ways in which I must think the subject cannot
be encountered in experience. This is a striking dissimilarity between apperception and the
categories – a category like causality differs in content from empirical judgments of causal
interactions only in its universality and necessity. In contrast, the intuition delivered in empirical
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apperception provides no content to the I of transcendental apperception. This is why
transcendental apperception does not result in any cognition, but only a thought or a
consciousness.
The issue is not that empirical and transcendental apperception share no intuitive or
predicative content – this is a plausible consequence of Kant’s transcendental idealism – but that
this makes it incomprehensible how we know to refer transcendental and empirical apperception
to the same subject at all. There is no reason to suppose that the I of transcendental apperception
is the I of empirical apperception, since there is no overlap – intuitive or judicative – between the
two. There is no clear answer, on Kant’s account, of how we can identify the I in which there is
time with the I which is in time.
In fact, Kant himself asks a similar question. In §24 of the B-Deduction, Kant asks,
But how … can the I who thinks be distinct from the I that intuits itself, and yet
be the same as it by being the same subject? And hence how can I say: I, as
intelligence and thinking subject, cognize myself as an object that is thought, viz.,
I so cognize myself insofar as in addition I am also given to myself in intuition –
except that I cognize myself, as I do other phenomena, not as I am to the
understanding, but as I appear to myself? This question involves neither more nor
less difficulty than does the question as to how I can be an object to myself at all,
viz., an object of intuition and of inner perceptions. Yet so it must actually be …
(pp. B 155-6).
To understand Kant's question, it will help to take a step back and consider the larger context of
§24. Kant's question takes place in something of an aside. After accomplishing the major task of
§24 – to begin applying the transcendental deduction to specifically sensible intuition by
introducing the figurative synthesis of the imagination – Kant claims that the time has come to
clarify the paradoxical situation that inner sense presents us not as we are in ourselves, but only as
we appear to ourselves. Specifically, what is paradoxical in this situation is that we intuit
ourselves only as we are "inwardly affected," i.e., in inner sense we are passively related to
ourselves. Just as I passively receive a manifold of intuition in perceiving external objects, in
inner sense I passively receive a temporal manifold of the determinations of my state. This is
paradoxical because I am an active being (the understanding is spontaneous), yet I receive myself
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only passively. Kant notes that some are tempted to resolve this paradox by assimilating
apperception to inner sense (our activity to our passivity), but that this will not do: we know that
the two are different because apperception determines inner sense. Inner sense, by itself, delivers
an indeterminate manifold of intuition, which can only be organized into determinate perceptions
in virtue of the understanding's activity of combination (e.g., it is the understanding's activity
which determines a manifold of inner sense as some one perception, some one sensation, some
one emotion, etc.). As we saw, Kant argued in §15 and 16 of the B-Deduction that such
combination is only possible through the synthetic unity of apperception. Thus, it is only through
the synthetic unity of apperception that inner sense is determined. Apperception and its synthetic
unity affect or act upon inner sense. Consequently, inner sense and apperception cannot be the
same thing.
But this sharp distinction between passive inner sense and active apperception has to be
reconciled with the fact that the I presented in both is not different. Kant's answer is that we intuit
ourselves not as we are, but only as we appear:
We intuit ourselves through [inner sense] only as we are inwardly affected by
ourselves; i.e., we must concede that, as far as inner intuition is concerned, our
own [self as] subject is cognized by us only as appearance, but not in terms of
what it is in itself (p. B 156).
The I of apperception and the I given in inner perception are evidently distinct, and yet they are
the same subject. This is only possible, according to Kant, through transcendental idealism about
time. Inner sense gives the I according to the form of inner sense (namely, time), but things in
time are appearances and not things in themselves, and so inner sense gives the I not as it is in
itself but as it appears under the form of time. In other words, Kant diffuses the problem by
distributing the I across the in-itself/for-us boundary: determining apperception is the I as it is in
itself and determined apperception is the I as it is for us.
The distinctions at play here are expressed with greater clarity in §25. Kant begins that
section by distinguishing transcendental apperception from both inner sense and myself as I am in
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myself: "… In the synthetic original unity of apperception, I am not conscious of myself as I
appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but am conscious only that I am. This presentation is a
thought, not an intuition." There are thus, in fact, not two but three ways of thinking the I under
consideration: a) the I of transcendental apperception, b) the I of inner sense (myself as I appear
to myself), and c) I as I am in myself (that self which is not phenomenal but noumenal). The I of
transcendental apperception is not the I of inner sense, because the former determines the latter.
But the I of transcendental apperception is also distinct from "I as I am in myself." The reason for
this is that I could only cognize myself as I am in myself if I had some intuition of myself, but
apperception gives no intuition, only a thought (recall that mistaking the one for the other, the
“logical” for the “real” subject, is the source of the Paralogisms). 121 Further, the I of inner sense is
also not I as I am in myself, due to Kant's transcendental idealism about time.
We are now in a position to discuss the role of activity and passivity in the self. An
important footnote to §25 does this work:
The I think expresses the act of determining my existence. Hence the existence
[of myself] is already given through this I think; but there is not yet given
through it the way in which I am to determine that existence, i.e., posit the
manifold belonging to it. In order for that manifold to be given, self-intuition is
required; and at the basis of this self-intuition lies a form given a priori, viz.,
time, which is sensible and belongs to the ability to receive the determinable.
Now unless I have in addition a different self-intuition that gives, prior to the act
of determination, the determinative in me (only of its spontaneity am I in fact
conscious) just as time so gives the determinable, then I cannot determine my
existence as that of a self-active being; instead I present only the spontaneity of
my thought, i.e., of the [act of] determination, and my existence remains
determinable always only sensibly, i.e., as the existence of an appearance. But it
is on account of this spontaneity that I call myself an intelligence (pp. B 157-8).
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In fact, Kant draws this distinction even more starkly in the Paralogisms. There he clarifies that the
transcendental unity of apperception does not give the subject as an object at all, but only as “the form of
thought” or “the subject of consciousness” (pp. B 411-2). In contrast, when I refer to myself, as a thinking
being, as I am in myself, I refer to myself as an object. It is confusing these two senses of “myself” that
leads to the Paralogisms: in the major premise I take myself as an object (that could be given to an
intellectual intuition) and in the minor premise I take myself merely as the formal subject of thought. This
formal subject of thought names the way in which I am analytically constrained to think of myself (e.g., as
identical, as subject, as active, as existing), but the self as it is in itself names an object that might be given
to some form of intuition. Both are ways in which the understanding thinks the subject, but in the one case
as the subject of thought and in the other as the object of thought. Inner sense, as an intuition of the self,
gives the self as an object, but not as this object would be given to the understanding (i.e., in an intellectual
intuition of the self as it is in itself).
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As we have already seen, apperception actively determines the manifold given in intuition, and
conversely this manifold is passive with respect to the understanding’s determining it. Kant thus
calls apperception the "determinative" and the manifold of intuition the "determinable." The
central conjecture is that I have intuition of myself only as determinable, never as determinative. I
know that there is a "determinative" in me, because I am conscious of its spontaneity (i.e., I am
conscious that I determine the manifold of inner sense). But inner sense does not deliver this
determinative self. If it did – just as time gives the determinable – I would have an intuition of
myself as active, i.e., I could "determine my existence as that of a self-active being." Lacking this
intuition, I have the mere thought of my spontaneity, i.e., the "I think" of apperception. But I do
not have myself as I am in myself, i.e., as a self-active being, because I lack any intuitive content
to give to the mere consciousness of my spontaneity. My sole intuitive content is given under the
form of time (as passively received), and this gives me not as determinative but only as
determinable. In other words, when I cognize myself, I cognize myself only as a passive object
(for this is how I necessarily appear under the form of inner sense), never as the active subject
that I am in myself.
Thus, Kant divides the determinative I (the active I of transcendental apperception, or the
noumenal self of which I have a bare consciousness of its existence and spontaneity in
transcendental apperception) from the determinable I (which I empirically intuit) across the
boundary between thing-in-itself and appearance. It is this boundary that allows Kant to maintain
that the two are evidently different and yet are the identical subject.
This solution explains how it is possible that the empirical and transcendental
apperception can be the same, but it gives us no reason to think that they are. What is totally
mysterious on Kant’s account is why we think of these as the same at all. Why do we not think
them as two totally distinct ontological levels: objectivated being and objectivating subject?
Kant’s genius is to think this ontological difference radically. But what is unexplored, on Kant’s
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account, is how these two belong together. In other words, Kant’s account lacks the resources to
explain how we could ever identify these as the same subject. Such an explanation may simply
not be a part of Kant’s project: he draws on this identity as pre-given. But then his project
presupposes this identity, and for his project to make sense for us, we will have to understand
how this identity is possible.
To see how the two can be identified, we would need to provide an account of a sort of
apperception in which the determinative and determined coincide. Such an apperception would
have to underlie the distinction between empirical and transcendental apperception, as the
resource upon which one would rely in order to refer these to the same subject. It is precisely this
sort of apperception that phenomenology aims to provide with its account of the pre-reflective
experience of oneself.
B. Reversibility
At the reflective level, we must think of two exclusive kinds of apperception. Through
empirical apperception, the self can never be cognized as active (as subject) and through
transcendental apperception, the self can never be cognized as passively received (as object). But
at the pre-reflective level, the self as subject and the self as object coincide. Every apperception at
this level is reversible, i.e., can be cognized either as passive or active, can be experienced as a
subject or received as an object of thought. The pre-reflective self – that of the tacit cogito – is
both that which passively synthesizes the flow of consciousness and can itself be synthesized
within the flow of consciousness.
The best way to see this difficult point is by turning to the phenomenological analysis of
the passive synthesis of time. 122 Recall that at the reflective level, apperception must be divided
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It may not be immediately clear that Kant and the phenomenology are on the same terrain here. But,
first, both do draw a distinction between the self as active and the self as passive. As we will see, Husserl
distinguishes between consciousness as objectivating and as objectivated. The former names the absolute
flow of consciousness, and the second refers to the flow as attended to and treated as a temporal unity.
Similarly, Kant distinguishes between the determinative and the determinable: the I as spontaneously
synthesizing temporal unities and the I as a temporal manifold to be synthesized. In each case, the
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into, on the one hand, the temporal flow of consciousness (inner sense), and on the other, that
which synthesizes this flow and so is not itself a part of the flow. 123 In contrast, at the prereflective level, synthesizing consciousness is itself temporal and can be attended to as such, i.e.,
can itself be synthesized within the flow of consciousness. In other words, the passive synthesis
of time is not atemporal, but is itself temporally extended. 124
To bear out these points, I will make a brief excursus into Husserl's Phenomenology of
Internal Time Consciousness. The passages I will consider are among the more challenging and

distinction is between the self as active – as subject – and the self as passively acted upon by consciousness
– as object.
Further, as will be important in what follows, for both, the active and passive selves have different relations
to temporality. For Kant, the I as determinable is a manifold of intuition given under the form of time: it is
a temporal object. The active I is not a temporal object. Anything given in terms of time is passively acted
upon by the synthesizing intellect, and so the I qua active cannot be given in terms of time. Similarly,
Husserl calls the absolute flow of consciousness "timeless" (Husserl, 1991, p. 117). Absolute consciousness
is timeless because, as that which constitutes temporal objects, it is not itself an object constituted within
time. In both cases, as soon as the I is taken as an object, it is taken as a temporal object, as occupying a
temporal position.
123
I see no problem in assimilating inner sense and the flow of consciousness to each other. Kant’s “inner
sense” is a faculty for intuiting the ever-shifting determinations of one’s state, i.e., the flow of presentations
through consciousness. What is disclosed in empirical apperception, then, are the contents of what Husserl
calls the flow of consciousness. The flow of consciousness itself would be intuited through something like
pure inner sense, i.e., a pure intuition of time: pure in the sense that it is not itself an unfolding process, but
an intuition insofar as what is intended is an individual, not merely a form. “Inner sense” and the “flow of
consciousness” thus map onto each other, where inner sense is a faculty for intuiting the contents of the
flow of consciousness.
Further, both Kant and Husserl agree that there is no constant and enduring content of this flow. Recall, this
is originally Hume's point: Hume argued that if there was an impression of the identity of the self, it would
have to be an impression constant and enduring throughout all of our experience, and since there is no such
constant impression, neither is there an impression of identity. Kant similarly affirms that we have no
intuition of a constant and enduring self. In the A deduction he writes that the consciousness of oneself
given in inner sense is "merely empirical and always mutable; it can give us no constant or enduring self in
this flow of inner appearances" (p. A 107). Similarly, Husserl writes that "it pertains to the essence of the
flow that no persistence can exist in it" (1991, p. 118). Again, "As a matter of principle … no concrete part
of the flow can make its appearance as nonflow. The flow is not a contingent flow, as an objective flow is.
The change of its phases can never cease and turn into a continuance of phases always remaining the same"
(Ibid.). All that remains constant, in terms of the flow, is its form: the continuous modification of contents
in terms of retention
124
This is, of course, also the direction in which Heidegger wished to push Kant. Heidegger's argument in
§34 of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics is that Kant's own principles – what Kant is really striving
after – commit him to a claim that he himself refuses to make, namely, that "The pure, finite self has, in
itself, temporal character" (Heidegger, 1997, p. 134). Or as Heidegger puts it more contentiously, the pure
self is time: "Time and the 'I think' no longer stand incompatibly and incomparably at odds; they are the
same" (Ibid.). Whereas Heidegger criticizes Kant for not going far enough toward this account of the self, I
take it that such an account of the self is not an intrinsic feature of Kant’s project. My claim is not that the
reflective account of the self is incorrect in its domain, only that it tacitly draws upon the pre-reflective
experience of the self.
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contested passages of Husserl's corpus, and so to keep this material manageable, I will steer clear
– as much as possible – from its complexities (I will not even consider, for example, his later
thinking, e.g., in the C-Manuscripts). 125 What results is a simplified version of Husserl's account,
but is I think the version Merleau-Ponty has in mind when he writes about the relation between
the self and temporality, and will convey the thoughts essential to my project.
In the third section of his 1905 "Lectures on the Consciousness of Internal Time",
Husserl distinguishes three levels of the constitution of temporal objects: a) empirical objects in
objective time (e.g., a tone sounding or a ball rolling), b) the "multiplicities of appearance" which
serve to constitute these temporal objects (e.g., the temporal adumbrations of a tone, or the
adumbrations of the ball rolling), and c) the "absolute time-constituting flow of consciousness"
(cf. §34). 126 In perception, we are given objects which persist through time. For example, I hear a
siren wail. This sound persists for a period of time, say from T1 to T2 to T3, and I recognize it as
a single sound throughout the time of its sounding. At no particular time is the entire duration of
the sound immediately given. At T2, for example, the sound at T1 and the sound at T3 are not
perceptually given. Yet I experience the siren not as a single instant, but as an enduring sound.
This is possible, according to Husserl, because at T2 I have a retention of the sound I perceived at
T1 and a protention of the sound as continuing (of the sound at T3). To perceive the enduring
wail of the siren, then, I must maintain a series of temporal adumbrations (T1, T2, T3) of the
sound, which I apprehend as a unity. We can thus distinguish the temporal object itself from the
series of adumbrations which constitutes the temporal object as a unity.

125

Note that there is a question about how much of the structure that I will describe (the self-constitution of
the absolute flow of consciousness) is maintained in Husserl’s later thinking about temporality, particularly
in the C-Manuscripts. Kortooms has argued that the role of the ego in this late thinking displaces much of
the structure I describe (2002). I find the responses forwarded by Brough (2016) and Mensch (2010)
compelling, but in any case I am interested here in the portion of Husserl’s thinking on which MerleauPonty draws.
126
There is some controversy about how exactly Husserl means to carve up these three levels, namely
whether the second and third level can be distinguished as intentional object and intentional act in prereflective experience. See Zahavi (2011) for an overview of this debate. My position is meant to remain
neutral with respect to this debate.
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The temporal adumbrations of empirical objects belong to the flow of consciousness. If
we reflect on our consciousness, we find an ever-changing set of temporal processes. My
perception of the siren unfolds and gives way to a perception of the table before me, which gives
way to a thought of my work, which gives way to feelings about this work, etc. Or more exactly,
a number of temporal processes may be unfolding at the same time: while the siren sounds
outside, the table remains constantly before me, and so too the cup that stands on it, which steam
continuously rises out of, curls, and dissipates. All these processes unfold simultaneously for me,
even though I do not advert to them all.
In each phase of this flow, then, there are adumbrations of temporal objects which stand
in continuity with those in other phases of the flow. But as Hume and Kant had recognized, there
is no constant and enduring content of this flow. As Husserl puts it,
No phase of this flow can be expanded into a continuous succession; and therefore the
flow cannot be conceived as so transformed that this phase would be extended in identity
with itself. Quite to the contrary, we necessarily find a flow of continuous 'change' …
(1991, p. 78).
Consciousness thus consists of an ever changing flow of particular temporal processes, e.g.,
empirical objects and our perceptions of them.
This flow must be distinguished from the temporal processes that take place within it.
Husserl’s argument for this distinction runs as follows: It is a property of any persisting object
that it can change at differing rates. Say a tone is modulated to change gradually from high-C to
low-C. This change could occur rapidly (perhaps over the course of a second) or more slowly
(over the course of a minute) or at the limit, the tone could remain at rest. The flow of
consciousness, however, has an in principle constant rate of change. Because the flow of
consciousness is not itself the unfolding of any enduring content, it cannot change more or less
rapidly, but only at a constant rate.
The interesting part of Husserl's account, for my purpose, is his claim that in the case of
the flow of consciousness, constituting and constituted coincide. Husserl arrives at this claim
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initially to avoid the threat of regress. The problem can be put, in a relatively simple form, as
follows: The temporal flow of consciousness – which is the constitutive condition of any
temporal object – can itself be made into a temporal object. Husserl writes,
To be sure, in a way [each phase of the flow] is also an objectivity. I can direct
my regard towards a phase that stands out in the flow or toward an extended
section of the flow, and I can identify it in repeated re-presentation, return to the
same section again and again, and say: this section of the flow (1991, p. 118).
This is true both of particular phases of the flow, and of the flow as a whole. But if the flow of
consciousness can be turned into a temporal object, it seems that some further consciousness will
be required in order to constitute this object. Since this further consciousness would itself admit
of being treated as a temporal object, and so require a further consciousness, this line of thinking
leads to a regress. 127
Husserl's solution is to claim that in the case of the temporal flow, the constitutive and the
constituted coincide. Specifically, Husserl claims that the flow of consciousness contains a double
intentionality: a "transversal" intentionality, which intends temporal objects, and a "horizontal
intentionality" through which the flow coincides with itself (Husserl, 1991, pp. 86-7). The former
serves to constitute empirical objects, the latter serves to constitute the flow as a unity. Husserl
writes,
The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only exists but
is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow
necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be
apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a
second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself. The
constituting and the constituted coincide … (Husserl, 1991, p. 88).
Yet Husserl immediately clarifies that constituting and the constituted do not coincide "in every
respect." Husserl argues that the constituted and the constituting phases of the flow are not
identical, because the constituted phases are past phases presently being constituted
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See Husserl 1991 (pp. 294-5) for another articulation of the problem.
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retentionally. 128 Constituting and constituted phases are thus temporally distinct, even while the
latter are retained within the former.
Elsewhere, Husserl distinguishes the two as follows:
If we speak of the perception of the sound, then here as everywhere else we must
distinguish between this perception as absolute consciousness and the
objectivated perception - more precisely, the perception as object of the
perception reflecting on it (1991, p. 296).
In other words, we can distinguish between a perception as constituting (as the flow of absolute
consciousness) or as constituted (the perception as object). Husserl goes on to say that it belongs
to the essence of absolute consciousness, i.e., the flow of adumbrations, that it can be treated as a
temporal unity in reflection, which is to say, it can be taken as an object. Thus, constituting and
constituted are the same here, i.e., both as the flow of consciousness, but differently considered.
Husserl spells out this distinction in the following passage:
The absolute consciousness lies, so to speak, before all positing of unity, that is,
before all objectivation. Unity is unity of objectivation, and objectivation is
precisely objectivating but not objectivated. All nonobjectivated objectivation
belongs in the sphere of the absolute consciousness (1991, p. 297). 129
"Constitution" and "objectivation" are here essentially equivalent, for Husserl is saying that the
absolute flow of consciousness lies prior to constitution (objectivation), as that which is
constituting (objectivating) and therefore not constituted (objectivated). Constituting and
constituted phases are here distinguished as absolute consciousness and objectivated
consciousness.

128

"The phases of the flow of consciousness in which phases of the same flow of consciousness become
constituted phenomenally cannot be identical with these constituted phases, nor are they. What is brought
to appearance in the actual momentary phase of the flow of consciousness – specifically, in its series of
retentional moments – are the past phases of the flow of consciousness" (Husserl, 1991, p. 88).
129
Note that Brough has claimed that this passage (dating from 1907) provides an inadequate account of
the relation between absolute consciousness and the experiencing of immanent objects, a relation which is
more fully worked out in later passages which we have been considering (1972, p. 309). But I do not think
Husserl gives up the distinction between objectivating and objectivated in later passages, insofar as he
maintains that the coincidence between the two does not amount to an identity.
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It is this thought – that constituted and constituting coincide in the passive synthesis of
time – that Merleau-Ponty sees as the distinctive feature of pre-reflective apperception. 130
Merleau-Ponty sums up his thinking as follows:
We will never understand how a thinking or constituting subject can posit or
catch sight of itself within time. If the I is Kant’s transcendental I, then we will
never understand how it could ever merge with its own wake in inner sense, nor
how the empirical self remains a self at all. But if the subject is temporality, then
self-positing ceases to be contradictory because it expresses precisely the essence
of living time … The originary flow, says Husserl, does not merely exist, for it
must necessarily give itself a ‘manifestation of itself’, otherwise we would need
to install behind it another flow in order to become conscious of it. Time
‘constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself’; it is essential to time to be not only
actual time or time that flows, but also time that knows itself … (2012, pp. 449450).
Merleau-Ponty’s conclusion is stronger than mine (for he claims that Kant is in error), but it gets
to the point I am trying to make: the pre-reflective experience of self necessarily underlies the
reflective experience of self given expression in Kant. 131 This, as I will now argue, is because the
reversibility of the pre-reflective experience of the self allows transcendental and empirical
apperception to refer to the same subject: pre-reflective experience, as ambiguous, is capable of
motivating two exclusive sorts of apperception (transcendental and empirical).
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Merleau-Ponty expressed the reversible nature of the flow of consciousness in the following passage: “If
even our purest reflections in fact retrospectively appear to us as in time, and if our reflections upon the
flow are inserted into the flow, this is because the most precise consciousness of which we are capable is
always found to be affected by itself or given to itself, and because the word consciousness has no sense
outside of this duality” (2012, p. 45).
131
Merleau-Ponty’s picture on the whole agrees with Husserl’s: Whereas at the level of reflective
judgment, Kant describes the determinative as that within which there is time, at the level of pre-reflective
experience, Merleau-Ponty describes the determinative as the flow of time itself. The pre-reflective subject
is “determinative” with respect to the flow of time, because it is responsible for the passive synthesis which
makes distinct temporal moments into a temporal flow. As determinative, the pre-reflective subject is not
itself properly something in time. It is not temporal, then, in the sense of having a place within a
chronology, but in the sense of being that which undertakes time. Merleau-Ponty writes, “Ultimate
subjectivity is not temporal in the empirical sense of the word; if the consciousness of time was built from
successive states of consciousness, then a new consciousness would be necessary for the awareness of this
succession, and so on. … We can say that ultimate consciousness is ‘timeless’, in the sense that it is not
intra-temporal. … Subjectivity is not in time because it takes up or lives time and merges with the cohesion
of a life” (2012, p. 446). In other words, the move to the pre-reflective level does not make the
determinative and the determined indistinguishable. However, the relation of this distinction to time is
redescribed, such that the determinative at this level is not that within which there is time, but is the
movement of time.
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Whereas the self as subject and the self as object are opposed in Kant, for Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty they coincide. According to Husserl, it is the flow of consciousness which
constitutes the flow of consciousness as an object, a) in terms of the unity of specific phases of
the flow, and b) in terms of the unity of the flow as a whole. Any phase of the flow (or indeed the
flow as a whole) which is currently functioning as absolute subject in constituting temporal
objects can in turn be objectivated. We can still distinguish between subject and object here, in
terms of which temporal phase is objectivating (present) and which is objectivated (past), but
there is a coincidence between the two, in the sense that it is the same thing which is both subject
and object.
In contrast, there is no coincidence between passive and active self in Kant.
Transcendental apperception does not count as a cognition of the self, for Kant, because no
intuitive content corresponds to it: judgments about apperception cannot be brought to
fulfillment. The intuitive content we do possess for cognition of the self does not give intuitive
content to transcendental apperception, but only to empirical apperception, i.e., awareness of the
determinations of our state. This intuitive content gives me to myself not as I am, but only as I
appear. And in this sense, passive and active self cannot coincide: no temporal position can be
attributed to the I of transcendental apperception, or in other words transcendental apperception is
not objectivating, i.e., it cannot give the subject as an object of awareness.
In other words, the phenomenological description of the pre-reflective subject allows for
the reversibility of constituted and constituting: the constituting can itself be placed within the
temporal order as constituted. 132 And this, in turn, allows us to understand how the constituting
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Reversibility is one of the central concepts of The Visible and the Invisible. Merleau-Ponty likely
borrows this term from Gestalt psychology, in which reversible images are those which admit of two
contradictory interpretations. For example, our perception of the Rubin vase is multi-stable or reversible,
because the same image can be seen as either a vase or two opposed faces – depending on what is
perceived as figure and what as ground – but not as both at the same time (see Figure 5.1). The curious
thing about such cases is that the same image can motivate two different meanings. Similarly, according to
Merleau-Ponty, reversibility is a basic characteristic of the body, insofar as it can be apprehended either as
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and constituted can refer to the same subject. Phenomenology avoids the problem about the
identity of the constituting and constituted self by returning to the pre-reflective experience of
self, in which the flow of consciousness constitutes itself as an object. The I of transcendental
apperception, in contrast, cannot constitute itself as an object. This is because the I can only be
intuited within time, and thus not as it is in itself, but only as it appears. If any intuitive content is
given for the I, it is immediately within time, and therefore does not pertain to the I in itself, but
only as it appears. In contrast, at the level of pre-reflective experience, the flow constituted as a
unity is not the flow as it appears rather than the flow as it is in itself. Instead, the constituted flow
“coincides” with the constituting flow. How is this possible? Only because at this level the
constituting flow is not atemporal, but rather is temporality itself. At the reflective level, I am
conscious of the I of transcendental apperception as spontaneous. But I am not conscious of it as
spontaneous now (or at any time): this would violate its transcendence by making it intratemporal. In contrast, there is nothing in principle mistaken at the pre-reflective level in being
conscious of the I’s activity “now.” Because the constituting I is temporality (is the flow or thrust
of time), it is not violated by being constituted as temporal. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
The ultimate consciousness is not an eternal subject that catches sight of itself in
an absolute transparency, for such a subject would definitively be incapable of
descending into time and would thus have nothing in common with our
experience; rather, ultimate consciousness is consciousness of the present. In the
present and in perception, my being and my consciousness are one … (2012, p.
448).
The problem at the reflective level arises because reflection distributes the constituting and
constituted self into the category of the atemporal, on the one hand, and the intra-temporal, on the
other. But a phenomenology of the self leaves no ultimate barrier between the self which
constitutes the flow of time – what at the reflective level will be called transcendental – and the
self which is constituted within the flow – what at the reflective level will be called empirical.

subject or object but never as both at the same time, e.g., if my right hand is touching the floor, and I touch
my right hand with my left, I will never touch the right hand as touching, but only as touched.
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Instead, it describes subjectivity as the ambiguous situation in which the constituting and
constituted coincide without being indistinguishable. Since reflective thinking lacks the resources
to explain how these apperceptions can be referred to the same subject, it must rely on the prereflective experience of self to do so. This line of thinking does not entail that Kant’s account of
apperception is mistaken, only that is relies on a pre-judicative apperception. The ambiguity of
this pre-judicative apperception, when raised to the reflective level, motivates two opposed sorts
of apperception: of the self as a purely active subject (what is given in transcendental
apperception) and the self as a purely passive object (what is given in empirical apperception).
Each of these has motivational roots in the ambiguity of pre-reflective experience. In virtue of
this shared root, the two can refer to the same subject. Taken by themselves, there is nothing that
holds these two sorts of apperception together. But taken as two modes of describing the prereflective experience of the self, the two refer to the same subject.
Conclusion
My point, in the previous section, has not been that the distinction between
transcendental and empirical apperception must be abolished, only that it is not stable. In fact, this
distinction must be maintained, for Kant is right that empirical apperception does not suffice to
justify the thought of self-identity, but transcendental apperception does. But if this distinction is
to have its proper sense, i.e., if it is to name two ways of referring to the same subject, then it
must rely on the ambiguity of pre-reflective apperception. For only if these two modes of
apperception are motivated by the ambiguity of this pre-reflective experience can we see how
they refer to the same subject. Without this ambiguity, empirical and transcendental apperception
refer simply to different selves: one the universal form of all experience and the other this
particular experiencing subject. What is remarkable, in Kant, is that these two must somehow be
the same, that the I of transcendental apperception is not simply a universal form, but names
myself as I would intuit myself if my intuition were intellectual. The question is how these two
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apperceptions belong together, and it can be answered, I have argued, only by returning to the
ambiguity of pre-reflective experience.
The return to motivation, then, does not open the door to metaphysics, to “dialectical
illusion,” as Kant would have it. It does however put transcendental and empirical apperception
into dialectic, i.e., it shows both types of apperception to be insufficient in themselves and to be
parts of a larger whole. I do not mean to affirm that rational psychology is in the right after all. I
am only showing that the propositions of critical philosophy remain one sided and it must be
shown how these sides belong together. In other words, something like speculative thinking, in
Hegel’s sense, is required. 133 Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, it seems to me, is speculative in
this sense, for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological effort is devoted to discovering the ambiguity
of human nature underlying the antithetical judgments by which the understanding confronts
experience. Merleau-Ponty writes that the sort of being referred to by dialectic "abounds in the
sensible world [i.e., the world of perception], but on condition that the sensible world has been
divested of all that the ontologies have added to it" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, p. 92). The task of the
dialectic, then, is "to shake off the false evidences." The method of the Phenomenology of
Perception might well be described as dialectical in this sense, insofar as it, in each domain of
perception, begins with the immediate evidence of the realist or empiricist standpoint, and then by
exploring the inner insufficiency or negation of this standpoint moves to the intellectualist of
idealist standpoint. From the inadequacy of this standpoint, in turn, it moves to uncover the
ambiguity of the phenomena themselves.
It might seem odd to call Merleau-Ponty's thinking speculative or dialectical given how
often Merleau-Ponty cautions against what he calls the "bad dialectic." But Merleau-Ponty's
worry is not about dialectic per se, but that the dialectic readily turns from ambiguity to
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Hegel says of speculative thinking that, "It consists solely in grasping the opposed moments in their
unity. Inasmuch as each moment shows, as a matter of fact, that it has its opposite in it, and that in this
opposite it rejoins itself, the affirmative truth is this internally self-moving unity, the grasping together of
both thoughts, their infinity – the reference to oneself which is not immediate but infinite" (2010, p. 122).
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ambivalence. Following Melanie Klein, Merleau-Ponty defines ambivalence as "having two
alternative images of the same object, the same person, without making any effort to connect
them or to notice that in reality they relate to the same object and the same person" (1964, p.
103). Such an attitude, for adult dealings, is often pathological, in contrast to which the ability to
attend to ambiguity is mature: ambiguity "consists in admitting that the same being who is good
and generous can also be annoying and imperfect. Ambiguity is ambivalence that one dares to
look in the face" (Ibid.). Ambivalence, in other words, is ambiguity that is ruled by contradiction.
In contrast, ambiguity consists in grasping the contradictory terms in their unity. As MerleauPonty puts it,
The dialectic is unstable … it is even essentially and by definition unstable, so
that it has never been able to formulate itself into theses without denaturing itself,
and because if one wishes to maintain its spirit it is perhaps necessary to not even
name it. The sort of being to which it refers, and which we have been trying to
indicate, is in fact not susceptible of being designated positively. … One of the
tasks of the dialectic … is to shake off the false evidences, to denounce the
signification cut off from the experience of being, emptied - and to criticize itself
in the measure that it itself becomes one of them. But this is what it is in danger
of becoming as soon as it is stated in theses, in univocal significations, as soon as
it is detached from its ante-predicative context (1968, p. 92).
Pre-predicative being, in its essential ambiguity, does not admit of univocal predicative
significations; such significations are one-sided, and so lose sight of experience. 134 Consequently,
Merleau-Ponty thinks that the dialectic will not obtain a new position which unites opposites in a
new predication (it will not obtain "the In-itself-for-itself which is the height of ambivalence") but
will instead "rediscover the being that lies before the cleavage operated by reflection" (Merleau-
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We could think here about Hegel’s claim that the form of judgment is essentially inadequate to
speculative truth, for judgments are always one-sided: every judgment is a only moment of the self-moving
unity of speculative thinking but risks taking on the appearance of fixity in abstraction from the movement
of which it is a moment. As Hegel puts it, "Judgment joins subject and object in a connection of identity;
abstraction is therefore made from the fact that the subject has yet more determinacies than the predicate
has, just as that the predicate is wider than the subject. Now, if the content is speculative, the non-identity
of subject and predicate is also an essential moment; but this is not expressed in judgment. … For the
purpose of expressing the speculative truth, the defect is first remedied by adding the contrary proposition
… . But another defect then crops up, for these propositions are disconnected and therefore present their
content only in an antinomy, whereas the content refers to one and the same thing, and the determinations
expressed in the two propositions should be united absolutely – in a union which can then only be said to
be an unrest of simultaneous incompatibles, a movement" (2010, p. 67).
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Ponty, 1968, p. 95). The task of phenomenology, then, is not to unite opposites, but to discover
the dialectical ferment that precedes, underlies, and brings the opposition into being; to trace the
lines of motivation from divergent judgments to their common perceptual ground.
In this final chapter, I demonstrated how such a project would look by considering how
this phenomenological dialectic can be applied to a particular metaphysical question: that
explored by Kant in the Third Paralogism, namely, the identity of the self. With respect to selfidentity our experience can motivate two quite different interpretations. On one interpretation, the
self has a necessary identity with itself throughout its presentations. On another, there is no selfidentity, but only a flux of presentations. The genius of Kant was to grasp these two
interpretations together, as two kinds of apperception, the former transcendental and the latter
empirical. But, as Merleau-Ponty points out and I argued in this chapter, Kant accomplishes this
at the price of no longer being able to explain how these two kinds of apperception can both refer
to the self at all. In other words, Kant's treatment of the paralogisms ends up in a situation of
ambivalence. To comprehend the unity of the self, we must return to the ambiguous phenomenon
that motivates both these interpretations, namely, what Merleau-Ponty calls the "cohesion of a
life."
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Figure 5.1. An example of Rubin’s Vase. Reprinted from Rubin Vase, in Wikipedia. Retrieved
August 9, 2017, from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rubin_vase. 2007 by John Smithson.
Reprinted with permission.

201

CONCLUSION
In this dissertation, I have defended two theses. The first is that the dichotomy between
two kinds of epistemic grounds, reason and causality, is a false one, because while reason and
causality are grounds with respective domains, they are not exhaustive of the forms of grounding.
There are not only two logical spaces, one in which beliefs are justified by reasons and another in
which they are explained by causal interactions. There is a third form of grounding: motivation.
In my first chapter, I defended this claim. I argued that motivation can be considered as
an epistemic ground, one which is irreducible to either reason or causality. Whereas reason
grounds in virtue of explicit meanings and causality does not ground in virtue of meanings at all,
motivation grounds in virtue of implicit meanings; whereas reasoning is active and causality
passive, motivation is spontaneous. Further, I argued that motivation is the form of grounding
characteristic of perception, for perception is spontaneous and shaped by implicit meanings.
The second thesis is that introducing motivation as an epistemic ground provides a new
solution to debates between rationalism and empiricism. In brief, this solution holds that
experience is the ground of all our knowledge while at the same time our knowledge transcends
our experience: our knowledge is not contained in or definable in terms of experience. There is a
contingent of beliefs – indeed, the most fundamental, what Merleau-Ponty called "perceptual
faith" – which sustain all our epistemic interactions and provide the context within which any
belief can be called into question or justified. These beliefs are not themselves justified, but
neither are they caused. Instead, they are solicited by our interactions with the world.
In chapter 2, I began working toward this conclusion by considering the type of
grounding with which experience provides empirical judgments. McDowell has argued that
experience can count as a reason for empirical judgments. In contrast, Davidson has argued that
because experiences are non-propositional and judgments are propositional, experiences can at
most cause judgments. It seems to me that this debate is rooted in an inadequate phenomenology
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of the grounding relation between experience and empirical judgments. This relation is neither
active nor passive, but spontaneous, and so is not well described in terms of either reason or
causality. I argue that motivation is the type of grounding with which experience provides
empirical judgments: experience grounds empirical judgments while at the same time empirical
judgments (being propositional) transcend experience. I tried to illuminate this conclusion by
considering cases of original or authentic expression, in which existing modes of expression do
not suffice to give propositional form to our experiences.
In chapter 3, I confronted the debate between rationalism and empiricism directly by
considering the type of grounding with which experience provides universal, and ultimately a
priori, judgments. Whereas the empiricist holds that all the content of our knowledge is provided
by experience, the rationalist holds that experience (delivering contingent particulars) does not
suffice to ground knowledge. I divided this debate into two parts, one concerning meanings and
the other concerning evidence. With respect to both classical and contemporary debates, I showed
that motivation provides a way of thinking about the relation between experience and knowledge
that avoids both rationalism and empiricism. Once we introduce motivation as a form of
grounding, we can see how experience can ground knowledge without containing it, a position
which accommodates both rationalist and empiricist insights.
In chapter 4, I confronted what I consider to be the best alternative to my resolution of the
debate between rationalism and empiricism: Kant's transcendental philosophy. Kant develops a
method of a priori justification which avoids both empiricism and rationalism, by grounding
synthetic a priori knowledge on experience with respect not to its actuality but its possibility: any
knowledge which is a condition for the possibility of experience is justified a priori. I argued that,
contrary to appearances, the projects of Merleau-Ponty and Kant are not so much opposed as
compatible. This is because, while the two both describe experience, they consider experience in
different ways. Kant thinks of experience in terms of empirical judgment and so approaches
experience with the standard of justification. In contrast, Merleau-Ponty thinks of experience as
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perception and so approaches experience with the standard of motivation. Nevertheless, it seems
to me that Kant's method of transcendental justification relies on motivation. Transcendental
method justifies a piece of knowledge on the grounds that that knowledge is a condition for the
possibility of a determinate feature of experience. It thereby presupposes that we have knowledge
of the determinate features of experience. This type of knowledge, as the ground for
transcendental justification, cannot itself be justified transcendentally. Instead, I argue, our
knowledge of the structures of experience amounts to a type of a priori knowledge that must be
motivated in the course of experience.
Finally, in chapter 5, I consider where this conclusion leaves us with respect to
metaphysics. I argue that motivation opens the door to metaphysical thinking, but does not meet
the standard of justification. It seems to me that Kant's critique of metaphysics is correct, if we
take justification as our standard. I take self-identity, the question Kant addresses in the Third
Paralogism, as an example, and argue that experience motivates judgments of self-identity
without justifying these judgments. Kant's treatment of self-identity seems plausible to me, but
here too I argue that it depends on the type of perceptual experience described by Merleau-Ponty.
In these final pages, I would like to consider where these conclusions leave us. The
central thesis I have drawn from introducing motivation as an epistemic ground is that all our
knowledge is founded on experience, i.e., the thesis that Merleau-Ponty called the primacy of
perception. Perhaps it is obvious by now that, in a certain sense, this way of stating the conclusion
is incomplete and an oversimplification: it treats what is a name for a problem as a solution to a
problem. Describing the relation between experience and knowledge in terms of motivation does
allow us to see how knowledge is grounded in experience, and yet it does not dispel the problem
at the heart of this relation. It is, finally, not much more than a willingness to acknowledge this
problem as a problem. Whereas empiricism explains knowledge in terms of experience and
rationalism divorces knowledge from experience, thinking in terms of motivation leaves us with
the puzzling conclusion that the contingent is capable of normatively grounding the necessary,
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i.e., that experience is capable of calling for knowledge. Motivation, as I claimed at the end of
chapter 3, is a structure of transcendence, which means that it is “a movement by which existence
takes up for itself and transforms a de facto situation” into the rational and the necessary
(Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 174). As participating in transcendence, motivation is ambiguous, or in
other words it requires us to acknowledge a problem: that on the one hand, the necessary is right
against the contingent, for it alone is properly true, and on the other the contingent is right against
the necessary, for it alone sustains the necessary in its being for us, in short, that the contingent
grounds the necessary.
If, as I have argued, our epistemological situation is ambiguous, then it might be best to
conclude this study with a consideration of how one ought to conduct oneself with respect to
ambiguity. For, according to Merleau-Ponty, there is a certain authenticity or virtue proper to
authenticity (and it may, after all, be true that every virtue is proper to authenticity, i.e., is a way
of taking up the discrete domains of our ambiguity authentically, as courage for example is a way
of taking up our mortality, the ambiguous situation of being a finite reason). Just as Simone de
Beauvoir distinguished between a natural and an ethical freedom (de Beauvoir, 1948, p. 24), so
we might distinguish between a natural ambiguity – the ambiguity that is our element, i.e., the
medium of our existence, or is the condition into which we arise – and a moral ambiguity –
ambiguity that is taken up and lived as ambiguous as opposed to ambiguity that is refused and
lived in ambivalence.
A. Love
According to Merleau-Ponty, the same structure that we have located in epistemology
pertains to intersubjectivity: the contingent founds the necessary, or in this case, the child's
apprehension of the other founds the adult's apprehension of the other. The child's apprehension
of the other is essentially confused. The child does not, according to Merleau-Ponty, distinguish
itself from the other as two "psyches," conceived as two only internally accessible successions of
states of consciousness. Instead, the child is oriented toward the other as a mode of conduct, a
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"postural schema," or a relation to the world (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 117). Such a postural
schema is relatively transferable between oneself and the other, and so what the child is
fundamentally aware of is not herself and the other as two distinct beings, but only that there is
behavior, conduct toward the world. The child's relations with others are defined by an
"indistinction" between self and other (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 120). Of course, such an
apprehension of subjectivity is confused, and the adult relation, which does distinguish between
self and other must, after all, be regarded as correct against the childhood relation. The whole
process of maturation with regard to the other is a process of gradually distinguishing between
oneself and the other, between oneself and one's mirror image, between one's own location and
behaviors and the other's locations and behaviors. The childhood relation with the other must be
regarded as a contingent starting point from which the necessary (the objective and correct)
relation with the other is gradually developed. And yet, Merleau-Ponty argues, there are a number
of ways in which adult intersubjectivity depends on childhood intersubjectivity.
First, adult intersubjectivity is unable to account for itself. Merleau-Ponty argues that if
we accept the adult's understanding of the self as private subjectivity, then we will be forced into
an irresolvable antinomy between the for-itself and the in-itself (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 365). If
I must constitute the other on the basis of my private sensations, then the other is for me not
properly speaking a subject, but an object. But if I am to perceive the other as a genuine other – as
my peer – I must perceive her as another constituting subject. Even if I do succeed in thinking the
other as constituting (as constituting me on the basis of her private sensations), I am still
constituting her as constituting, in which case I am the ultimate constituting consciousness.
Conversely, if I conceive the other as ultimate subject, then I become an object for her. But I am
forbidden from so doing by my awareness of myself as more than object (Merleau-Ponty, 2012,
p. 368). The adult intersubjectivity is thus forced into an antinomy – or an ambivalent situation in
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which self and other trade positions – which ultimately makes the experience of the other as an
other impossible. 135
Adult intersubjectivity is thus unable to account for itself, for when it attempts to do so, it
reaches an antinomy. We cannot understand how there is an other for me if we begin from the
distinction of self and other. But if instead we understand the adult’s perception of the other as the
result of a process of clarification or differentiation of an originally indifferent self-other
situation, then it makes sense that the other is an equal for me, i.e., that we are both selves. If I
and the other are pieces of a common situation, then I cannot constitute without the other also
constituting and the other cannot be constituted without myself being constituted. The antinomy
of adult intersubjectivity can only be resolved by being placed back within the ambiguity of the
child’s intersubjectivity.
Second, Merleau-Ponty argues that the child's intersubjectivity is never suspended. Adult
intersubjectivity is fragile; the adult can always regress to the child's mode of intersubjecitivity.
Of course, what counts as normal sociability for a child is pathological in the case of the adult.
The child's confusion of self and other reemerges when hallucinating patients identify their own
speech as someone else's (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 134). Further, according to Merleau-Ponty,
jealousy implies a certain confusion of self and other, and so amounts to a regression to the
child's state of indistinction (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 143). The fact that Alzheimers patients
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Merleau-Ponty develops another line of argumentation for this principle. Because adult intersubjectivity
thinks of the other as a private subjectivity, it faces a problem about how the other is identified as other.
The best means of explaining how one private subjectivity can perceive another, i.e., that one pairs one’s
introceptive image with the extroceptive image of the other, contradicts facts we know about the perception
of others. For example, we know that an adult’s smile brings about a smile in even very young infants
(Meltzoff & Moore (1994) & (1999)). If child and adult were each private subjectivities, the child would
have to pair the self-awareness of her psyche with her introceptive self-image, and then pair this
introceptive self-image with her extroceptive image of the other, and on this basis infer conclusions about
the other's psyche. But the young child seems to respond to others before she can even pair her introceptive
self-image with her extroceptive image in a mirror, and so this hypothesis is implausible. Instead, the very
young child exists in a state of "indistinction" between herself and the other. She perceives the other as a
mode of conduct or a relation toward the world, such that in the other's gesture, the other's smile, she
perceives not that "He is happy," but that "There is happiness." This happiness is like a cloud that rolls
through the child, and when she perceives it, it animates her face with a smile
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regress to pre-scientific beliefs about the world is generally taken as evidence that such beliefs are
continuous throughout our lifespans, but are suppressed by capacities damaged by Alzheimers
(Shtulman & Lombrozo, 2016, pp. 59-60). Similarly, for the regressions we have been
considering to be possible, the child's intersubjectivity must never have been eliminated, but only
masked by adult intersubjectivity.
Third, the child's intersubjectivity reemerges in ways that are not only pathological, but
also normal and important to adult life. For example, Merleau-Ponty claims that love requires a
reappropriation of the child's intersubjectivity. This is because love depends on a degree of
indistinction between oneself and the beloved. First of all, in love there is a mutual encroachment
upon the freedom of the other, in the sense that if the love is real one cannot help but exert an
influence on the other, to impose certain responsibilities on the other, and to some degree to
choose for the other (and conversely, to be chosen for). As Merleau-Ponty puts it, "If one loves,
one finds one's freedom precisely in the act of loving, and not in a vain autonomy" (MerleauPonty, 1964, p. 154). Further, love, according to Merleau-Ponty, is alienating: one becomes
through love other that what one was. One's own situation overlaps with the other's, both in
sympathy and in taking up the milieu of the other; a person in love enters into a shared situation, a
mixed life. It is for this reason that love is also painful; having become more than one was, one is
now vulnerable to the other. Consequently, love is always menaced by insecurity, that is, by the
possibility of doubting the other. To the extent that in love one becomes confused with the other,
one finds oneself dependent upon the other. At the same time, one cannot stand guarantee for the
other's action. Thus, in love one entrusts oneself to the other and so finds oneself "dispossessed"
and incapable of removing doubt about the other's fidelity. Love, so important to adult existence,
is a reemergence of the child's relation to others. Yet the "normal," adult reaction to this
dispossession is different from the child's. The child's love, writes Merleau-Ponty, is "ensnaring":
the child can never have enough proofs of love, because these of course are always finite in
number. In contrast, the non-pathological adult reaction is to have "confidence above and beyond
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what can be proved" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 155). 136 The adult’s love is a transformation of the
child’s, and consists in allowing the other a degree of independence. It is because the adult's love
is a transformation of the child's that it is always menaced by the possibility of regression into
jealousy and yet is not defined by jealousy. 137
Merleau-Ponty’s defense of childhood intersubjectivity as an integral feature of adult
intersubjectivity is no nostalgia for childhood. The child’s relations with others are unstable or
ambiguous, and this is why they give way to adult intersubjectivity. Further, the child’s love does
not amount to a recognition of the other as other: it is jealous or ensnaring. The development into
adult intersubjectivity must be regarded as a progression. Yet if the independence which the adult
attains were taken rigorously, if the individsion of the child’s relations with other did not
reemerge, we could not understand how there is an other, and we could not account for genuine
love. The point I wish to make is that there is an authenticity that can only be understood as a reappropriation – and not a rejection – of genesis, namely, genuine love. If one refused to admit any
confusion of self and other, love would wither; if one refused to admit any difference between
self and other, one would return to the ensnaring love of the child. In love, we negotiate the limits
of self and other, and in love we negotiate the paradox of genesis: that we transcend precisely
what we do not leave behind. Love is, then, an authenticity proper to ambiguity.
B. Heroism
We can, second, consider the figure of the hero, with which Merleau-Ponty concludes the
Phenomenology of Perception, writing that only the hero "fully lives his relation with men and

136

The difference between child and adult love is much like the distinction between passion and love that
DeBeauvoir draws in Ethics of Ambiguity, when she writes that the passionate person is tormented by her
distance from the desired and seeks to eliminate it, while to love the other genuinely is “to love him in his
otherness and in that freedom by which he escapes. Love is then the renunciation of all possession, of all
confusion. One renounces being in order that there may be that being which one is not” (de Beauvoir, 1948,
p. 72). What is not made clear here, however, is that love depends on and would wither without the element
of confusion that it must tame if it is not to devolve into passion.
137
In this vein, the narrator of Swann’s Way likens his anguish for his absent mother to Swann’s anguish in
the absence of his beloved (Proust, 2002, pp. 30-31).
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with the world.” Merleau-Ponty borrows an example from Antoine Saint-Exupery’s Night Flight,
of a parent saving a child trapped in a fire, quoted somewhat liberally as follows:
You would trade your shoulder, if there were an obstacle, to knock it down. You
reside in your very act. You are your very act … You give yourself in exchange
… Your signification shines forth, dazzlingly. It is your duty, your hatred, your
love, your loyalty, your creativity … Man is a knot of relations, and relations
alone count for man (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 483).
On Merleau-Ponty’s definition, heroism comprises an authentic appropriation of the ambiguity of
our relation with the world. This relation is ambiguous because it requires us to negotiate between
a) our personal existence, which is deliberate and free, and b) our pre-personal existence, which is
characterized by a received general style of existence and a set of relations with particular
individuals and a particular time into which we are thrown. 138 As we saw in chapter 5, MerleauPonty thinks there are situations in which personal and pre-personal merge:
It can even happen that, when I am in danger, my human situation erases my
biological one and that my body merges with action. But these moments can be
no more than moments, and most of the time personal existence represses the
organism without being able to transcend it or to renounce it, and without being
able to reduce the organism to itself or itself to the organism (Merleau-Ponty,
2012, p. 86).
Personal and pre-personal therefore stand in a relation of ambiguity, which can be taken up
authentically or inauthentically. We must understand this authenticity properly. One might be
tempted, given that Merleau-Ponty describes the hero as one willing to sacrifice their body ("you
would trade your shoulder") for their intention, to think that this authenticity consists in the
subsumption of the body to the spirit. But this would overlook the fact that in heroism the body is
not taken as a disposable, intrinsically inert, tool. Such a conclusion would contradict the core of
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Ta-Nehisi Coates illuminates this sort of authenticity in his Between the World and Me. Coates describes
growing up black in Baltimore as an experience of alienation from one’s body (in terms of the constant
vulnerability of one’s body and in terms of the white public’s apprehension of this body) and from the
world (in terms of the gulf between Coates’ lived experience and the white world he knew of through the
“dispatches” of television). I point towards this articulation of authenticity because it puts the body front
and center. Perhaps the centerpiece of this work is a description of Coates own attempt to reclaim his body
from these various kinds of alienation. For example, he writes that he has been directed toward “the total
possession of [his] body” (Coates, 2015, p. 48). The kind of authenticity described by Coates, then, consists
in a proper relation between personal existence and the body and its relations to the world.
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Merleau-Ponty's thinking, which understands the body not as a collection of parts at the disposal
of the mind’s intention, but as an organism or a synergy of parts which itself "sketches out the
movement of existence." In other words, the body is understood as the pre-personal cohesion
which anchors us in a set of relations. This is why even an insect, which is not governed in its
comportment to its milieu by a mind, can treat its limbs as replaceable: it is not a mere collection
of parts, but a synergy geared toward a milieu. 139 In a certain sense, the hero does no more than
renew this animal orientiation toward a milieu, except that an animal milieu is not yet a world
(see chapter 4), and so the hero renews this orientation on an entirely new level: whereas the
animal is, in Heidegger’s terms “captivated” with its milieu, the hero fully lives her being-in-theworld. Thus, heroism is not the "erasure" of the pre-personal, but the gearing of the pre-personal
into the personal.
Moreover, without the pre-personal, there would be no heroism but only adventuring. For
heroism requires something like history, i.e., the taking up of a situation in its given-ness and not
an arbitrary determination of that situation. As Merleau-Ponty writes,
[If] nothing ever solicited freedom, then history would have no structure, we
would not see an events take shape there, and anything might results from
anything. … History would never be going anywhere, and, even if a short period
of time were examined, it could never be said that events are conspiring toward a
certain outcome. The Statesman would forever be an adventurer, that is, he
would commandeer events to his own advantage by giving them a sense that they
did not have (2012, pp. 474-5).
In contrast, it is characteristic of the hero to take up the sense offered by the situation – to heed its
solicitation – and transform it in a manner that is original or authentic, just as the good author
takes up the sense of a story and transforms it through a speech that is not merely spoken but is
speaking (chapter 2). As Aristotle said, it is in facing not any kind of death but the right kind of
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Cf. Merleau-Ponty 2012 (p. 80)
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death that courage is found. Heroism is thus a virtue proper to ambiguity, the virtue in which the
personal and pre-personal are negotiated with integrity. 140
C. Conclusion
So, there are virtues – for example, love and heroism – that are proper to ambiguity.
These virtues are achieved when ambiguity is not diffused, but authentically appropriated. In a
certain sense, love (in which the contingent foundation of intersubjectivity is reappropriated) is
the model for handling our epistemic situation, for in love the contingent and the necessary are
successfully negotiated. What is required first is that we not dispel the ambiguity of our epistemic
situation through a dogmatism that lays claim to an absolute evidence or to a skepticism that
denies the legitimacy of all evidence (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 418). There are beliefs which are
both contingent and at the core of normal adult life, for example, what Merleau-Ponty would call
perceptual faith, i.e., the belief that being appears, that there is evidence, if never absolute. Such
faith is contingent because it is not justified and because it is spontaneous – we could never be
dissuaded from it, except in certain pathological cases. But it is also at the core of human life, for
as Fichte showed, there is no such thing as a vocation if there is not a world in which it is
exercised (Fichte, 1987, p. 71), or as Susan Wolf has argued, love binds us to the world, for love
intends not merely a representation of the other, but the other itself (Wolf, 2015). If we
interrogate these fundamental beliefs, which are motivated and not justified, we will not be able
to reject them, for they are the framework within which all acceptance and rejection must be
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This is the sense in which de Beauvoir distinguished the adventurer from the hero, insofar as the
adventurer "finds joy in spreading through the world a freedom which remains indifferent to its content"
(de Beauvoir, 1948, p. 62). Or as Heidegger also puts it, adventuring misunderstands the "uncanny" as that
which is merely "unhomely," whereas the hero from within the unhomely seeks after the homely: "The
adventurer is merely not-homely: the deinotatos [the most terrible one, i.e., humanity, or in this case
Antigone], by contrast, is the most uncanny being in the specific manner of being homely, namely that
which, within its own essence, finds no entry to this essence, remains excluded from it and without any way
out that could allow it to enter the center of its own essence. The one who is properly unhomely relates
back precisely to the homely, and to this alone, yet does so in the manner of not attaining it. The
adventurer, by contrast, finds the homely precisely in what is constantly and merely not-homely, in the
foreign taken in itself. To put it more precisely: For the heart that seeks adventure, this distinction between
the homely and the unhomely is altogether lost. The wilderness becomes the absolute itself …" (Heidegger,
1996, pp. 74-5).
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made. Neither will we, in them, finally reach a ground on which we could rest. But I have argued
that this does not mean that our beliefs trade on nothing, for within the contingent we grasp the
necessary. This insight lies at the bottom of Husserl’s claim that “We have the truth … not as
falsely absolutized, but rather, in each case, as within its horizons” (Husserl, 1969, p. 279). The
thesis of the primacy of perception, in founding knowledge upon experience, does not set us on a
firm ground. It does not deliver an apodictic principle, such as the Cartesian cogito, nor a set of
axioms from which a mathesis universalis would commence. But neither does it leave us
groundless. As Merleau-Ponty wrote,
The progress of the inquiry toward the center is not the movement from the
conditioned to the condition, from the founded unto the Grund: the so-called
Grund is Abgrund. But the abyss one thus discovers is not such by lack of
ground, it is [the] upsurge of a Hoheit which supports from above (MerleauPonty, 1968, p. 250).
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APPENDIX. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: MOTIVATION IN HUSSERL AND STEIN
Despite the important role it plays at crucial junctures of Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty does little to offer a formalized account of motivation or to flesh out what he does
offer. Much of what I have done is to draw out implicit or superficially discussed features of
Merleau-Ponty’s account. Perhaps part of the reason Merleau-Ponty is comfortable using this
concept without developing it is that motivation is a central theme in the phenomenological
tradition prior to Merleau-Ponty. At any rate, this tradition is certainly part of the context in
which Merleau-Ponty thinks about and uses the concept of motivation, and thus a full account of
Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term requires a brief explanation of the role of the term in this
tradition. 141 The purpose of this section is primarily to outline this historical context. But the fact
that Merleau-Ponty draws on phenomenological tradition is here not only of historical interest: it
also allows us to open further avenues for filling out Merleau-Ponty’s account of motivation, both
by articulating types of motivation characteristic of experience and exploring practical
motivation.
In what follows, I will offer a brief account of the role motivation plays in the thinking of
Husserl and Edith Stein, the two phenomenologists who do most to investigate this concept.
1. Husserl
Husserl does little more than Merleau-Ponty to offer a formal definition of motivation,
but does much to flesh out Merleau-Ponty’s account. While I will offer a general presentation of
Husserl’s thought about motivation, I think that what this presentation offers my project is a rich
set of phenomenological data about different kinds of motivation, i.e., it will help to articulate the
concept of motivation into a differentiated set of species of the genus “motivation.” I will begin
by defining what Husserl means by motivation generally, will then move to Husserl’s contrast
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For example, Merleau-Ponty explicitly cites Stein on the concept of motivation (Merleau-Ponty, 2012,
p. 503).
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between motivation and natural causality, and finally will highlight some of the major species of
motivation discussed by Husserl.
A. What Is Motivation?
At no point does Husserl provide a sufficiently broad and descriptive definition of
motivation. Thus, it is necessary to reconstruct one on the basis of what Husserl has said. To my
knowledge, no adequate definition has yet been provided. Many define the term by contrasting it
with natural causality. 142 This is fine as far as it goes, but offers little positive content to our
account of motivation. In my opinion, others are too vague, 143 commit errors, or are too
narrow. 144 The key to Husserl’s concept of motivation, I suggest, is that it describes the kind of
explanatory grounding characteristic of the relation between lived experiences. If one is asked
why one thinks or has done something, one will respond in terms of one’s motives: the motives
are the ground of the thought or action. Some mental occurrence give rise to or motivate others,
and the former give (at least in part) the “because so” of the latter. In other words, motivation is
the relationship of grounding between two mental occurrences, such that if mental occurrence X
motivates mental occurrence Y, one can say “Y because X”. Because motivations operate
according to general regularities that can be explicated, Husserl can write in Ideas II, that
motivation is “the lawfulness of the life of spirit” (Husserl, 1989, p. 231).
For example, if I see smoke, I may be motivated to think that somewhere there is fire.
Here, my belief in the presence of smoke motivates the further belief in the presence of fire, and
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See for example (Moran & Cohen, 2012, pp. 213-4). Barry Smith similarly defines motivation in
parallel with natural causality, but as “mental” rather than “material” (Smith, 1995, p. 412).
143
For example, Ricouer’s “Motivation designates the law according to which consciousness unfolds, is
connected temporally, reacts to the world, and understands the conduct of others in a surrounding world of
persons and things” (2007, pp. 73-4).
144
Yoshimi, for example, has provided a precise definition of motivation, but only with respect to the
motivation of perceptual expectations (Yoshimi, 2016). Or, Walsh has defined motivation for Husserl as
“the experiential character of something feeling plausible, but not ‘evident’” (2013, p. 71), but this does not
describe all cases of motivation that Husserl might consider, e.g., a scene’s motivating a flight of fancy
does not involve “plausibility.”
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if I were asked why I believe there is fire, I would respond in terms of my belief in the smoke. As
Husserl writes in the Logical Investigations,
Certain objects or states of affairs of whose reality someone has actual
knowledge indicate to him the reality of certain other objects or states of affairs,
in the sense that his belief in the reality of the one is experienced (though not at
all evidently) as motivating a belief or surmise in the reality of the other (2001,
p. 184).
Notice that, for Husserl, the motivational relationship is not strictly speaking an evidential
relationship. Strictly speaking, for Husserl, evidence [Evidenz] of an object names the intuitive
givenness of that object, i.e., that an empty meaning-intention is fulfilled. As long as I am merely
seeing smoke, but the fire is obscured from view, I have no evidence (in Husserl’s sense) that
there is fire. Rather, as Walsh points out, for Husserl the smoke “attests to” [Zeugnis ablegt] the
fire, or gives evidence in quite another sense (secondary and indirect evidence, testimony)
(Walsh, 2013, pp. 74-6). Motivation thus carries consciousness beyond what is strictly given
(what is evident), opening intentional horizons of possibility. In this sense, Husserl writes, “Every
motivation is apperception. The emergence of a lived-experience A motivates the livedexperience of a B in the unity of a consciousness; the consciousness of A is equipped with an
intention that points beyond, ‘indicating’ a coexistence” (Husserl, 2001, p. 625).
B. Motives and Causes
When Husserl calls motivation the “lawfulness of the life of spirit,” he means to
distinguish motivation from natural causality – the “lawfulness of nature.” As Husserl puts it, the
“because so” of motivation is different in kind than that of natural causality. When we ask why a
natural event occurred, we would be content with an explanation – a “because so” – in terms of
natural causality. But when we ask why a person acted as they did, a “because so” of natural
causality would be unsatisfying. What this question seeks, what would satisfy it, is an
understanding of a person’s motives. Husserl writes, “No causal research, not matter how farreaching, can improve the understanding which is ours when we have understood the motivation
of a person” (1989, p. 241). The natural-causal order of explanation is insufficient for
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understanding a person, because it is not the sort of grounding or lawfulness proper to the “life of
spirit.”
For Husserl, what differentiates these two realms is intentionality. Whereas the natural
realm is characterized in terms of real relations, including between a real object and a real
subject, the “spiritual” realm is characterized in terms of the intentional relation between the Ego
and noemata, the object as given; whereas a noise on the street outside my window does really
affect me, i.e., it is a natural-causal process which strikes my body and produces a sensation, it
can only serve as a motive (e.g., to close the window) insofar as it enters into intentional life.
Motivation, in short, is a grounding relation not between two real things or events, but between
“lived experiences” or mental occurrences.
While Husserl, like Merleau-Ponty, draws a clear distinction between motivation and
natural causality, he does not draw a distinction between motivation and reason. Instead, he
distinguishes between passive and active motivations. These two kinds of motivation differ in
terms of their content: whereas active motivation is a relation between two “position-takings”
(consciousness involving an explicit intention), passive motivation occurs between non-positional
lived experiences. But Husserl also suggests they differ in terms of the quality of motivation:
whereas passive motivations are not necessarily responsible to reason, active motivations are.
Husserl’s point is not that all active motivations are rational (indeed, they often fail to be), but
rather that they occur within “the sphere that stands under the norms of reason” (Husserl, 1989, p.
232). In contrast, the basic norm of passive motivation is not reason but habit or association.
Further, for Husserl, these two regions are partially, but not totally closed to each other. Some
kinds of passive motivation can be reapprehended at the level of active motivation, e.g., passive
association can be converted into a rational principle (if whenever I see an X it is accompanied by
a Y, when I next see an X I can expect to see a Y), though not all can (Husserl claims that
sensation, which belongs to the passive realm is “a-rational” (Husserl, 1989, p. 234)). Conversely,
habit can be informed by reason: an act of reason can be “sedimented” into a passive tendency.
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Certainly, not all habits are informed by reason, nor necessarily can all habits and associations be.
Unlike Merleau-Ponty, Husserl does not, then, distinguish between motives and reasons. For
Husserl, reasons are a kind of motive. But Husserl does at least share with Merleau-Ponty the
claim that not all motives are reasons. We might say, then, for Husserl the space of reason is part,
but not all, of the space of motivation.
C. Kinds of Motivation
One of the accomplishments of Husserl’s discussion of motivation in Ideas II is to begin
analyzing the genus, motivation, into various species. In so doing, Husserl furnishes us with a
great deal of phenomenological data about motivation, thus providing an important supplement to
Merleau-Ponty’s work on motivation.
In what follows, I will offer a brief account of Husserl’s description of a few major
species of motivation.
1)

Judgments motivated by perception.

According to Husserl, at least some judgments, namely perceptual judgments, are
motivated by perceptions: perception serves as a motive for judging about that
perception. If I see a person in a shop window, I might judge “That is a person.” Here, the
judgment is motivated by the perception, insofar as the judgment is verified or draws its
evidence from perception.
Perception motivates not just straightforward assertoric judgments, but can motivate the
various modalizations and derivatives of judgment (say, as I move closer, I perceive that
what I thought was a person is in fact a mannequin, or I hesitate between these two
options): negation, hesitation, doubt, question, and possibility. 145
2)

145

Judgments motivated by affects and vice versa

See Experience and Judgment, Part II, Chapter 3, “The Origin of the Modalities of Judgment.”
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Husserl does not elaborate on this sort of motivation, but there are several ways in which
this sort of motivation might work. First, judgments about one’s affects (e.g., “I feel
happy”) seem clearly motivated by one’s affects. Second, judgments about objects or
states of affairs could be partially motivated by one’s affects, e.g., “The wine is bad.”
Conversely, if one whose taste I trust judges “The wine is bad,” I may be more inclined
to feel displeased by the wine.
3)

Valuations motivated by valuations

While some things are valued, according to Husserl, as “absolute motivations,” i.e., they
are not motivated by some further things outside themselves (they are “final” goods),
others are valued because of other values (Husserl, 1989, p. 232). I might value wealth,
for example, because of the security and freedom it brings, which I value for their own
sake.
4)

Attention motivated by an obtrusive stimulus

Active attention toward an object can be motivated by the object’s obtruding on
consciousness (i.e., standing out from a perceptual background). An object obtrudes, for
example, when it contrasts with or has a considerable qualitative discontinuity with its
background. This obtrusion motivates one to “turn toward” the object or awakens an
intentional tendency toward it. 146
5)

Expectations motivated by perceptions

Present perceptions often motivate expectations of perceptions to come. This occurs, for
example, by association (when I have perceived A in the past accompanied by B, in now
perceiving A’ I am motivated to expect B’) or similarity (in perceiving the present fact of
the object, I am motivated to expect the rest of it to be similar).
6)

146

Apperception of real unities (apprehension of real objects)

See Experience and Judgment §17, “Affection and the turning-toward of the ego.”
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According to Husserl, the motivation of expectations plays an integral in the constitution
of objects: every real object is apprehended through a “web of motivations” (Husserl,
1989, p. 236). In the perception of a real object, I am only ever given a particular
adumbration, a particular face or side of an object, and yet what I apprehend is not just
this particular face, but a whole object, one containing faces now hidden from me, of
which I yet feel assured. How can I apperceive a whole object through this single face?
Husserl’s answer is motivation. The perception of three sides of a cube motivates an
anticipation of or tendency toward the other three sides. The perception of this side of a
couch as brown motivates an expectation that the other side will also be brown. In
general, the perception of a part of a thing motivates a vague anticipation of the other
parts, it defines for them a particular range of possibilities that would allow a harmonious
whole. If I see three sides of a white die, marked with one, two, and three dots, these
parts suffice to motivate vague anticipations of the other sides: they will be white, will be
sides of a cube, and will correspond to particular numbers. One’s motivations, then,
correspond to the possible harmoniousness of the object: one anticipates the unseen sides
will support and be in harmony with the seen side, and vice versa. There would be
perceptual disharmony if, as I rotated the die before me, it ceased to show itself as a cube
and was revealed instead to be a sphere. The limit case of such disharmony is the
contradictory or the impossible, but within the realm of possibility, we are certainly
familiar with perceptual disharmony: wherever a whole seems to lack sufficient integrity,
where its parts don’t quite cohere and support each other in a unitary whole. 147 The
perception of a particular part thus casts beyond itself a range of harmonious possibilities;
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Say if, instead of discovering the cube as a sphere, the three other sides were revealed as red, orange,
and blue, again with one, two, and three dots, respectively. This possibility is not called for by the three
sides I had previously perceived, at least not so much as is the possibility that the further three sides are
white and marked by four, five, and six dots, respectively. On this possibility, the object is out of harmony,
or has less harmony.
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the part points beyond itself, motivating an interpretation of the whole, and
determinations of the other parts. While these anticipations may certainly be
disappointed, they draw perception beyond any particular adumbration of a thing to the
apprehension of a unitary whole. Thus, Husserl claims that “All thingly apperception and
all apperception of unities of the nexus of several things and thingly processes would
have their source in associative motivations” (Husserl, 1989, p. 237). Such unities are
motivated not just in the perception of outer objects, but also in memory and imagination,
according to Husserl.
7)

Unity of the stream of consciousness

Obviously not every event present to consciousness can be said to occur “in consequence
of” a prior event: when a sudden, loud noise attracts my attention, my consciousness of
the noise is certainly not motivated by my prior consciousness of, say, reading a book.
And yet, according to Husserl, at a deeper level, every conscious event stands in some
motivational relation with every other, insofar as they are all bound by the unity of the
temporality of the stream of consciousness. According to Husserl, the temporal forms,
“past,” “present,” and “future” are ceaselessly motivating each other: that I experience a
present at all motivates a retention of a past and an expectation of a future. Thus, the very
unity of the stream of consciousness is made possible by motivation. As Husserl puts it,
“even the pervasive unity of the stream of consciousness is a unity of motivation”
(Husserl, 1989, p. 239). This idea is central to Merleau-Ponty’s description of the
“cohesion of a life.”
8)

Ideals motivated by consciousness of progress

In Passive and Active Syntheses, Husserl claims that ideals (i.e., limit-ideas) are given
through motivation. Such ideals are motivated when one is conscious of a gradation of
possible givennesses. For example, if as I gradually approach something it is given in
increasing clarity, I am given to anticipate a maximum of clarity, an ideal or pure clarity.
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Or, if I am given a gradation of possible reds, I may be motivated to anticipate a “pure
red.” The ideal here is never something itself given, but only an anticipation motivated by
the experience of progress through gradations. As Husserl says, “the idea in question is
self-given as an evidently motivated anticipation, as a degree that is never self-given, and
yet is self-given in evidence as an anticipatorily motivated limes, self-given precisely as
‘idea’” (2001, p. 254).
2. Edith Stein
Edith Stein’s Beiträge zur philosophischen Begründung der Psychologie under der
Geisteswissenschaften is certainly a locus classicus for phenomenological analysis of motivation.
Like Husserl in Ideas II, Stein is largely concerned in this work to distinguish motivation, as a
“basic lawfulness of mental living,” from the kind of lawfulness of physical causality. But unlike
Husserl, whose analysis is largely concerned with theoretical motivation, and unlike Pfänder,
whose analysis in “Motive and Motivation” focuses on practical motivation, Stein’s analysis
moves fluently between both the theoretical and the practical aspect of motivation, offering a
general analysis of motivation – much like Merleau-Ponty’s.
In what follows, I would like to do three things. First, I will provide a summary of Stein’s
analysis of motivation. Next, I will examine in more depth two interesting claims made by Stein
in the course of her analysis: a) motives do not constrain (i.e., compel or force) [zwingt] one to do
or think a certain way, b) motivation can be mistaken.
Stein defines motivation as an internal connection of grounding between experiences. 148
She writes,
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Commentators have attempted to articulate Stein’s definition of motivation in a variety of ways, often
not greatly satisfying. Bello has articulated motivation as “the type of link that exists between acts,” but not
a connection of “co-penetration” or association, but of “issuing” (Bello, 2010, p. 141). MacIntyre writes
that motivation names “the relationship between earlier and later” (MacIntyre, 2006, p. 113). Sawicki
perhaps puts it best in writing that motivation is “the valence or inclination of the current experience to
flow forward from one active experience into the next” (Sawicki, 1998). While none of these articulations
are incorrect, they seem to me to lack sufficient precision to give a well-defined articulation of Stein’s
thinking about motivation.
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Motivation, in our general sense, is the connection that acts get into with one
another: not a mere blending like that of simultaneously or sequentially ebbing
phases of experiences, or the associative tying together of experiences, but an
emerging of the one out of the other, a self fulfilling or being fulfilled of the one
on the basis of the other for the sake of the other (2000, p. 41).
Whereas some connections between experiences are external (i.e., seeing a person I have not met
before, I associate them with someone I have, on the basis of a certain likeness), according to
Stein, connections of motivation are internal: the motivatum emerges from the motive. For
example, my wanting to purchase a plane ticket emerges from my wanting to visit the northwest.
Here, my wanting the ticket is not “tied together” with my wanting the visit – while there is no
necessary connection between wanting a plane ticket and wanting to visit the northwest (I might
want the plane ticket because I am obligated to visit the northwest for work, not because I want
to), in my case neither is the bond between the two accidental. 149 And whereas some connections
are not connections of grounding (for example, seeing two trees with similarly shaped leaves, I
connect them in my thought – here neither is the ground of the other), connections of motivation
are: if experience X motivates experience Y, one could say that Y occurs because of X. Further,
motivation is not an internal, grounding connection between any kind of two given things, but
only between intentional acts, or experiences.
I’d like briefly to point to a few other minor points of Stein’s analysis before moving on
to her claim that motives do not constrain. First, Stein argues that it is never the act (of hearing,
seeing, thinking, etc.) that motivates, but the sense content [Sinnesgehalt] of the act: “Lightning
turns into my motive for the expectation of thunder, not the perception of lightning” (Stein, 2000,
p. 43). 150 Second, while some motives motivate a particular motivatum (e.g., in relations of
logical entailment), others can motivate a range of possible motivata, this range serving as the

149

As with Merleau-Ponty, it is an open question how exactly one must specify the term “internal relation.”
Stein seems to suggests simply that any relation in which one of the relata is the generative ground of the
other is internal. I think the most tenable specification of the term is the same I offered with reference to
Merleau-Ponty in chapter 1.
150
Of course, it’s only qua correlate of an act that a sense content can serve as a motive (Stein, 2000, p. 43).
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limit of reasonable motivations. For example, if someone greets me on the street, no particular
response is motivated on my part, but rather a range of possible reasonable responses comes into
view. Recall that, in terms of Merleau-Ponty, I described this phenomenon as the indeterminacy
of motivation or solicitation. 151 Third, not all motives require their motivata (as do relations of
logical entailment): some merely permit them. In this case, according to Stein, the connection is
not one of rational grounding, but merely of an understandable connection of meaning. If in
listening to a piece of music another is called to mind, this “calling to mind” is certainly
understandable (I can say why this piece has been called to mind), but is neither reasonable nor
unreasonable (Stein, 2000, p. 44). Fourth, a sense content serves as a motive within a particular
“meaning ensemble,” or context of meaning. Thus, a sense content will function differently as a
motive within different meaning contexts (a piece of music playing in the context of a concert
might motivate my attention, but in the in the context of playing on my radio while I am trying to
make a phone call might motivate me to turn off the radio), and with respect to different
individuals (people with different tastes will be differently motivated by the same item). 152
A. Motives Do Not Constrain
One of the more controversial claims made by Stein is that motives do not constrain us to
think or act in a given way. While Stein thinks that no thought or action is unmotivated, i.e.,
motivation is a necessary condition for thought or action – she writes, e.g., that “free acts
presuppose a motive” (Stein, 2000, p. 55) – she does not think that motives always suffice for
thought or action. Stein argues this position by offering two kinds of counterexample to the claim
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Stein claims that some motives do entail a particular motivatum, because she includes logical reasoning
within the space of motivation (following Husserl, but unlike Merleau-Ponty). The proper disagreement,
then, isn’t about whether some of what Merleau-Ponty terms “motives” are not at all indeterminate, but
what the scope of “motivation” is.
152
While, as a matter of fact, different individuals will be differently motivated by the same sense content,
it does not follow that they are right to be so motivated – sometimes one individual will be motivated in a
manner concordant with reason, while the other is motivated in a manner discordant with reason.
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that motives constrain us: one in terms of thoughts, the other in terms of willing. I will now look
at these two kinds of counterexample more closely.
According to Stein, information (any kind of information – anything from sensory uptake
to a written report) motivates belief [Stellungnahme – position-taking or opinion]. If I see a coat
hanging at the other side of the room, I am motivated to believe that there is a coat there, that it
exists, and exists as I see it. Of my beliefs, Stein thinks, I do not have control: they “befall” or
“seize” me. At no point in the process of my forming a belief in the existence of the coat across
the room am I consulted about this belief – the belief is not presented as a choice. As often
happens in the case of optical illusions, even if I am told that that is no coat, but somehow an
illusion, I may be unable to succeed in shaking my belief, in seeing it as other than a coat really
over there. Thus, at the level of belief, the motivation provided by information does suffice for
belief, and I will succeed in changing my belief only if presented with adequate countermotives.
However, while the motivation provided by information suffices for belief, neither the
motivation of information nor of the belief suffices for adoption (or denial) of this belief. While I
do not decide what I believe, I do decide whether or not to adopt my beliefs as true. Perceptual
illusions are a good example of this principle. In the case of the Müller-Lyre illusion, though I
may be unable to shake my perceptual belief that the lines are unequal, I can refuse to adopt this
belief. Notice that refusing to adopt the belief isn’t the same as removing or changing the belief: I
would need some information to serve as a countermotive, and not just a decision on my part, in
order to do that. Here the motivation which suffices for the belief does not suffice for adoption of
the belief. Thus, we seem to have a counterexample to the claim that motivation suffices for
thought. One could object that from the phenomenal fact that the kind of motivation that suffices
for belief does not suffice for adoption of belief, it does not follow that no motivation has sufficed
for the refusal of adoption: in the example above, perhaps one measured the two lines, and this
information has sufficed to motivate the refusal. In this case, I decide not to adopt the belief
because the motives against it outweigh the motives for it. But Stein disagrees with this model of
225

decision making. She thinks that decisions are not made simply by the weight of motives,
automatically, like the tipping of a scale. The greater weight, by itself, does not suffice for my
adoption: I must actively affirm this weightiness, and decide upon the adoption. For example, in
the case of Cartesian doubt, the motives in favor of trusting one’s senses generally outweigh those
for doubt – and yet belief is not adopted, because the standard for adoption here is logical
necessity.
The point is clearer if we move to the closely parallel case of the motivation of willing.
With regard to willing, the place of belief is taken by inclinations [Strebungen]. Inclinations are a
motive for willing, but are not themselves something that we choose or bring about: much like
beliefs, they happen to us (they are spontaneous, in the language I used in chapters 1 and 2). But,
according to Stein, though inclinations are motives for willing, they do not constrain us to willing.
Stein argues that even if an inclination is uncontested by countermotives, it does not necessarily
lead to willing (Stein, 2000, pp. 70-4). For example, one of us suggests going for a hike, and we
are both inclined to do so. But, despite neither of us being disinclined to hike nor having
compelling reasons not to do so, we never fully will to go on the hike, such that we do not go on
it.
Thus, there seem to be some cases in which, even without countermotives, the motivation
to think or will in a given manner is not sufficient for thinking or willing. According Stein, we are
not determined by motives: the ego has the power to stand back and view motives critically
before affirming or rejecting beliefs and inclinations. This does not mean that the ego is
unmotivated, only that it is not constrained by its motives to think or will in a particular manner.
The ego always has the power to suspend decision, and so motives do not suffice for decision.
B. Motivation Can Be Mistaken
The second claim made by Stein that I wish to consider is that it is possible to make
mistakes with respect to motives. Stein distinguishes between motives and reasons [Grunde].
Whereas whatever actually gives rise to a thought is a motive, only what should give rise to a
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thought counts as a reason. A reason thus holds “objectively”: it should serve for anyone as a
motive (Stein, 2000, p. 51). While one’s motive often coincide with reasons, they can also
diverge from reasons or lack reason, in which case one may be mistaken. If I receive news from
an objectively trustworthy source that someone for whom I cared deeply has died, I may refuse to
believe the report, I may retain hope that they live and search for means of validating my faith.
Here the trustworthiness of the source is a reason for belief in the report, but my attachment to the
dead one is a motive against belief. Here reason and motive diverge, such that my disbelief in the
report is unreasonable and mistaken.
But why, according to Stein, are reasons and motives separable? Stein gives two answers.
First, lack of clarity. Most of the time, if one makes one’s motives explicit and examines them
carefully, they will lose their motive power, or will be reformed in conformity with rational
grounds. Here there is not so much ill intent as ignorance: as soon as the mistake is clarified,
revealed as a mistake, it loses its motive force. Second, humans are not solely rational beings, but
also governed by feelings, which can subvert the rule of reason. Reason is neither a sufficient
motive for action, nor does it necessarily even function as a motive. 153

153

Stein thus seems to be a sort of externalist about motives. She claims, for example, that even if someone
grasps as valuable something that is truly valuable, they will not necessarily feel its value with the force
commensurate to that value, as a matter of “available lifepower,” i.e., the underlying energy or power that
allows motives to have force (Stein, 2000, p. 86). MacIntyre certainly reads Stein as an externalist, writing
of “some motivating factor over and above the ground” (MacIntyre, 2006, p. 114), or that for Stein motives
and grounds do not suffice for action without inclination (MacIntyre, 2006, p. 116), something that itself
depends on lifepower. But there is also an implicit internalism in Stein’s thought that if one acquires clarity
about one’s motive by being explicit about them, these motives will tend to be replaced by objective
grounds, i.e., reasons. This thought implies that properly executed judgments will serve to reform one’s
motives.
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